Providence on ten thousand different occasions, we never suppose that those everlasting purposes, or these providential interpositions, were designed to supersede the use of means, or had any such tendency, as to the concerns of time. Why, then, should we strive to separate the end from the means, in things of infinitely greater importance? The dictates of inspiration, the maxims of philosophy, the principles of common sense, and the general conduct of mankind, all unite in utterly disavowing such a procedure as irrational and absurd to the last degree.

Further: This objection militates no less against the infallible foreknowledge of God, than against his purpose. This appears from hence. Jehovah is perfect in knowledge. That knowledge which is absolutely perfect can admit of no increase. All the volitions, therefore, of moral agents, and all the events consequent upon them, were, from eternity, present to the divine mind, and open to his omniscient eye; and as all things future were included in his all-comprehending view before the world began, so it would be absurd to suppose that any event should ever take place, otherwise than as he foresaw it. With equal reason, therefore, might the objector infer from the divine prescience, that the use of means to attain any end is vain, as from the doctrine of predestination: for, between the foreknowledge and the purpose of God, there is a close and inseparable connexion. illustrate the point, and apply the object to my present purpose. Allowing the perfect foreknowledge of God, the objector may thus argue against the use of means respecting his eternal state: The foreknowledge of God is perfect-from eternity he viewed iny final state--either he foresaw me seated on a throne of bliss, and exulting in a sense of his favour, or loaded with chains of darkness, and groaning in the agonies of endless despair. As he from eternity viewed me, so it must inevitably be; for perfect foreknowledge is infallible. My eternal state is therefore a fixed point with the Deity. What need, then, of

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the use of means, to avoid punishment or obtain felicity? Prayer and watchfulness, all the exercises and all the duties of a painful profession, are entirely in vain. If the Omniscient foresaw me happy in a future world, I cannot be miserable. If he foresaw me miserable, I shall not, I cannot be happy; though all the angels of heaven, and all the men upon earth, were to afford me their united aid.'

This argument, I humbly apprehend, wears the face of probability to as great a degree, and infers the objection I am now refuting with as much propriety and force, as that which is formed, and the inference from it, against the decree of election. But the truth is, neither that nor this has the least force or propriety. For as Jehovah, when he decreed the end, appointed the means, and the application of them to their respective objects; so, in his eternal presence, he not only viewed the end, but also foresaw the means, with their application and use, as connected with the final event. As he foresaw none in the abodes of darkness, but those whom he viewed as guilty, and walking in the ways of destruction; so he determined to bring none to glory, but in a way becoming himself, as perfectly holy, and by the use of means of grace should render effectual. Hence it appears that the objector must either give up his argument, or deny that his Maker is perfect; which to do, is to undeify the God that is above. This, indeed, with a bold impiety, many have done in order to support their favourite notions about free agency and the li berty of the human will, in opposition to the doctrine of sovereign grace and divine predestination;* being well aware, that whoever allows the eternal and perfect foreknowledge of God, cannot consistently deny his decrees respecting the final state of men, the Socinians have freely acknowledged: Admitting,' say they, the infallible prescience of all future contingencies, Calvin's doctrine of the predestination

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This

* Hoorne, Socin. Confut. tom. i. 1. 2. c. 3. Dr. Owen's Vind. Evang. chap. 5. Dr. Doddridge, Lect. p. 99, 100.

of some by name to life, and of others to death, cannot be refuted.'* They, therefore, do their utmost endeavour to prove (horrid to think!) that he who formed and governs the universe, is not possessed of such a foresight; in other words, that he is not God. This they do by much the same arguments that others use in opposition to the doctrine here maintained.

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To the foregoing objections some, perhaps, may be ready to add, with an air of confidence, Does not this doctrine, in its inseparable connexions, represent the Most High as partial in his conduct towards his creatures, and as a respecter of persons? as dealing hardly, if not unjustly, with the far greater part of mankind?' In answer to which I observe, that as to the charge of partiality and respect of persons here exhibited against the divine conduct, it is entirely void of the least foundation. For wherever such a charge may be advanced with propriety against the conduct of any one, it must be the affairs of remunerative or punishing justice, and where the rules of equity are more or less transgressed, but cannot possibly have place in matters of sovereignfavour and mere bounty, of which kind is election. For instance, if we consider a person in the capacity of a magistrate, as invested with the executive power of the criminal laws of his country, and behold him inflicting the penalties annexed to their respective crimes, upon such offenders as are poor and mean, and of little account in the world; while he suffers others of nobler birth, more elevated rank, and affluent circumstances, to escape with impunity, we have great reason to remonstrate against such a procedure as a culpable partiality,, a criminal respect of persons, and as no other than a perversion of justice. But if we consider the same person under the character of a benefactor, and behold him dispensing his favours among his indigent neighbours, in order to relieve their wants, and render them

* Compend. Socin. c. 4. § 1. apud `Wits. Econ. Fœd. 1. 3. c. 4. § 12.

happy, we never imagine that he is under any obligation to show an equal regard to all who may stand in need. Supposing he distributes his bounty in the greatest variety to the favoured objects of his beneficence; supposing he load some with favours, while others who stand in the same need are entirely overlooked; shall we arraign his conduct as partial, or call him a respecter of persons? By no means. The reason is, we here view him as having a right < to do what he will with his own.' Were not this the case, there would be nothing indecent, if, after he had manifested his beneficent regards to some, others were to come with a commanding voice, and require his assistance in the same way, and to the same degree; than which nothing could be more bold and impertinent.

Besides, if Jehovah must be denominated a 'respecter of persons,' and his conduct pronounced partial, on the supposition that he loved and chose some to everlasting happiness, while he rejected others, and left them to perish under his righteous curse; if the equity of his proceedings, in the affairs of grace, must be called in question, because he bestows eternal blessings on some, and entirely withholds them from others'; how shall we vindicate the methods of Providence, in ten thousand different instances? Does not God, as to the concerns of religion, afford those means of grace, his word and ordinances, to some, while, they are entirely withheld from others? And where they are enjoyed, does he not regenerate and sanctify some by the spirit of truth, while others who have the same external means continue in spiritual darkness, and finally perish? If, then, the incontrollable God may do that in time for some, which he is not under any obligation to do for any, none can doubt whether he might from eternity form such a resolution; nor is divine Providence any thing else but the execution of God's eternal purpose. Similar to this is the conduct of the allwise God towards mankind as to temporal things. For nothing is more evident than that the Supreme

Governor of the world is liberal in communicating enjoyments of every kind to some, while others not more unworthy, are all their lives subject to the greatest distresses. And though there is a vast disparity between temporal and eternal blessings, yet if to distinguish between his creatures, in bestowing or withholding the latter, would any way impeach his character, it must in proportion do so in the former. For the Judge of all the earth must do right. And as none can, without open blasphemy, quarrel with the sovereign dispensations of Providence on account of that difference which subsists between one man and another in the present life, so none should indulge a captious humour in finding fault with the methods of grace, because their Maker does not manifest an equal regard to all.

Nor can it be inferred from any thing asserted or implied in this doctrine, that God deals hardly, much less unjustly, with any part of mankind. Here let me ask the objector, and let him ask his own conscience, Have all men sinned? Is sin a transgression of the divine law? Is the law they have broken righteous, just in its requirements, and equitable in its sanction? If so, every man is guilty before God, and every mouth ought to be stopped; for all have deserved to die-to perish-to be destroyed with an utter destruction. Either these things are acknowledged as undoubted truths, or the authority of the Bible is rejected, and divine revelation denied. These truths being admitted, reason itself must allow that if all mankind had perished under a curse, the honour of their Maker, as the supreme Governor and righteous Judge, must have been unimpeached; and if so, it is impossible to conceive how his choosing some to life and happiness, and his rejecting others, can afford the least occasion for the charge suggested in the objection. For the election of those whom God determined to save, does not injure the non-elect. Their situation would not have been at all the better, if none had been chosen, nor