taken from an elder, comprehending in it the several sensible kinds contained in the other."* The author illustrates his meaning by comparing God to an architect, who, having designed to build a splendid city, first forms a complete plan of it in his mind, before he carries his scheme into execution." In the same way," adds he, "we must conceive of God, who having purposed to build this city of universal nature, first conceived the models of it, constituting the intellectual world, and then used this as a pattern, when executing the sensible world; and as the ideal city preconceived in the architect, had no external local existence, but subsisted only in the mind of the artist, so the ideal world, consisting of models, can have no other place than the divine intellect which arranged it."t

The original of divine intellect, or the intellectual world, is 90s λoyos, the divine Logos, or Aoyos Grou, the Logos of God. In thus applying the term Logos to the intellect of God, or to the effect of that intellect subsisting within himself, Philo professes to speak with philosophical accuracy. "If I might use," says he, " plain language, I should say that the intellectual world, Jou λoyov, is nothing else but the intellect

• De mundi opificio, Vol. I. 4, or p. 3.

† Καθαπερ ουν ή εν τω αρχιτεκτονικῳ προδιατυπωθείσα, την χώραν εκτος ουκ ειχεν, αλλ' ενεσφραγιςο τη του τεχνιτου ψυχη τον αυτον τρόπον, ουδ' ὁ εκ των ιδίων κοσμος, αλλον αν έχει τοπον η τον θείον λογον τον ταῦτα διακοσμησαντα. . Vol. i. p. 4,

of God, while he was now making the world; for the intellectual city is nothing else but the reasoning of the architect, while employed in projecting the material city."* He adds, that God, and no other, is the author of nature, employing only his own attributes, without advice, without assistance from any other. For who, asks he, could be his assistant or adviser?

The words of Philo are opposed to the supporters of atheism in Egypt and other gentile countries. The Gnostics, though pretended believers, were real atheists or Epicurean Jews. Against these, we have just seen, John publish ed his Gospel; and as he had the same object with Philo, the two writers might be expected to use similar language and modes of reasoning; and remarkable is the manner in which they illustrate and confirm each other.

"In the beginning was the Logos." This declaration inculcates, that when the system of nature began to exist, an infinite intelligent spirit is the cause of its existence. Philo declares the same thing, namely, that an intellectual principle, under the name of Logos, preceded the formation of all material things.

"And the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God." The same thing, in nearly the

* Ει δε τις εθελήσεις γυμνοτέροις χρησασθαι τοῖς ονομασι, ουδέν αν έτερον είποι τον νοητον είναι κόσμον, η θεου λόγου ηδη κοσμοποιουντος ουδε γαρ ή νοητή πολις ἑτερον τι εσί, η ό του αρχιτεκτονος λογισμός, ηδη την αισθητην τη νοητή κτίζειν διανοουμένου. Vol. i. 5. or p. 4.

same words, is asserted by Philo, when he says, that the Logos, the immediate cause of the material world, existed in no place but in the mind of God, and was no other than God himself.

"All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing that was made." This proposition is the object of Philo to prove in the above passage, where he says, that all created things were copied from the Logos, or intellectual world, as a younger image is taken from an elder, containing in it the several sensible kinds contained in the other.

"In him, i. e. in the Logos, is life, and the life is the light of men. The light is the true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." Assertions to this effect are made

by Philo. "Moses," he presently adds, "gives the precedence to spirit and to light the former he calls the spirit of God, for God is the cause of life; the latter light, as being exceedingly fair."* Both writers characterize this light in the same manner. Philo affirms that it is the divine Logos, or image of God; John, that the life or light was in the Logos. The former again calls it the intellectual light; the latter, the true light, and the light of men; † understanding by this

* Προνομιας δε το πνεύμα και το φως ηξίου το μεν γαρ ωνόμασε θεου, διοτι ζωτικωτατον το πνευμα ζωής δε θεος αιτιος, το δε φως· ὅτι ὑπερβαλλοντως καλον.

Vol. i. p. 6.

* Το φως των ανθρωπων. The article is used not to express some men in opposition to others, but men in opposition to other animals. For the generic use of the article, see the last Appendix to my Illustrations of the Four Gospels, or Greek Grammar, 2d edit.

last, that while the visible and material light belongs alike to all animals, the light of divine wisdom, and of the Gospel, belongs to men or rational beings alone. According to the Evangelist, the true light is the source of light to all` rational creatures, enlightening every man that cometh into the world; according to Philo also, it is the source of all light, who emphatically calls it the universal light, whence even the sun, moon, and stars, have derived their lustre *.

We are then to conclude, that John means the same thing with Philo, who expressly says, that the Logos, in its strictest sense, denotes the Divine Intellect, or more generally the natural and moral attributes of God. But the apostolic writers, and with them Philo, have applied the term Logos catachrestically sometimes to the founder of the Gospel, and sometimes to the Gospel itself. The steps by which they came to do this, and their object in so doing, it is of consequence briefly to point out.

The advocates of a supreme intelligence, who opposed the prevalent system of atheism, considered the ideas or models of material things as realities or entities, though having no place of subsistence but in the divine mind. This notion, which originated in the philosophy of Moses, †

* Vol. i. p. 7.

↑ Modern critics suppose the ideal system to have been borrowed from Plato, and unknown to Moses. Philo, and other philosophical Christians, in the number of whom was Paul of Tarsus, thought otherwise, and thought so justly. The former says, Μωσεως και το δόγμα τούτο. Vol. i. p. 5.

insensibly led them to use similar language respecting the reason, and the other attributes of God. Nor did they merely consider these as principles or powers having real existence in God; but they, moreover, were hence led to represent them as agents or persons existing with him, and cooperating in the creation and government of the world. By thus personifying the divine perfections under the name of Logos, they rendered their positions more emphatic and prominent, in opposition to those who rejected the notion of an Intelligent Being as the cause of nature, and the author of the Gospel.

The Gnostics denied the attributes of God; they therefore referred the Logos not to him, but to a line of divinities called Eons, of their own feigning. They denied also that Christ acted with authority from God, or that he was endued with the perfections of God; his object being not to carry into execution the great plan of Providence for the redemption of mankind, but to emancipate the human race from the severe and arbitrary laws of the Creator. If these positions were admitted, not only the fair system of Christianity, but that of natural religion, fell to the ground. The apostles took the wisest and most effectual means to defeat their views: they referred the Logos to the universal Father, and invested him with all natural and moral perfections. And they extended the same word to the Gospel of Christ, and to Christ himself; thus holding forth, by one and the same term, the absolute perfections of Jehovah, the divine origin of the Gospel, and the divine mission of Jesus.

As the Logos, though a mere attribute or

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