I had eaten the apple and kept the orange. But why, if he did not feel that at the time he had the power to keep the orange and eat the apple? Yes, men have the and the consciousness that they have it power; will go with them through eternity. What says God, when he warns the sinner of the consequence of his evil choice? Lest thou mourn at the last, when thy flesh and thy body are consumed, and say, how have I hated instruction and my heart despised reproof, and have not obeyed the voice of my teacher, nor inclined mine ear to them that instructed me. Incurable regret will arise from the perfect consciousness that when we did evil we did it freely of choice, under no coercion; that the act was our own, and that we are justly reponsible for it. This is the worm that never dies, this, this is the fire that never shall be quenched. And because this consciousness is in men, you never can reason them out of a sense of their accountability. Many have tried it, but none have effectually or for any length of time succeeded; and the reason is plain, there is nothing which the mind is more conscious of than the fact of its own voluntary action with the power of acting right or wrong. The mind sees and knows, and regrets when it has done wrong. Take away this consciousness and there is no remorse. You can't produce remorse, as long as a man feels that his act was not his own--that it was not voluntary but the effect of compulsion. He may dread consequences, but you never can make him feel remorse for the act on its own account. This is the reason why men who have reasoned away the existence of God and argued to prove that the soul is nothing but matter, know, as soon as they reflect, that all their reasoning is false. There is a lamp within, which they can't extinguish, and after all their metaphysics, they are conscious that they act freely, and that there is a God to whom they are responsible; and hence it is that when they cross the ocean, and a storm comes on, and they expect to go to the bottom, they begin, straightway, to pray to God and confess

their sins.

6thly. I have only to say that there are traces of this principle of the moral government of God, in the administration of all human governments. They all proceed upon the supposition of a natural ability to do right. They take it for granted, and as they depart from this assumption, and substitute physical coercion for moral influence, they debase man, and break him down into an animal. Treat men as if they were dogs, and soon they will act like dogs. But the moment you treat them as free moral agents and responsible for their actions, that moment you begin to elevate them: just as you do a child when you trust him and address his reason; he feels that he is raised, and he acts accordingly; and just as you depart from this you become unable to manage your child. He gets out of your hands, he gets above you; for as respects his relation to

you, he is indomitable. The will of man is stronger than anything in the universe, except the Almighty God; and if you disregard this truth you ruin your child.

I have now finished the argument in confirmation of the doctrine of the Confession of Faith, so far as the confirmation is derived from the nature of things.

There

The interpretation given by Dr. Wilson goes up stream. It is against the whole constitution of the universe. It is contrary to the common sense and intuitive perceptions of man. is a deep and a universal consciousness in all men as to the freedom of choice, and in denying this you reverse God's constitution of man. You assume that God gave a deceptive constitution to mind, or a deceptive consciousness. Now I think that God is as honest in his moral world as he is in the natural world. I believe that in our consciousness he tells the truth, and that the natural constitution, universal feelings and perceptions of men are the voice of God speaking the truth; and if the truth is not here, where may we expect to find it?

My next argument is to show that in view of such reasoning the whole church of God has set her seal to this doctrine, and that what has been termed a slander upon her fair fame, so far from being a slander, will turn out to be a glorious truth, and that the demonstration of it will have wiped off from her fame a foul stigma, which was cast upon it by a misinterpretation of her standards.

I affirm then, in support of my exposition of the Confession, that the received doctrine of the church from the primitive age down to this day is, that man is a free agent, in possession of such natural powers as are adequate to a compliance with every requirement of God. Now as to the evidence of this, it is derived from two sources

first, the creeds of different branches of the church, and secondly, the works of her standard writers-and by standard writers I mean such as by their talent, learning, number, and the veneration attached to their names may be taken as fair representatives of the current opinion of the church from age to age. And I affirm, that the greatest and the best men in the church have taught the very same doctrine that I teach, and which I say the Confession of Faith teaches. If this is so, it settles the question.

But Dr. Wilson has said, what are the opinions of these writers to us? What have we to do with them? I answer that the opinions of great and good men in the church, showing how the church from generation to generation has understood the Bible, is a light in which both he and I have reason to rejoice. And if I shall bring the united testimony of the talent, learning and piety of the church, in support of my exposition, I am willing to run the risk of going to Synod. I shall therefore submit to the Presbytery a series of quotations from the fathers as I find them, collected by Dr. Scott, in his remarks

According to us, there is nothing in any rational crcature, which is not capable of good as well as evil. There is no nature that does not admit of good and evil, except that of God, which is the foundation of all good. p. 66.

We have frequently shown in all our disputations, that the nature of rational souls is such as to be capable of good and evil. Every one has the power of choosing good and choosing evil. p. 67.

It is our business to live virtuously, and that God requires of us not as his own gift, or supplied by any other person, or as some think decreed by fate, but as our own work. p. 68.

A thing does not happen because it was foreknown, but it was foreknown because it would happen. This distinction is necessary. For if any one so interprets what was to happen as to make what was foreknown necessary, we do not agree with him, for we do not say that it was necessary for Judas to be a traitor, although it was foreknown that Judas would be a traitor. For in the prophecies concerning Judas, there are complaints and accusations against him, publicly proclaiming the circumstance of his blame; but he would be free from blame, if he had been a traitor from necessity, and if it had been impossible for him to be like the other apostles. pp. 80, 81.

The virtue of a rational creature is mixed, arising from his own free will, and the divine power conspiring with him who chooses that which is good. But there is need of our own free will, and of divine cooperation, which does not depend upon our will, not only to become good and virtuous, but after we become so, that we may persevere in virtue, since even a person who is made perfect, will fall away, if he be elated by his virtue and ascribe the whole to himself, not referring the due glory to Him, who contributes by far the greater share, both in the acquisition of virtue and the perseverance of it. p. 82.

The fault is in him who chooses, and not in God.For God has not made nature or the substance of the soul bad; for he who is good can make nothing but what is good. Every thing is good which is according to nature. Every rational soul has naturally a good free will formed for the choice of what is good. But when a man acts wrongly, nature is not to be blamed; for what is wrong, takes place not according to nature, but contrary to nature, it being the work of choice and not of nature. For when a person who had the power of choosing what is good, did not choose it, but involuntarily turned away from what is best, pursuing what was worst; what room for escape could be left him, who is become the cause of his own internal disease, having neglected the innate law, as it were, his Savior and Physician. p. 91.

In all these quotations, the words of these

fathers must be expounded with regard to the object at which their writings were directed. Let it not be forgotten, that the first heresy which vexed the church after the days of the apostles, was the pagan notion of fate, or such a necessary concatenation of cause and effect, as was above the will both of gods and men; the very gods themselves had no power to resist it. The same notion was involved in the heresy of the gnostics, who held that all sin lay in matter, and that man was a sinner from necessity; and of the manicheans, who held that all sin was in the created substance of the mind. Now in resisting these heretics, these fathers maintained with zeal the doctrine of free will, meaning thereby not an unbiased will, but a will free from the necessity of fate, for the philosophers and the gnostics, and the manicheans all held the doctrine of man's natural inability. The philosophers derived it from fate; the gnostics, from the corruption of matter; the manicheans from the constitution and nature of the soul. This was the first great attack upon the truth, on which these venerable men were called to fix their sanctified vision, and it was against these several versions of error, that they bore their testimony in favor

of free will.

Cyril of Jerusalem, A. D. 348.

Learn also this, that the soul before it came into the world committed no sin, but having come sinless we now sin through free will.

The soul has free will: the devil indeed may suggest, but he has not also the power to compel contrary to the will. He suggests the thought of fornication -if you be willing you accept it, if unwilling you reject it: for if you committed fornication by necessity, why did God prepare a hell? If you acted justly by nature and not according to your own free choice, why did God prepare unutterable rewards? p. 103,

Hilary, A. D. 304.

The excuse of a certain natural necessity in crimes is not to be admitted. For the serpent might have been innocent, who himself stops his ears that they may be deaf. p. 110.

There is not any necessity of sin in the nature of men, but the practice of sin arises from the desires of the will and the pleasures of vice.

Perseverence in faith is indeed the gift of God, but the beginning is from ourselves, and our will ought to have this property from itself, namely, that it exerts itself.

Epiphanius and Basil, 360, 370.

How does he seem to retain the freedom of his will in this world? For to believe or not to believe, is in our own power. But where it is in our power to believe or not to believe, it is in our power to act rightly or to sin, to do good, or to do evil.-Epiphanius.

They attribute to the heavenly bodies the causes of those things that depend on every one's choice, I mean habits of virtue and of vice.-Basil p. 115.

If the origin of virtuous or vicious actions be not in ourselves, but there is an innate necessity, there is no need of legislators to prescribe what we are to do and what we are to avoid; there is no need of judges to honor virtue or punish wickedness. For it is not the injustice of the thief or murderer who could not restrain

his hand even if he would, because of the insuperable necessity which urges him to the actions.-Basil. p. 116.

tor.

Gregory of Nazianzen A. D. 370.

The good derived from nature, has no claim to acceptance; but that which proceeds from free will is deserving of praise. What merit has fire in burning? for the burning comes by nature. What merit has water in descending? For this it has from the CreaWhat merit has snow in being cold? or the sun in shining. For it shines whether it will or not. Give me a virtuous will. Give me the becoming spiritual, from being carnal; the being raised by reason from being depressed by the weight of the flesh; the being found heavenly from having been low-minded; the appearing superior to the flesh, after having been bound to the flesh. p. 124.

We have now come to Augustine. And now it will be necessary to avail myself of the remarks I made on the laws of exposition. I said that it was necessary, in order to a right exposition of any ancient instrument in the church, to take into view the controversies which prevailed at the time of its composition. We must now apply this especially to Augustine. Down to his time, the free will and natural ability of man were held by the whole church, against the heretical notions of a blind fate, of material depravity, and of depravity created in the substratum of the soul. The great effort, hitherto, had been to throw moral qualities into the will. But now Pelagius arose, and denied the doctrine of the fall; and from this spot it became necessary not so much to prove natural ability which Pelagius admitted, as to prove moral inability, which was as much opposed to the Pelagian heresy as it was to that of the pagan philosophers, of the gnostics, and of the manicheans. The church had now to enter upon a new controversy, and to fix her eye upon the question, what were the consequences of the fall? The question of free agency was no longer to be argued, for that was not now controverted. Both Augustine and Pelagius admitted it. The question which

now exists between Dr. Wilson and myself was not at issue between them. The question indeed had the same name, viz: touching free will; but it did not mean the same thing. The ques tion between them was, is the will unbiassed? Is it in equilibrio? It was not, whether it was free from the necessity of fate, or the influence of matter, or of created depravity; but the question was, has the fall given it a bias? has it struck it out of equilibrio? and struck the balance Augustine said, wrong? Pelagius said, no. yes; and while in opposition to Pelagius, he denied free will, he was as strong in favor of free will in the other sense, as any of the fathers before him; as strong as I am: so that if I am a Pelagian, Augustine was a Pelagian; although his whole strength was exerted against Pelagius. If what I teach is Pelagianism, then Augustine, and Calvin, and Luther, and all the best writers of the church in this age have been Pelagians, except a few who deny natural ability.

Augustine, A. D. 398.

Free will is given to the soul, which they who endeavor to weaken by trifling reasoning, are blind to such a degree, that they do not even understand that they say those vain and sacrilegious things, with their own will. p. 176.

Every one is the author of his own sin. Whence, if you doubt, attend to what is said above, that sins not be justly avenged unless committed with the will. are avenged by the justice of God; for they would ibid.

It follows that nothing makes the mind companion of lust, except its own free will. ibid.

But now sin is so far a voluntary evil, that it is by no means sin, unless it be voluntary: and this indeed is so clear, that not any of the learned and no con

siderable number of the unlearned dissent from it. p. 179.

Which free will if God had not given, there could be no just sentence of punishment, nor reward for right conduct, nor a divine precept to repent of sins, nor pardon of sins, which God has given us through our Lord Jesus Christ; because he who does not sin have said, unless we had free will would not be sins. with his will, does not sin at all. Which sins, as I Wherefore, if it be evident that there is no sin where

soul has done that it should be punished by God or there is not free will, I desire to know, what harm the repent of sin, or deserve pardon since it has been guilty of no sin. p. 214.

That there is free will, and that from thence every one sins if he wills, and that he does not sin, if he does not will, I prove not only in the divine scriptures, which you do not understand, but in the words of your own Manes himself: hear then concerning free will, first, the Lord himself when he speaks of two trees, which you yourself have mentioned: hear him saying, make the tree corrupt and his fruit corrupt." When

Either make the tree good and his fruit good, or else

therefore he says, 'do this or do that,' he shows power, not nature. For no one, except God, can make a tree, but every one has it in his will, either to choose those things that are good and be a good tree; or to choose those things that are bad, and be a bad tree. p. 215.

If he (Pelagius) will agree that the will itself and