which has ever been considered the greatest sin that was ever committed by man.

Lorenzo. If the doctrine of election is established, it must follow that there is a necessity for every event to take place just as it does.

Evander. Although there is no natural necessity for all events to take place just as they do; yet there is a moral necessity that they should; so that they all may terminate in such a manner, as finally to produce the greatest possible quantity of good, and bring the highest glory to God's name.

Lorenzo. For my part, I know no difference between moral and natural necessity. What I mean, by necessity, is what must inevitably take place, and cannot be hindered.

Evander. I consider there is an entire distinction between moral and natural necessity. On the principle of the latter, mankind are acted upon, but do not act, any more than the wheels of a clock, which are compelled by the power of the weights. Natural necessity may be opposed to the will; but moral necessity, on the contrary, agrees with the will, and is perfectly consistent with its freedom. If I should put you out of my house, while you made every effort in your power to oppose me, because I was the strongest man, I should say you went out by a natural necessity; but if you went out of your own free inclination, the event of your

choice would prove there was a moral necessity, though you acted with an entire freedom; and in this case there is no natural necessity. Moral necessity supposes a certain course of events, which necessarily follow from the character of the agents. All moral agents necessarily act according to their disposition. There is a moral necessity for God to for ever remain the same holy being that he is now; which arises from his holy nature; agreeable to this, we read in the Scriptures, that " it is impossible for God to lie." There is a moral necessity for mankind to commit iniquity, while they remain completely under the power of a sinful disposition. The apostle said to the crucifiers of our blessed Lord, "Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain." They had a natural power to refrain from this wicked act, but they were constrained by their own perverse wills. I presume you will not contend for their innocence; but, on the contrary, that they were miserable offenders; which acknowledgment supposes that moral necessity does not interfere with free agency.

Lorenzo. There is no question but that mankind possess the liberty you describe; but I cannot admit that there is an absolute necessity for every event to take place just as it does.

Evander. If God has a fixed plan of government, and acts according to system, then every

event must take place agreeable to his system; but if he acts without order, and has no fixed plan of government, then he has created beings without end or design, and without knowing what part they would act in creation; and instead of events taking place by order, and under Divine direction, they take place by mere chance; but "known unto God are all his works from the beginning." If he knew all his works from the beginning, then he must have known them from his fixed determination. To know an event will take place, it is necessary the event should take place. Determination is the foundation of foreknowledge, as it cannot exist without it. If God possesses foreknowledge, it follows that the certainty of every event is established.

Lorenzo. It follows, that if every event takes place by necessity and Divine agency, then sin has taken place by Divine agency, and you make God the author of sin, which I think is nothing short of blasphemy.

Evander. If you mean God is a sinner, because he has so disposed of events that sin has been introduced into our world, I shall deny that any such inference follows; for his works are the effect of his power, and not the emanation of his nature. If they necessarily partake of his nature, then the most venemous reptiles partake of his nature; but if sin has taken place contrary to the Divine plan, then infinite wisdom and almighty power are disappointed. But

if sin has been a mean, under Divine direction, of producing an infinite quantity of good, more than could possibly have existed without it, then its permission must have been a benevolent

act.

Lorenzo. Is it necessary that evil should exist in order that good may come? "Shall we do evil that good may come ?"

Evander. I conceive an entire distinction between permitting and doing evil; for creatures to do evil that good may come, is contrary to the Divine law; but for God to permit evil, in order to produce the greatest possible degree of blessedness, is perfectly consistent with his holy nature. Neither does it follow that he does evil, because he has said, "I, the Lord, create evil;" but, on the contrary, that he does good, and that "his tender mercies are over all his works." If evil had never existed, no created being could have any just idea of its nature and tendency, any more than a man that was born blind could have of colours. If sin had not existed, no created being could have seen its infinite opposition to holiness; and God's true character could never have appeared to his creatures in its full beauty and glory. If sin had not existed, Christ would never have died for sinners, and of course redeeming love never would have been sung; and because God is good, and possesses almighty power, we know that it is for the best; if it was not, he would have prevented it; which

is a sufficient reason to silence every objection.

Lorenzo. If sin is necessary, in order that created beings should have a true sense of the nature of holiness, does it not follow, that the angels in heaven have no just idea of holiness, because they never participated of sin; notwithstanding they cry, one to another, "holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hosts, and the whole earth is full of his glory?"

Evander. I think it does by no means, as they have the example of all sinful beings before them. If sin had never existed in the system, they would have possessed perfect innocence, and would have had a taste for holiness. A babe may relish a sweet cordial, while he is destitute of a capacity to judge of its nature and tendency. Since sin has existed, they can see its infinite opposition to holiness; they may see, that it was of such dreadful turpitude, that it required an infinite atonement; they can as well judge now of its nature and tendency, as you can of intemperance, though you never drank to excess; they can now behold the beauty of God's attributes, in his dealings towards his rebellious creatures; they can see his infinite justice in the punishment of impenitent sinners; they can see his infinite benevolence, in providing an atonement for sin; in his long-suffering and tender mercies towards his probationers, and in the gift of his holy spirit to awaken, regenerate, and sanctify his redeemed; so that they can