passions, and those fictitious ones which are created by a disordered imagination, we may swell the catalogue of human miseries to an enormous size. But, what reason have we to complain of providence, when we ourselves, alone, are to blame? What our bountiful Creator hath done for us, we have already observed: and what are we that we should be visited with so much loving kindness? When we contemplate this scene, wherein we are placed, which is so grand, when we survey this earth, which is so beautiful, how vile a thing is man on this magnificent work of heaven? When we compare the grandeur of the structure with the meanness of the inhabitant, we cannot help exclaiming with the psalmist, "What is man that thou art mindful of him, 66 or the son of man that thou dost visit him."

Besides this, we have good reason to infer, both from observation and from presumptive reasoning, that, infinite goodness requires that there be a gradual progression and ascent from the lowest to the most exalted being, that no part be wanting, no station be unoccupied from the millions in the peopled grass to the most perfect angels which surround the throne of God. For one of two things must be be

lieved, either that the goodness of God made it necessary for him to create all beings the most perfect and the most happy possible; which is contrary to fact, and which could be shown to be inconsistent with the wisdom and perfection of God's works; or else, that, this progressive scale of being is not inconsistent with his goodness. Now it is plain, that, in this chain of existence, there must be somewhere or other such a state as that of man, a state which is imperfect, liable to change, and exposed to suffering and pain. The question, then, is whether man is placed in the state proper for him. This brings us, at once, to see, that our reasoning and complaint on this head arise from pride. We think that we are entitled to destroy every beast of the field, and every bird of the air for our pleasure and amusement; but, if we feel the least pain and unhappiness ourselves, we immediately exclaim that God is cruel and unjust. We seem, indeed, to be the chief of God's works on this earth, but perhaps we only act a secondary part to some other system. We are the first of that order of beings with which we are acquainted; but perhaps we are lower than the lowest of another order. We foolishly ima

gine, that, this spot of earth is sufficient to engross the care and attention of the Almighty. But what is this globe and all its appendages to him by whom worlds are continually created and dissolved. The keen eye of philosophy hath often discovered, in the wide regions of space, stars of which before we had no knowledge; and it hath also sought for others, with which it was formerly familiar, but whose place could no more be found. And when this globe itself shall be dissolved, it will be nothing but as the extinction of one luminous point amid the immensity of the Creator's works.

Farther, we may observe, that, much false reasoning on this subject arises from forming unjust ideas of the divine love or goodness; an attribute which we abuse and trifle with, both in our conduct and speculations. Our conduct makes mercy highly necessary, and we trust much to it. Our speculations do not correct the mistake, but lead us to form the most vague and absurd notions concerning this attribute. It is not a blind and undistinguishing propensity; it is not a mere tendency to produce happiness, as is too often supposed, but a tendency to make the wise, the virtuous,

and the honest man happy. We, very improperly, divide the attributes of God, and, as it were, set them at variance. God is one : and, though, from the imperfection of human conception, we frequently speak of his perfections as separate and distinct, yet they are all the same in the divine essence. We do not consider that a God all mercy is a God unjust; and we bid goodness triumph over God himself, as if this attribute of his nature would lead him to do any thing repugnant to his holiness and justice. Much of the natural evil which is in the world, at least all that which is the consequence of moral guilt, is thus accounted for, in consistency with the most perfect love. The only difficulty, in this case, is whether, when God foresaw the calamities and distresses which moral evil would bring upon his creatures, it was consistent with his goodness to permit its introduction? But, upon supposition, that, we are free agents, (and, that we are, the voice of nature, speaking within us, declares in the most unequivocal manner) this question is very absurd. For to suppose that God could make us free, that is, could make it possible for us to commit sin, and at the same time could prevent the commission of it, that

is, could make it impossible, is to suppose a contradiction. If it is asked why God made us free agents when he foresaw that we would abuse our liberty? the only answer which any human being can give is, "We cannot tell." But who art thou, O man, who repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say unto him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus ?With equal propriety might we ask why we are men and not angels? And with such questions we will not stop until we assail heaven itself, and shake the throne of the Most High.

Thus it appears that the sufferings of the guilty are, in no respect, inconsistent with the greatest goodness. But, how are the sufferings of the just to be accounted for? Upon this subject, men, anxious to vindicate the ways of God, have reasoned in various manners.

Some have argued, that we are not fit judges of what is good, and what is evil. We see too little into the ways of providence to be able to decide upon them: We are but a very small part of the universe, and a part can never contain the whole. As well might an insect pretend to judge of architecture, and to decide concerning proportion and disproportion, as we attempt to follow this mighty maze of