[PRICE 10D

SIR,

Upon reverting to the subject of the Negociation of 1805, I cannot, upon reading your remarks a second time, forbear taking some notice of the curious" incident," which appears to have led to the opening of that negociation, namely, the tender of his services made by an assassin to Mr. Fox. This was, indeed, a curious "incident;" and yet, somehow or other, it has happened, that there never was an incident that gave rise to less conversation, in public, or in private, It was a thing, which, as it were by compact, all men were in the mind to pass over in silence. As to myself, I will tell you flatly and plainly, that I looked upon the whole as being a matter of mere contrivance, as completely as any "incident" of a play-house piece; and, the reason why I never said this before, was, that Mr. Fox being dead, I felt a repugnance at commenting upon the part, which he had had the weakness to act; which repugnance is now outweighed by the considerations arising from the evident motives, whence you have set forward this almost forgotten incident. The story of the incident is this: a person makes shift to get from France to England

without a passport," a very extraordinary thing in itself; but hither he comes, and, going to Mr. Fox, tells him, that a scheme had been formed for killing Napoleon, at Passy, attended with neither risk nor uncertainty. Mr. Fox drives him from his presence; but orders him to be kept in custody of the police, until the French government be informed of the matter, which information is given by Mr. Fox to Mr. Talleyrand, in a letter dated on the 20th of February, 1806; and, when it becomes pretty certain, that the information is received in France, and, of course, that measures are taken to defeat the intention of the assassin and his colleagues of Passy, the assassin is sent off

[258 out of the kingdom. This letter of Mr. Fox brings him one from Mr. Talleyrand Perigord, formerly Bishop of Autun, and one of the guardians of the holy oil, which had been kept in a bottle at Rheims, ever since the coronation of Charlemagne. The Bishop conveys to Mr. Fox the thanks of his imperial and royal majesty, Napoleon, and, at the same time, gives him, in the way of "news," an extract from the Emperor's speech to his legislators, about peace; this, accompanied with a hint from Mr. Talleyrand, upon the same topic, leads to a negociation in form. But, first let us, since you will have it só, inquire a little into the prebabilities of the plot at Passy. First, it is, as was before remarked, not a little extraordinary, that any one should, without the cousent, or connivance, of the French government, get from France to Gravesend.. Where was he to embark? On board of what? How was he to pass unmolested? Secondly, upon the supposition, that the plot was really formed, the house taken at Passy, and the preparations for the murder all duly made, how came Mr. Talleyrand not to let Mr. Fox know whether the thing had been discovered, or what had been the result of that inquiry, to which Mr. Fox's letter would naturally have, led? Thirdly, how comes it that we have never heard the Moniteur say any thing upon the subject, which was one of great public interest; and how comes it, too, that neither the envoy of the assassins, nor any one of the band, has ever been brought to justice? Mr. Fox certainly did not act as I should have done. I should have looked upon the man as sent from France, in the same manner that Méhée de la Touche was; I should have had him confined, and strictly examined; and, should, in the meanwhile, have informed the French government, that, unless it could be clearly proved, that preparations for assassination had actually been made at Passy, the envoy would be considered as a spy, and very soon hanged in that capacity. This is what I

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should have done in a like case, and should never have thought of availing myself of such an opportunity to give a mark of my "attachment" to Mr. Talleyrand. 1 see much of a want of presence of mind; much of weakness, in this proceeding, on the part of Mr. Fox; but, it will, I believe, require a pair of those party spectacles, that you seem to have on your nose, to see any thing of "noble-mindedness" in it. Mr. Fox, disguise the fact how you will, must have seen through the trick that was attempted to be played him; or, at any rate, the best that can be said of him, in this case is, that he was the dupe of Mr. Talleyrand. And, Sir, you gravely retail to us the recognition, on the part of Talleyrand, of "those principles "of honour and virtue, by which Mr. Fox "had always been actuated, and which," as Talleyrand said, "had already given a new

character to the war," thereby intimating, that theretofore, our government had carried on the war like 'assassins, though it should have been remembered by Mr. Fox (if for gotten by Mr. Talleyrand), that the war had theretofore been carried on by persons, then composing two-thirds of the cabinet, of which Mr. Fox was a member. But, at the close of this your eulogium on Mr. Fox, you have a most unworthy insinuation. You say: "Even the political opponents of Mr. "Fox ought to have felt rightly upon such a "subject. They ought to have known,

that it was no effort to his great and gene"rous mind to reject the proposals of an avowed assassin." And, how do you know, Sir, that they did not feel rightly upon this subject? What warrants you in supposing, that they would have employed the assassin? And, if this be not what you mean to insinuate, to what rational purpose does your observation, with respect to them, tend? For my part, when I came to see the papers (Parl. Debates, Vol. VIII. p. 91, and the following pages) I thought the conduct of the then opposition remarkable for forbearance; and, if Mr. Fox had been alive at the time when the discussion upon those papers took place, I am inclined to think, that the assassination plot at Passy, which certainly equals the "Meal-Tub Plot," or any of the other plots of the reign of Charles I would have been made to afford, at St. Stephen's, where you then were, a good deal of merriment; especially if you had taken it into your head to describe the conduct of Mr. Fox, upon that occasion, as "exemplifying, in the most striking manner, one of the most important maxims of morality, and exhibiting to the world a noble proof, that, amidst the rage of national and in

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"dividual animosity, the eternal laws of "justice and of virtue were neither over"thrown nor shaken." The horse laugh, which would have drowned your voice long before you had arrived at this period, would have convinced you, that if you chose to be the dupe of the Bishop of Autun, there were not many others disposed to follow your example.

Mr. Talleyrand, as if he had been a little ashamed of the miserable trick he had resorted to, got rid of the subject in great haste, and proceeded to that of peace. The negociation was opened, and that, too, at the very place which the French must have wished. In speaking of this negociation, you appear to be sadly divided between your auxiety to vindicate the conduct and the motives of France and your fear of throwing blame upon your own party; but, after long apparent struggles in your bosom, the for mer gains the preponderance, and you make a very decent sacrifice of your friends upon the altar of your country's enemy. You tell us, that, in the first place, England insisted that Russia should, as an ally of hers, be a party to the treaty; that, while a debate was going on about this, Russia, though in spite of our remonstrances, entered upon a separate negociation; that, being now at liberty to treat for ourselves, a dispute arose about the basis of the treaty, and that, "unfortu nately," we insisted upon the state of actual possession, as a basis, though neither the language of Mr. Talleyrand nor the circumstances of the case could warrant us in sodoing; that, while this dispute was going on, the treaty between Russia and France arrived at St. Petersburgh, where it was refused to be ratified, which induced us to re turn to our first resolution of not negociatin.. but in conjunction with Russia, though the "terms were such as might have satisfied "both the honour of the sovereign, and the "expectations of the British ministers; "that, "unhappily" the negociation was "thus broken off, and the contest continued "for interests not our own." We will speak of these "satisfactory terms" by-andby; but, here we must stop to ask you, who it was that conducted this negociation on the part of England? Why, those very men, whose departure from office you have, in another place, told us, deprived the nation of all hopes of peace. But, there is a question, in which you, Sir, are more nearly concerned. There were, in parliament, two discussions, relative to the negociation of 1806, the principal one on the 5th of January 1807 (See Parl. Deb. Vol. VIII. p. 505), when Mr. Whitbread moved an amendment to the

address proposed by Lord Howick. After an eulogium on Mr. Whitbread's speech, upon that occasion, you say, in a tone of lamentation mixed with anger, "yet, the motion of Mr. Whitbread" (which softened the asperity of that of Lord Howick) was negatived without a division."And, whose fault was that? Why, it was the fault of your pacific ministry. It was the fault of those very then, whose elevation to power, you tell us gave the people a confident expectation of peace, and whose fall you tell us, deprived the people of all hope of peace. Not altogether, indeed, was it their fault; for, though they had a decided majority in St. Stephen's, yet, the "negative without a division" was not their fault, but your fault, and every man's fault, who disapproved of breaking off the negociation. It was in your power to divide the House. It required no knack at speaking for an hour at a time. A single syllable, distinctly pronounced, would have been sufficient; and, if you refrained from making so slight an effort to serve the cause of peace then, when your party was in power, what credit is due to your professions now? A negociation is broken off upon grounds, which you represent as feigned; the enemy, you say, offers satisfactory terms of peace; our ministers come to parliament with an assertion that a continuation of the war is rendered unavoidable by the injustice and ambition of the enemy; you now say that this assertion was false; and yet, oh, patriotic gentleman; "real friend of mankind" and great enemy to the tra"gedy of war!" What do you do? Sit, at the back of the minister, like a mouse in a cheese; say not a word; give your silent assent to what you now say was a false assertion; but, the ministry being changed, and the new ministry having ousted you from your seat in parliament, you come forth in a pamphlet and say that, which you ought to have said in your place in parliament; you now address to faction and distress, that which you ought to have addressé to the public spirit and reason of the nation. Upon the supposition that you were incapable of speaking (which is not, however, the fact, you having spoken, in all, six times); upon this supposition, or upon the supposition that your talents and faculties are of that peculiar sort which are not to be brought to bear against a minister, to whom you are looking up for emoluments or honours; upon this supposition, which is the most favourable to you that I can conceive, why did you not bring out your

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pamphlet at an earlier period? The time for it to have been useful was immediately after the parliamentary discussion, above referred to; and, if that had been, from your great duties as a law-giver, let slip, you surely might have published it after you were happily disburthened of that charge. But, no; you stop till the rupture of the negociation has produced all its mischiefs; you stop, in short, until the very hour, when you think that your pamphlet, joined to the distresses in the manufactoring districts, will have a chance of producing an effect hostile to the party, to whose superior cunning you owe your fall as a public man. You now affect to lament the consequences of the rupture of the negociation you now display before the public its terrible effects upon the North of Eu rope, seeming to suppose, that we should forget, that no small part of those effects had been already produced, when the discussion in parliament took place. In short, it is as clear as poon day, that of what you have now said, against the breaking off of the negociation, not one word would, in any way, have been said by you, if the late ministry had remained in power, and if. you had remained in parliament. Such a person it becomes to be cautious how he accuses others of a want of principle.

It is true, however, that what has here been said has little to do with the question itself, though it may, by exposing your conduct and motives, be useful in counteracting. your designs. The ministers might be much to blame for breaking off the negociation, though you could not discover it, until they were out of place, and though, so far from appearing to discover it in due time, you, with all the information before you, gave your silent assent to a solemn proceeding, the purpose of which was to give to their conduct the stamp of public approbation. To come to a decision upon the merits of the case itself, we must now take a view of those " satisfactory terms," which were offered by France, during the negociation of 1806. These terms were; that Hanover was to be restored to the king, Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, the French possessions in the East Indies, and Tobago, in the West Indies, were to be left in our hands; while the only condition which France asked in return was, that we should leave her the absolute mistress of every port. upon the continent of Europe, those of Russia, Sweden, and Denmark excepted, the island of Sicily being to be surrendered to her, and the king of that country being to be made a pensioner of

Spain.

"Hanover for the honour of the crown, Malta for the honour of the navy, "and the Cape of Good Hope for the "honour of commerce." This was the ingenious arrangement of Mr. Talleyrand, of whom you seem to be an humble pupil; for you, too, tell us, that the terms offered by France were" such as might have satis

fied both the honour of the sovereign and "the expectations of the British ministry," had not their "determination not to desert "our Russian ally prevented such terms from being accepted." As a proof of the truth of this assertion of yours, you refer to the declaration of Lord Lauderdale, that the arrangement contended for, by us, in favour of Russia, "was considered as "an object, more interesting, if possible,

to England, than those points which "might be considered as peculiarly con"nected with her own interests ;" and, in confirmation, you quote the King's Decla ration, recently made with regard to Russia, in which the Czar is reminded, that "the negociation of 1806 was broken off upon points, immediately affecting, not his majesty's own interests, but those of his imperial ally." Upon the strength of these declarations you assert that the war, after the negociation of.1806, was "continued for "interests not our own," leaving out, with your usual fairness, all the qualifications accompanying the expression, in both declarations. Lord Lauderdale only says, that the arrangement desired for Russia was an object "more interesting," than those points peculiarly connected with our own interests; and he adds, "if possible;" clearly implying that those points were of themselves of very great interest. And, in the king's recent declaration, the word "immediately" so qualifies what follows, as to give to the declaration a meaning not at all different from that of Lord Lauderdale, which meaning plainly is, that, though, as to the interests of England, there were great differences, yet, it happened, that it was upon points more immediately connected with the interests of Russia, that the regociation was broken off. But, to bave adhered to the fair construction of these declarations would not have suited your purpose, which was to bring your readers gradually to the following clenching argument: that, as the non-compliance

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by France with our demands, on the part "of Russia, was the only reason for continuing the war, there exists not now, "when that reason is effectually removed by the avowed hostility against us, either any just ground of offence against France

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"for her conduct in this transaction, er

any difference of interest between the "two countries, which can now be alledged, as a motive for continuing the war;" an argument, which might have done honour, to counsellor Bramble or counsellor Botherem, but which one would have expected to be scorned by a man putting forward such high pretensions to fairness and integrity; for, to say nothing more of the false premises upon which you proceed, who, above the level of a journeyman callico-weaver, does not perceive, that, though the reason for beginning a war, or continuing a war, may be removed, in the course of the war, there may be other reasons arise, in the course of the war for its continuance, or prolongation; and that the same set of terms, which would have been desirable at the former stage of the war, would be totally inadmissible at the latter? Your enemy scizes your county of Lancaster; you go to war in order to recover it; you succeed, but he gets possession of Somersetshire; and, are you to cease the war, be cause the original reason of it is removed? This part of your argument, is, therefore, worth nothing; and, as to the proposition that " we have no just ground of offence

against France for her conduct in the "negociation of 1806, because Russia has "now openly avowed her hostility against "us," it is too miserable a mockery of rea soning to merit serious remark. Not only may it happen, that a new reason for continuing a war may arise, during a war; but it may happen, that the new reason may arise out of the removal of the original reason; and this has been the case in the present instance; for, if we were now to negociate, the basis and the terms ought to be very different indeed from what they might have been at the period of the nego ciation of 1806. And, yet you tell us, that the war is now continued "without

an object and without a cause," merely because we have lost the ally, for whose sake we, more immediately, broke off the negociation conducted by Mr. Fox.

The terms, as above stated, would, in my opinion, have given to this country, in the state in which it was in 1806, not a moment of real repose. Hanover is set in the foreground, though it would be very difficult to shew how the restoration of that electorate could have been an honour to the "crown" of England. That France would offer to restore it was foreseen and foretold, long ago; and, the mighty sacrifice she therein would have made must be evident, when we recollect, first, that she has strip