God, whereby he hath, for his own glory, predetermined whatsoever has, or shall come to pass. And we prefer, in our discussion, to use the word purpose, for this idea of the Divine determination, rather than decrees. It is the word more commonly employed in the New Testament; it is a more comprehensive term, and, with greater metaphysical correctness, confines the notion to one vast volition of the Eternal Mind, within which all is perfectly embraced, rather than a series of volitions, the one taking precedence of the other, and all occupying time in their passage through it; a notion which the term decrees is certainly adapted to convey, but which is utterly incompatible with any correct conceptions of the Deity. "He spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast." Is there here any thing like series, or succession, or number of volitions? No; the complicated result is thus sublimely stated as the single act of the Creator's will: thus the whole universe He governs, in all its systems, beings, and actions, rose entire in purpose and design to the single and eternal volition of His will; nor can there aught exist which that volition of the Eternal Mind did not include. This purpose is eternal. It must be so, on the supposition of the eternity of God. Nothing had existence from eternity, but the supreme Intelligence; and He must necessarily have existed from eternity, for it is quite clear that the denial of the eternity of God is equivalent to the denial of his being; and even Atheists allow that something has existed from eternity. Now, an infinitely wise Being must always know what is fittest and best, and what ought actually to take place in every possible case or event: and what is fittest and best, if he is a being of infinite rectitude, must be most pleasing to him; and that which is most pleasing to him must be the subject of his preference and choice: and, if he be infinite in power, that which is the subject of his preference must be also of his determination and purpose. If, therefore, God has existed from eternity, he has known from eternity what is the best plan by which to govern the universe: he has from eternity had a preference for that which is best, and from eternity determined to adopt and pursue it; and that is all that is intended by his eternal purpose; the determination of God from all eternity to do that, in every possible case, which it appeared most desirable to himself that he should do. His purpose is immutable. It cannot alter. An alteration in the Divine purpose would necessarily imply an alteration in the Divine mind, which would be, in fact, to suppose a fickle, changeable God. "But he is of one mind-who can turn him?-The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever, the thoughts of his heart to all generations." If the purpose, or the plan of God, for they are the same thing, could change, it must be from one or other of these causes, the existence of either of which, could it be proved, would undeify Him. Either his plan was imperfect at first, and it needs completing; or it was not, on the whole, the best, and it needs improving; or something has happened which was not foreseen, or which, if foreseen, was not provided for, and, therefore, the deficiency must be supplied. All of which ideas, the moment they are contemplated, appear absurdities; and compel us to take shelter from the horrible and monstrous conclusions to which they would conduct us, in the immutability of the eternal purpose of God. It is sovereign,-not arbitrary. There are some who always understand the word sovereign, as though it were synonimous with arbitrary; and therefore reject the idea of the Divine sovereignty altogether: and for the same reason they reject the doctrine of the Divine decrees, as though they were the mere expression of arbitrary power, without any reason or propriety; and, therefore, utterly repugnant to the ideas which they have formed of God. But this is not the case. We discard such a notion, as monstrous, and tending to Atheism. To entertain it would be to reduce the Divine purpose to a mere system of blind and senseless fatalism, and to introduce the stoicism of the ancient philosophers into the theology of modern times. No: in the purpose of God there is an end to be secured infinitely worthy of himself, namely, his own glory; and that purpose is nothing more than the determination to secure this end by the best possible means. The sovereignty of his purpose lies in this: that it is perfectly independent of his foreknowledge, as its cause; and that, in the adoption and prosecution of it, he is not in any way responsible to any of his creatures. We said that the Divine purpose or decree was independent of his foreknowledge; and the denial of this involves us in absurdity. If God decreed only that which he foresaw would certainly come to pass, then that which he has decreed would certainly have come to pass without his decree, or else he could not certainly have foreseen it; and it is mere trifling to say that God has only decreed what he saw would come to pass without his decree: such a decree as this were no decree at all, but only the determination of a Being, who, foreseeing that certain events will happen, magnanimously bows to the necessity he cannot avert. But, can any thing in the universe be rendered certain, independently of the purpose of God? We presume not. It is the being comprehended in his eternal purpose and perfect plan, that secures its accomplishment; and as that plan is perfect and eternal, so every thing is included in it; and from this circumstance its futurition is rendered certain. Thus the certainty of all created existence, and every event, is the object of the Divine knowledge; and that certainty is the result of his unalterable determination and purpose. If such and such things had not been determined by him, their existence could not have been foreknown by him, for it is only his determination that could make them certain; and unless certain, they could not have been certainly foreknown. It is absurd, then, to talk of the Divine purpose being the result of his foreknowledge. If it were right to speak of succession in the Eternal Mind at all, it would be more correct to say, that the Divine foreknowledge is in consequence of his decree; and that he foreknew all that would come to pass, from a perfect acquaintance with that purpose of his own mind, whereby the existence of every thing was made certain. But, we conceive it most correct to dismiss these ideas of progression from our notion of the Infinite Mind, and rather to say, that the purpose and the foreknowledge of which we speak have existed simultaneously, essentially, and eternally, in the bosom of the Deity. Further than this-his purpose is sovereign, inasmuch as he has formed and executes it independently of the opinions and counsels of his creatures. He avows his great and glorious design, and ever keeps the end of all his dispensations steadily in view; but he rarely condescends to shew his creatures in what way that end shall be accomplished, or how the measures he adopts will tend to advance it: he gives no account of any of his matters, any further than he pleases. "He doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth: and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou?" Often, in our view of the subject, his methods seem least adapted to secure the end; his instruments least likely to subserve effectually his purpose; and he is frequently just at the accomplishment of his design, when, to our short-sighted apprehension, he appears furthest from it. "Clouds and darkness are round about him:" but "righteousness and judgment are the habitation of his throne." It yet remains to be distinctly observed, that in this eternal purpose of the Deity, every thing within the range of his moral government is certainly included. For every being, every circumstance, every event, however minute, from the birth of an archangel, to the falling of a sparrow; from the salvation of an immortal soul, to the numbering of a hair; is comprehended in his perfect plan. If any, the minutest thing had been omitted, so far as that thing was concerned, the plan would have been imperfect; and an imperfect plan would argue a want of some faculty or attribute in the Eternal Mind, essential to the perfection of his plan. But, a perfect being must act according to a perfect plan; and any other idea than that of absolute infinite perfection is incompatible with correct conceptions of the Deity. Thus we see that the doctrine of the Divine decrees is nothing more than the simple purpose of the Divine mind, eternally formed and settled, to accomplish the most glorious possible end, i.e. his own glory, (for the glory of an infinite Being must be the highest possible end in the universe,) by the best possible means; those means being perfectly known to himself, and, therefore, the subject of his eternal purpose, and included in his perfect plan. Now, the proof of this doctrine may be derived by an appeal both to reason and to Scripture. The argument from reason has been involved in our previous statement of the doctrine, and it may be thus summed up. God from all eternity determined to promote his own glory, by the creation of the world, consisting of intelligent beings, provided with a suitable habitation, and subject to a system of moral government, which he should exercise over them. In the anticipation of such a system of things he must know what course would, upon the whole, best secure the great end he had in view. That course he, therefore, must needs determine to adopt. This determination must necessarily be eternal, upon the admission of the eternity of God. This determination is his eternal purpose or decree, and it has received different names, according to that department of his moral government in connexion with which it is viewed: PROVIDENCE, general and particular, according as it is supposed to regard the general concerns of empires and societies of men, or the history of individuals; PREDESTINATION and ELECTION, as it is regarded in connexion with the dispensation of special and saving grace, to different and particular persons of mankind. To prove the doctrine from Scripture, our quotations might be endless. Isa. xlvi.10. "My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." Here, then, God is represented as having a counsel and pleasure: nothing can occur to contravene that counsel or pleasure; every thing that exists must exist in exact harmony or accordance with that pleasure, else his counsel does not stand, he does not do all his pleasure. Isa. xliii. 13. “I will work, and who shall let it?" Dan. iv. 35. "He doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou?" Here his will is asserted to be absolute law, his pleasure irresistible energy, acknowledged alike in heaven and in earth, and which no creature can successfully oppose. Rev. iv. 10. "The fourand-twenty elders fall down before him that sat on the throne, saying, Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour and power: for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created." That the actions of moral agents are foreknown by God, is evident, or they could not have been foretold; yet multitudes of such actions, the voluntary actions of moral agents, are distinctly predicted in Holy Writ, ages before they actually had existence. Now, if they were certainly foreknown by God, they must, upon the whole, have been either according to his pleasure, or contrary to it. But, he will do all his pleasure, and nothing can resist his will: although, therefore, individual cases may occur which seem to us repugnant to the benevolence of the Deity, yet we may be assured that, upon the whole view of every such case, the existence of those actions appeared more desirable than their non-existence; and, therefore, that they were according to his pleasure; and, if according to his pleasure, certainly included in his eternal purpose or plan. No one can say that the murder of the Son of God was an amiable act on the part of the Jews, and taken apart from its causes and its consequences, it is not such an event as one could suppose would awaken pleasure in the Eternal Mind; and yet take that event in connexion with the scheme of human redemption, and it absolutely eclipses every other in importance, and absorbs in its peculiar glories all that has occurred in the annals of time, and on the theatre of the universe. ""Twas great to speak a world from nought, |