صور الصفحة
PDF
النشر الإلكتروني

blished and evident, the impression of the real performance of the facts, or of the power evidenced in them being certainly superhuman, has, perhaps, grown fainter. I do not think indeed, as I have said, that the proof is impaired. But still, as has been shown, the impression made by the proof may be much less, even while the proof itself remains the same, or rather while it remains equal. We now, therefore, see constituted a different species of trial from that which existed under very different circumstances, each species that doubtless which is the best fitted by God's unspeakable wisdom for the differing circumstances of his moral creation, and each combining, as is apparent even to our feeble perceptions, both that moral trial which, according to the nature of the case, is an essential part of its intent and propriety, and also that wholly irrefragable, though not actually irresistible, proof of the miracles, which allows us to pronounce that they are certainly true, and cannot be doubted except by blindness or perversity.

a See Ch. 11. § v., and compare pp. 278, 279, 232.

[ocr errors][merged small]

THAT IN PROVING THE TRUTH OF THE SCRIPTURE MIRACLES, IT IS UNNECESSARY TO DRAW A STRICT LINE OF DISTINCTION BETWEEN TRUE AND FALSE PRETENSIONS TO MI

RACLES.

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

In the preceding chapter it was allowed, and even argued, that though our proof of the Christian miracles is complete, yet we cannot arrive at it but by a deductive process, and on ground which requires or presumes the establishment of many critical and historical facts. That we have to go through such a process in the case of Christianity, a religion which occupies so large a space in the world, and which both by its own magnitude, and moral character, and by our position, must of necessity take fast hold of our attention, has not any thing in it to which objection can be made. This indeed, as is plain also from what has been said", is only a part of that moral probation or trial

a See the preceding Chapter.

which we even venture to say that the evidence of a true religion may be expected, or ought, to include.

But it may be here objected that this process demands of us to enter into enquiries very complicated and difficult, and which human faculties are indeed unequal to undergo. One part of the process consists in establishing the fact that no falsehood can be found supported by equal evidence. But this, if provable, it will be said, must be proved in one of two ways: either by laying down a principle of exact discrimination, by which truth and falsehood may be always known from each other; or else by examining all cases that can be found. But to lay down such a principle of exact discrimination between truth and falsehood is plainly impossible. In all cases of fact, the evidence goes to a jury, who can never be expected, nor indeed be able, to say exactly where stands that hinge on which its truth or falsehood depends. It is equally impossible also to examine all cases in which the claim of miracles has been falsely pretended. We can examine but few cases, we can know of but few, compared with the multi

tude of all those claims of miracles which have been made during the long history of mankind. If then, it will be said, we know not all cases, or if, of any of those cases of which we know something, we possess only loose or imperfect accounts, how can we presume from our partial observations to think of drawing a universal conclusion. There may be falsehoods better evidenced than any we know of. There may be stronger cases than any which have been adduced, cases which may be set against the evidence which we possess of the real performance of the Scripture miracles.

To this I answer that, certainly, I pretend not to draw any strict line which shall discriminate falsehood from truth, nor yet do I contend that the cases produced in order to contrast those cases with the Scripture miracles are beyond doubt the strongest cases possible. Still, however, we know from the principles within our reach, principles which those cases which have been produced may very sufficiently supply or illustrate, that that greater degree of evidence which we possess for the truth of the Scripture miracles could not have been acquired in behalf of a falsehood. There are many contrarieties on which

. U

we may safely pronounce, though we cannot define the separation between them". We grant that it is impossible to state any evidence of fact, or perhaps any evidence not strictly mathematical, in which the line of exact truth can be pointed out. out. In a trial for murder, it is impossible to say how much evidence may be safely subtracted, leaving precisely enough to justify conviction, and leaving no more. It is by no means certain that some future murderer may not produce stronger evidence in his favour than has ever yet been found except in the case of the innocent. But this prevents us not from being able to affirm with certainty that some strong evidences are decisive of guilt. And so, if we can discriminate the Scripture miracles, as true, from every thing that may be assumed or proved to be false, there may be much intermediate, and debatable evidence with regard to other miracles, which need not come into question, unless indeed, supposing those other miracles true, there be in them something inconsistent with Scripture.

Besides this also, it ought in fairness to be observed, that it is not the business of the de

a Malthus on Population. Book III. Ch. 1. Vol. 11. p. 89. Edit. 1806.

« السابقةمتابعة »