I must not, therefore, say, This would have been wise; and God ought to have

great notoriety, therefore, of the miracles and signs which authorized the mission of this minister, were necessarily such as might answer all the purposes of prophecy. This dispensation was undoubtedly adapted to the character and peculiar circumstances of the Jewish nation. It will be easily conceived what ideas these words, character and circumstances, are intended to convey; and it is needless that I should point them out.

The plan of the new economy was very different. It was not to be confined to one family alone. All the nations of the earth, for a great series of ages, were to be partakers in it. How would it have been possible to assemble in one and the same place all the nations of the world, to authenticate to them the new minister of this new economy, which was to take place of the ancient, to perfect it, and render it universal?

But if the mission of this minister had been foretold, at sundry times, and in divers manners, by many prophecies sufficiently circumstantial with respect to the time of his coming, so that the character of his person, his functions, &c. could not reasonably be mistaken by that people, who were the first object of his mission; if other nations could also come to the knowledge of these prophecies; if the minister of this new economy was to be endued with supernatural power and wisdom; if he was to do works which none other had done; if man had never spoken as this man spoke; if he was to give to other men the power of doing the same works, and still greater; if he was to send them to all nations, to enlighten them, and to signify the good-will of the Father of all; if, consequently, he was to endue these messengers with an extraordinary gift, by the means of which they might communicate their thoughts to these nations, and be by them understood but the intelligent reader, the friend of truth, has already anticipated me and to his judgment I refer these considerations.

done thus: but I must say, God has done thus, therefore it is wise. What! shall a being so consummately ignorant as I am, presume to determine on the ways of Wisdom itself? The only occupation which appears proportioned to my weak faculties, is to study the ways of that adorable Wisdom, and to feel the value of his unbounded kindness.

There yet remains, however, another circumstance which will require his attention. These miracles of the ancient economy, which had been wrought before the eyes of a whole nation, have not continued from age to age in that nation. All the succeeding generations to our own days, have not seen with their own eyes, the superb appearance of the sovereign of the Jews, and yet have strongly adhered to his law; all have been fully convinced of the truth of this appearance, and of the divine mission of the first legislator. What then has been the logical foundation of this strong and permanent persuasion ? Wherefore does the present generation persevere in the belief entertained by the generations before them? This logical foundation undoubtedly rests on oral and written tradition. The proofs, therefore, of the miracles of the ancient economy, as well as of the miracles of the new economy, depend essentially on the rules of testimony.

The question, therefore, amounts to this; namely, Whether the testimonies, on which the mission of the second legislator rests, are inferior in force to those which establish the mission of the first legislator? This important inquiry concerns parti cularly the wise men of that nation, which is dispersed even to this day amongst all people, and which still rejects the mission of the second legislator, clearly foretold by the first, and foretold. in a still clearer and more precise manner by later prophets.

CHAP. VIII.

APPARENT CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN DIF FERENT PARTS OF THE DEPOSITION.-REFLEC TIONS ON THAT SUBJECT.

SAID that there exists a harmony

I parts

evidence; that they all appear to have the same scope and design: I nevertheless perceive a great difference both as to the form and the matter; nay, I further discover here and there contradictions, at least they appear so to me. I find difficulties which occur on certain points of genealogy, of places, persons, and facts; and I do not immediately discover a ready solution to these difficulties.

As I have not the least interest to induce me to believe these difficulties insurmount able, I do not set out by imagining they

are só. I have studied the logic of the heart as well as that of the mind; I have also acquired some knowledge of that science called Criticism, with which I ought not to be utterly unacquainted; I bring together the parellel passages; I compare them one with another; I anatomize them; and I borrow the assistance of the best interpreters. I. soon perceive the difficulties disappear; the light increases every instant; is diffused on every side; and illumines equally the most obscure parts of the object.

If there be nevertheless corners which, in my opinion, do not receive sufficient light, if there be still remaining some clouds which I cannot effectually disperse, it will never enter into my mind, and still less into my heart, to draw conclusions against the general scope of the evidence; because these obscurities do not destroy, in my opinion, the strong light which is reflected from the great parts of the picture.

I have a right to doubt; philosophical doubt is the path which conducts to truth: but I must be also candid. True philoso-phy is utterly inconsistent with disingenui

ty; and true philosophy resides in the heart more than in the head. If, in a critical ex- · amination of any work, I direct myself by the safest and most common rules of interpretation; if one of those rules directs me to judge from the general harmony and correspondence of the whole; if, by another rule, I am taught that trifling difficulties can never weaken this whole, more especially when the most essential characters of truth, or at least of probability, are impressed upon it; why should I refuse to apply these rules to the examination of the evidence in question? and why am I not to form my opinion of this evidence by the correspondence of the whole? Do not these apparent contradictions, these difficulties of different kinds, clearly indicate that the authors of the various parts of the evidence have not copied each other; and that each of them has set forth what he received by the testimony of his own senses, or what he had learnt from ocular witnesses? If these different parts of the evidence had agreed more exactly with each other, not only in the form, but in the matter, might I not then have justly suspected, that they all