to diffuse over this world, something of that light which encircles the divine majesty: The Word was made flesh and dwelt among men: They beheld his glory, the glory, as of the only begotten Son of God, full of grace and truth. You cannot duly appreciate this religion, even as a system of duties and motives, without contemplating that palpable gloom, which had for ages, enshrouded the world. But I will not on this occasion, repeat remarks, which your course of education has rendered familiar. My object is less to eulogize Christianity, than to leave on your minds a practical sense of the connexion which it has with your peace, your honor, and salvation. In the spirit of this holy religion, and relying on the atonement and intercession of its Author, may you, amidst all the changes of human affairs, but especially at the present interesting moment, prefer to heaven the poet's prayer: "Father of light and life! Thou Good Supreme! O teach me what is good! Teach me thyself! Save me from folly, vanity, and vice, From every low pursuit! And feed my soul ADDRESS, DELIVERED AT THE COMMENCEMENT IN 1815. Young Gentlemen, In all those parts of the universe, which are subject to human remark, we recognise the effects of divine legislation. That there are certain laws, agreeably to which all changes in the material world are effected, is acknowledged by atheists; the inconsistency of admitting laws without a lawgiver notwithstanding. It is no more denied by the infidel, than by the religious philosopher, that similar causes uniformly produce similar results. If Deity has suffered no particle of matter, however worthless, to exist, uncontrolled by laws, it will hardly be questioned, that intelligent beings have some kind of designation; in other words, that the object of their existence will be answered by their proceeding in a particular course, and frustrated should they pursue the opposite. Gravitation is not more a law to material objects, than virtue is to all beings, who are capable of it. I know not that the present occasion can be better improved, than by addressing you on the immutable, independent nature of moral obligation; or of that virtue, which results from a compliance with it. "Morality," to use the words of an able writer," is fixed on an immoveable basis, and appears not to be, in any sense, factitious, or the arbitrary production of any power, human or divine; but equally everlasting and necessary with all truth and reason,' 99 When it is asserted, that morality is not the production of any power, human or divine, we do not deny, that those persons reason conclusively, as well as reverently, who infer the rectitude of a measure from the fact of its having been adopted by Deity;-because, being previously assured of his moral perfections; that is, of his infinite attachment to the eternal rules of truth, goodness, and justice, we conclude with unwavering confidence, that no particular act of his can violate these rules. In this however, it is by no means implied, that the standard of moral rectitude is factitious, or dependent on the will of any being whatever. The rectitude of actions does not depend on their proceeding from one being or another; but on their coincidence with the immutable principles of virtue. Almost all men think with good reason, that they speak honorably of the Supreme Being, when they say, that all his measures are taken because they are right. Now this language implies that there is, independent of all will, such a thing as right and wrong. If I say of the vernal forest, it is green, or of the sun, it is luminous, I assert nothing, unless I affix some ideas to those epithets. The immutable principles of morality necessarily result, we believe, from the nature of things, and from the relation, which they have one to another. As God is the author of all things, the relation, subsisting between them, may be considered, as depending on Him. But, while objects continue, in all respects, as they are, no change can be produced in their relations. A figure, which is now a square, may be turned into a circle. But, while it continues a square, it must have the relations of such a figure. Now, it is just as absurd to ascribe to Deity the power of changing vice into virtue, or virtue into vice, as to speak of his giving to a globe, so continuing, the properties and relations of a cube; or to speak of his making a whole, which is less than the sum of all its parts. So certain is it, that the reality of moral obligation, or the distinction between virtue and vice, is not the creature of power, that were we to make the most absurd of all suppositions, viz. that there is no intelligent Author of the universe, even then a distinction between right and wrong, and consequent obligation, would still remain. Without investigating our origin, we are found to be in a situation in which, as we pursue certain courses, we may either contribute much both to the happiness of ourselves and others; or render both ourselves and them sufficiently wretched. Now, were the will of no Supreme Being consulted, nor any future retribution anticipated, I appeal to your understanding, whether it would not be right for a man to live in such a manner, as to render society regular and tranquil, and himself and others happy, rather than to form such dispositions and habits, as would produce misery in his own breast, and diffuse it among those around him? I would ask further, whether such a person, perceiving one course to be right, and another to be wrong, would not be under obligation to adopt the one and avoid the other?-whether this obligation would not be fastened upon him in every connexion, which he might form, and in every stage of life? Some actions and feelings are intrinsically, or independently of consequences, wrong. Others are in like manner right. No circumstances can make malignity right, nor benevolence wrong. No consequences can render it fit, that two opposite moral characters should, on the whole, be treated alike. No supposed utility can render it right for innocence to be oppressed, or crimes rewarded. Whatever it is impossible to conceive not to exist, is said to exist necessarily. On this principle we prove, that a distinction in moral actions is necessary, and therefore immutable. For you can no more conceive the annihilation of this distinction, than the non-existence of space or duration." But when, in addition to this abstract view of the subject, we find a Being, in whom moral perfection is actually exhibited ;-a Being in whom the principles of virtue are, so to speak, embodied; when this Being bursts upon our astonished sight, not only as a pattern for our imitation, but as a judge to decide on our character and destiny, the moral edifice assumes a new appearance; it exhib its not only solidity and proportion, but splendor and awful sublimity. Deity acknowledges the eternal distinction between right and wrong, by making it the basis of his own administration. His throne is established in righteousness. He proposes it to all created intelligences, as the criterion, by which their characters are to be estimated, and his own treatment of them to be regulated. I am not insensible, that the obligations of virtue have by some been resolved into an affair of expedience or utility ;and that whatever is useful, has been pronounced as therefore right. The nature of virtue is doubtless the same in all beings who possess it. It would follow, then, from the principle just mentioned, that the Almighty, and all creatures, so far as they imitate his moral rectitude, hesitate at no means, by which a result, finally advantageous can be accomplished. It is readily acknowledged, that the greatest happiness of the universe, which can be effected consistently with justice to each individual, and the unchangeable rules of truth and goodness, is a motive to action, than which, so far as we are able to judge, nothing can be more worthy of the Supreme Being. But, that such an object should be pursued independently of these limitations; or, that moral rectitude should have no other basis than general utility, is a position, which surely ought not to be readily adopted. Such principles in morality would introduce universal uncertainty and distrust. No confidence could on this ground be placed in the promise of any being whatever; as any government, whether human or divine would be justified in deceiving, nay, would be morally bound to deceive, when greater utility might be thereby promoted. And beings of enlarged views may see that to be useful, which others do not. Therefore, my not seeing, that a deception practised on me would be useful on the whole, does not prove that it would not, and consequently that it may not happen. But even were it allowed, that all the moral perfections of |