act, or not act, as we please, has always been thought a very good Argument against the Materiality of the Soul; for Matter cannot move it felf, but moves as it is moved; and therefore there can be no Principle of Liberty and Spontaneity in Matter.

But there is an obvious Objection against this Way of Reasoning; That this Argument proves too much, and therefore it proves nothing. For if whatever is immaterial is immortal, and whatever has a Principle of confcious Life, Senfation, Reason, Knowledge, is immaterial; unless we will deny, that Brute Creatures have any Sense and Perception, and confcious Life, we muft acknowledge the Souls of Brutes to be immaterial, and confequently immortal also.

But we know fo little of the Souls of Brutes, that no Man needs concern himfelf about this Objection. That there is a Spirit in a Beaft, diftinct from its Body, and feparated from it by Death, we learn from Solomon; Who knoweth the Spirit of Man, that goeth upward, and the Spirit of the Beast, that goeth downwards to the Earth? Eccl. 3. 21. And the real Distinction between Body and Spirit in Beafts, moft probably infers as real a Diftinction in their Natures. And that the Spirit of Beafts going down to the Earth, fignifies that it utterly perifheth, is more than I can prove.

The Pythagoreans and Platonists did agree, That mere Matter was not capable of confcious Life and Senfation; and therefore did affert, That the Souls of Brutes, which manifeftly have Life and Senfation, and fome faint Appearances of Reason and Knowledge, were immaterial Spirit. And the famous French Philofopher fo far agrees with them, That, if they have Life and Senfe, they are not mere Matter. And yet it feems much lefs abfurd to me, to attribute Life and Senfation to mere Matter,

Matter, as the Epicureans did, than to deny Life and Senfation to Beafts, who appear as much to live, and to perform all the Offices of Life and Senfation as Men do. Now thefe Philofophers, who appropriate Life and Senfation to a spiritual Nature, did not believe that the Souls of Brutes perifhed with their Bodies, but that they either pafs'd into aerial Bodies, or fell into a State of Infenfibility, till they were united to fome other earthly Bodies; but that no Life did wholly perish, no more than the Parts of Matter do in their various Changes. And were I only to chufe as a Philofopher, I fhould much rather chufe this Side of the Question, than fubfcribe to thofe who attribute all Life to mere Matter, and diffolve it with Matter too; becaufe I had much rather the Souls of Beafts fhould be immortal, than that my own Soul fhould be mortal.

All that I intend by this, is only to fhew you how weak and unconcluding this Objection is; because the Principle whereon it is founded, viz. the Mortality of all Brutal Souls, is fo precarious and uncertain. But fetting afide all this, let us fuppofe that the Souls of Brutes are immaterial, and yet mortal; it does not hence follow that human Souls, tho' they are immaterial, are mortal alfo.

That the Soul is Immaterial, proves no more, but that it cannot die as the Body does; it has no Parts, no Compofition, and therefore cannot be divided, or diffolved: And therefore that the Body dies, is no Proof that the Soul dies alfo; and then there can be no Pofitive Proof of the Mortality of the Soul.

But I never thought that the Immateriality of the Soul, alone confidered, was a fufficient Proof of its Immortality: For tho' a Spirit cannot be divided or torn afunder, as a Body may, yet it may be annihilated, if God pleafe; or have fuch

an

an abfolute Dependance on the Body, as to fall into perfect Infenfibility, which is the Lofs of all confcious Life, when it is feparated from it. And therefore we must farther enquire what natural Evidence we have, that human Souls are of such a Make and Conftitution, that they can live in a State of Separation from these earthly Bodies; and that it is the Will of God that they should do fo: And this will make a vaft difference between human Souls, and the Souls of Brutes, though they. were both fuppofed to be alike immaterial.

2. Having therefore laid this for the Foundation of our Argument, to prove that human Souls are immortal, viz. that they are immaterial, which proves that they are diftinct from the Body, and do not depend on the Body for their Subfiftence, and cannot die as the Body does, and therefore not with the Body neither: In the next Place let us confider the true Nature of human Happiness; which will furnish us with a more fenfible Argument for the Immortality of the Soul. This has either not been taken Notice of, or not so advantagiously reprefented to this Purpose; and therefore I fhall the more particularly confider it.

If we know what the Happiness of any Creature is, we may certainly know what its Nature is; our Happiness results from Nature, and bears a juft Proportion to it. It is certain Happiness cannot rife higher than Nature, nor be more perfect than Nature is; for that is to be happier than our Natures are capable of, which is a Contradiction. A mix'd Happiness, when our Pleasures are of very different Kinds, proves a compound Creature ; and the highest and nobleft Pleasures are always feated in the most perfect Nature, has the most perfect Life, and is the fuperior and governing Principle.

Let

Let us then confider what the Happiness of Man is; and we all feel our felves capable of two very different Sorts of Pleasures, which have no Dependance on each other, for they may be parted; I mean the Pleafures of the Body, and of the Mind. The Pleafures of the Body are the Pleafures of Eating and Drinking, and other Corporeal Delights, which wholly depend on the Body, increafe, and decay, and die with it; the Pleasures of the Mind are the Pleafures of Wisdom and Knowledge, and Virtue, and Religion, which are immediately feated in the Mind, and have no relation to the Body, any otherwife than as the Soul lives and acts in the Body, and directs and governs it. Which of thefe are the greatest and noblest Pleafures: Which moft become a Man, and are moft perfective of human Nature, I need not tell any one, who has tried both. Nay, without trying, or with a very little Trial of each, the general Opinion of Mankind will tell us this; or their natural Paffions rather than Opinions. We admire no Man for Eating and Drinking well, or for enjoying all Bodily Pleafures to the full : This may create them Envy, but not Efteem, Whereas Learning, Wifdom, and Prudence, true Piety, and Virtue, and all the Offices of Humanity, Charity, and Friendship, if they meet with no other Rewards in this World, have the Praise and Commendation of those who will not imitate them: Wife and good Men are loved and honoured as the Glory of human Nature, as more perfect and excellent Creatures than other Men are, who cannot raise themselves above Flesh and Senfe: Which fhews what the Opinion of Mankind is, concerning the Perfection of human Nature.

Nay, an Excefs in bodily Pleasures, as fond as most Men are of them, is univefally infa

mous;

mous; which proves that they are not our last and highest Happiness, wherein there can be no Excefs. Who was ever reproached for being too Wife and Good? Who ever thought it poffible to exceed in these things, or that it was infamous to do fo? Nay, who was ever reproached for defpifing bodily Pleafures, for great Abftinence and Continency, and almost an utter difregard of the Body? Not only Superftition is apt to Saint fuch Men, but the wifer Part of Mankind do as much reverence fuch a perfect Conqueft over the Body, as they defpife and abhor the Slavery and Servitude of brutish Lufts. It would be impoffible for a Soul, which is nothing but Body and Matter it felf, thus to raise it felf above the Body, and to contradict and fubdue its bodily Appetites and Inclinations. And were not Mankind confcious to themfelves of fore diviner Principle in them than Matter, and of fome diviner Pleasures, more honourable and becoming than the Pleafures of the Body, it is impoffible they fhould fo univerfally admire thofe Menwho defpife the Body and all its Delights. And yet thus it has been, not only among Chriftian Afceticks, but even among Pagan Philofophers themselves; not as a part of their Pagan Superstition, but for the love of Wifdom, which gave them a true Contempt of bodily Pleafures,

This might be enough to fatisfy Men, who know little themfelves what the Pleafures of the Mind are, that certainly they must be more fatisfactory and tranfporting than all bodily Pleafures are, and therefore the proper and genuine Pleafures of human Nature: But we have many other unanswerable Arguments of this, which I fhall briefly represent to you.

Whatever bodily Pleafures are, they for a Moment, and please no longer

I

are but than we

enjoy