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SECTION VII,

Of the unequal Degrees of Merit and Demerit in External Actions.

MERIT is the presence of that quality which, whatever it be,

is the object of moral approbation; demerit, on the contrary, is the abfence of fuch quality; or the prefence of any quality which is the object of difapprobation.

From the obfervations, that have occurred under a few of the preceding titles, it fhould appear, that neither mediocrity of effect, fympathy of feelings, nor actual utility, is the specific object of moral approbation; that moral good and evil are peculiar to mind; and that the merit of an action, or the object of moral approbation in any action, is the prefence of qualities which constitute the specific excellence of mind: Such are wisdom, goodness, temperance, and fortitude. That efforts of benevolence, or good will to mankind, properly fupported with intellectual ability, application, and resolution,. constitute actions morally good. That malice,

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PART II.

CHAP. II.

SECT. VII.

PART II. malice, however directed or fupported, conftitutes an action
CHAP. II.
SECT. VII. morally evil.

This diftinction is, to us, not only matter of perception and difcernment, but awakens a fentiment or paffion, by which we are difpofed to accumulate good on the good, and evil on the evil. While we perceive that beneficence is a bleffing, we would willingly confer additional bleffings. Perceiving that malice is a curse, we would willingly inflict additional fuffering. This sentiment is partly implied or expreffed in the terms of merit and demerit.

That the good deferves to be rewarded, and the evil to be punished, is an apprehenfion which we are born to entertain, and is justly confidered as a fymptom or earneft of the moral government of God, under which men being inspired with a disposition to distributive justice, become inftruments of Providence for its actual effect. This difpofition operates moft powerfully, perhaps, in its animofity to what is wrong. The right is firm upon its own foundation, and needs not the prop of extraneous reward; while the wrong feems to call for interpofition, to prevent, repel, or repair its effects.

Hence it is that wrongs are diftinguished under their respective denominations of guilt or demerit, more precisely, perhaps, than the oppofite degrees of merit. The right, however, alfo has its gradations, and the actions of men their unequal meafures of approbation or efteem. Actions, which indicate good will to mankind in the highest degree, are thofe commonly which we conceive to be of the highest merit; as the effects of malice prepenfe are, on the contrary. of the highest demerit; and thus the prefence of good or ill difpofition is not only attended with mo

ral approbation or disapprobation; but the measure of the effect, PART II. in fuch inftances, is alfo ever found in just proportion to that of the cause.

Perfeverance in the exercife of any good difpofition, is admitted as an evidence of its power; or is the indication of a mind exempt from those paffions or views which occafionally mislead the will, or interrupt the tenour of a virtuous conduct.

Hence it is, that a beneficent course of life, uniformly purfued; that duties performed in the midft of difficulty, danger, or unmerited obloquy, in the midst of allurements, that would seduce, in the midst of pain or fuffering, that would depress the mind, or daunt the refolution, as they carry evidence of a difpofition proportionally vigorous and unfhaken, are justly estimated of the highest merit.

Hence it is also, that superstitious Afceticks having a view to the circumstances that would prove the force of a virtuous affection, if any fuch actually existed, while they withdraw from the world, and shun every occafion on which good difpofitions towards mankind are exerted, mistake fasting, abstinence, and corporal penances, for articles of merit towards God. They attach the esteem that is due to merit to the circumstances of difficulty or fuffering, in which merit if real might fhine out with advantage; but which voluntarily incurred, and without any rational object, only give evidence of misapprehenfion and folly.

Besides the immediate effects of wisdom and benevolence, which form the higest order in the scale of merit, there are articles of inferior confideration, fuch as propriety, decency, civility and politeness,

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CHAP. II.
SECT. VII.

PART II.

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politenefs, which may proceed from a difpofition or habit of SECT. VII. doing that which is agreeable, or of avoiding that which is offensive to others; a disposition in its own nature exquifitely amiable, and whose effects are esteemed proportionally to the evidence they bear of its reality; although, from the mere occafions on which it is exerted, the highest measure of virtue could not be inferred.

In comparing fuch examples together, we find. though without any precife distinction of name, a gradation in the fcale of merit, by which men in the course of life are unequally the objects of approbation or esteem.

At the fame time, there is a corresponding gradation in the fcale of demerit, which is not perhaps more obvious; but is thought to require a more pointed discrimination of names, such as those of crimes, offences, and faults.

Crimes, or actions of the highest demerit, are such as proceed from malice, under any of its ordinary forms, whether of envy, emulation, jealousy or revenge; or fuch as proceed from any habit or paffion, as from covetousness, fenfuality, or ambition, in gratifying of which the criminal has occafion deliberately to trespass on the rights, or to disturb the peace of his fellow creatures.

When the crime proceeding from one or other of these motives is committed under circumftances of peculiar truft, or against perfons peculiarly entitled to respect and affection, the atrocity of guilt or degree of demerit is rated accordingly; and pernicious actions, performed deliberately, intentionally or knowingly, though not originally suggested by malice, yet as they imply great

defect

defect of the oppofite good difpofitions of humanity or candour, PART II. and thereby give evidence of great depravity, have a correfponding degree of demerit.

The person who without having entertained any malice, nevertheless deliberately kills that he may rob, is justly reckoned guilty of murder ; and he who knowingly performs an action pernicious to his neighbour, though only from a motive of intereft or conveniency to himself otherwife allowable, is nevertheless in fuch inftances, juftly reckoned guilty of a heinous crime.

As perfons thus deliberately offending are not likely, from mere recollection, to repent of the actions, which, under a recollected perception of their pernicious nature, they already performed; the peace of fociety, and the fafety of innocence,require, that fuch perfons fhould be restrained by the fear of punishment; and, if not reclaimable, that they fhould be removed by exile or death from the fociety they disturb or molest.

What in the scale of reprobation is qualified with the more venial name of offence, may, in respect to the external effect, be equally hurtful with what is denominated a crime.

Under this title of an offence, the peace of fociety may be difturbed, or a citizen may fuffer in his perfon or effects; but when this proceeds not from malice, nor from an ordinary habit of indifference to the rights of others, but from a fudden and occasional emotion or paffion, which may hurry a mind, otherwife difpofed to innocence and good will, into an action pernicious or hurtful to those whom it may concern, the demerit is proportionally alleviated.

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CHAP. II.
SECT. VII.

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