sian, or that of the restoration of a man's lost limb at Saragossa.

To prove the miracles also, or at least to impress on the reader the fulness of the evidence by which they are proved, this would, doubtless, be the right method. But it is a method, which, as far as it is to be accounted mere method, is not calculated to prove the writer's conviction. This is to be proved, not by the proof of the miracles, but by our seeing them regarded as wholly unquestionable. And it is worthy of remark that in the Scripture miracles, while the detail of some is so particularly brought before us, that we see the very circumstances which proved their reality, others are thus related in a more general way, and so as to indicate the natural and unaffected conviction which was felt by the original witnesses.

But further, this proof of the entire conviction which was felt by the witnesses of our Saviour's miracles, namely, the proof derived from the manifest sincerity which is indicated in the tone of their actual narrative, extends itself far beyond the actual narrative, and is, perhaps, even more visible in many incidental allusions, which evidently demonstrate both the conviction of

the writers, and also the notoriety of the facts alluded to, or that they were regarded by the persons to whom the writers address themselves as being facts wholly unquestionable.

In every history, in all discussion or controversy, there must always be much of this kind of allusion to those facts or matters which are assumed as incontestable, and as the basis of the exposition or argument. Every fact, or rather every series of facts, on which much turns that is of importance, must always be spoken of in some compendious method. We are naturally desirous to get rid of the labour of detailing repeatedly what will be sufficiently understood, if stated only in brief. In this principle, as is well known, originate all those compendious forms of expression which the theory of language traces and explains. Thus we speak compendiously of the wars of Athens and Sparta, of the battles of Salamis and Platæa, as of single facts, though no doubt each of them including a very great number of particular circumstances.

On the very same principle also we are led on to allusion, and this particularly in matters of history, and in matters of serious argument and discussion, where the facts alluded to are con

sidered incontestable. Thus the Norman Conquest will naturally be often alluded to in every history of our own country, and alluded to in terms which could not be used, if it were not for the notoriety of the truth of the fact. Speeches in Parliament are always full of allusion to facts which either are true, or are admitted as true by both parties. And it is material to observe, that facts not thus true, or not admitted, are not, and cannot be, alluded to seriously in the same manner. Who would endure any writer or speaker, who should allude to the fables of the building of London by Brutus, or of the supposititious birth of the first Pretender, as to facts which would supply a basis for argument? Controverted facts, or even fables such as these, may indeed be introduced to cover the arts of the rhetorician, but can have no place in any serious discussion.

I have now, therefore, to prove that this species of allusion is actually to be found in the sacred historians. And this it is impossible to prove better than in the words of Paley: "A remarkable instance of this kind is the ascension, which is not mentioned by St. John in its place, at the conclusion of his history, but which is

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plainly referred to in the following words of the sixth chapter: What, and if ye shall see the son of Man ascend up where he was before?' And still more positively in the words which Christ, according to our evangelist, spoke to Mary after his resurrection, Touch me not, for I am not yet ascended to my Father: but go unto my brethren, and say unto them, I ascend unto my Father and your Father, unto my God and your God.'b God." This can only be accounted for by the supposition that St. John wrote under a sense of the notoriety of Christ's ascension, amongst those by whom his book was likely to be read. The same account must also be given of St. Matthew's omission of the same important fact. The thing was well known, and it did not occur to the historian that it was necessary to add any particulars concerning it. It agrees also with this solution, and with no other, that neither Matthew nor John disposes of the person of our Lord in any manner whatever."

We may draw the same conclusion also from the extreme rarity which is to be observed of any appeal, or of any express reference to our

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a Also John, iii. 13, and xvi. 28.

b John, xx. 17.

Paley's Evidences, Part I. Prop. 1. Ch. vii.

Saviour's miracles, except to the miracle of his resurrection from the dead, in the speeches of the Apostles, as recorded in the Acts, and in the epistles written by the same apostles*. I must not be supposed to produce this rarity of appeal to our Saviour's miracles by way of proof that those miracles were performed. A rarity of appeal to them, considered alone, is rather an argument against their real performance. It has, indeed, been alleged as such: and the rare ascription to Mahomet (or I should rather say perhaps the very hesitating ascription) of the miraculous powers which are sometimes claimed for him, has always been regarded as one proof among many, that he possessed not any such powers at all.

But still I contend that granting only the facts that the apostles were sincere men, on the whole, that they believed on the whole that Christ had performed miracles, or that they were not teaching what they on the whole supposed to be false, I then contend that the very rarity of their appeals to our Saviour's or indeed to any other miracles, is an argument that they

a Paley's Evidences, Part III. Ch. v.

b Ibid.