"The powers given to the government imply the ordinary means of execution; and the government in all sound reason and fair interpretation, must have the choice of the means which it deems the most convenient and appropriate to the execution of the power." (1 Kent, 252.)

It would seem impossible for any fair and logical mind, after due consideration, to deny the truth of either of these two propositions: 1. That the power to forgive and the power to retain sins, were conferred upon the apostles; 2. That with the main powers, were also given all the necessary incidents, to enable the apostles to carry the powers into practical effect.

These two positions being true, it follows that remission of sins committed after baptism, could only be had through the exercise of this power by the apostles. For it will be observed, that they had not only the power to remit, but also to retain sins. Both powers were given at the same time; and both were equally intended for practical application to individual cases. If the transgressor could obtain remission, without the consent of the apostles, then their power to retain sins would have been idle, because inefficient. Christ meant something effectual in giving the power to retain sins; and, therefore, He could not have intended to confer a contradictory power upon others. He would not give this power to the apostles, and require them to exercise it, and promise Himself to ratify their acts, and at the same time give the party offending, the power to escape the exercise of this function. He said explicitly, "Whose soever sins ye retain they are retained;" and He could not, therefore, violate this promise. If the party offending could obtain remission of sins, without applying to the apostles, who had the power to retain, as well as to remit; then, as a matter of course, he would not apply to them, for fear they would retain his sins. In practical effect, the exercise of these two most important powers would have been defeated, unless we concede that, when given, they were intended as exclusive and supreme.

The apostles, then, had the exclusive power to forgive and retain sins. What is sin? It is a violation of the law of Christ. One violation of this law constitutes one sin, and two or more violations constitute sins. Each transgression consti

tutes a separate and distinct offence. It is so in all laws defining crimes. If a man steal two different pieces of property, at different times, he commits two separate and distinct offences.

The power to remit and the power to retain sins, were the powers to remit or retain each particular transgression of the law. How, then, could the apostles remit or retain sins unless they knew what they were? It was not intended that these great powers should be exercised blindly. It could not have been intended that they should have the powers to remit and retain sin in one undistinguished mass; because the authority was to remit and retain sins, not sin. If they could remit and retain sin, not sins, without distinguishing between different violations of the law, then the whole end and purpose of these powers would have been substantially defeated. Such a view would confound all distinctions between different sins, and different individuals; and would, by this confusion of all just distinctions, render the exercise of these powers useless. How could the apostles tell what sins to remit or retain, unless they first knew what they were?

That each separate and distinct offence was intended, is shown by the command of St. James: "Confess your faults (in the Douay Bible, sins) one to another." (James v. 16.)

Now here the term sins (in the plural) must mean different transgressions. This is not only clear from the word itself, but from the purpose of the provision. This confession of sins was unquestionably a great duty; otherwise it would not have been imposed. It was not put upon us for a mere idle purpose. It must have been intended to accomplish something important. But if each individual was only required to confess the general fact that he had sinned, (and not his sins, as the apostle commanded,) the whole purpose of this command would be defeated; for the plain reason, that it places all upon the same footing, the flagrant offender with the most circumspect. For a man simply to say that he is a sinner, is simply to confess that he is as bad as the apostles, for they sinned also. It would be not the slightest humiliation to confess that which all must confess. Such a confession is no check upon transgression, as all must equally confess the same thing, and no more, whether they sin much or little. What possible reason could there be in re

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quiring only such a confession as that? What good could it accomplish? What humility could it require? Each and every one would have plenty of company. Such could not have been the intention of Christ, or of the apostle.

The right to acquire this knowledge of the particular sins. of each individual, must have been given with the delegation of the powers to remit and retain sins, because essentially neces sary to give force and effect to the powers themselves. How, then, did the apostles attain this knowledge of the sins of individuals? Did they possess the power to see into the hearts of all men, so as to know their secret thoughts? If so, what proof is there of this fact? On the contrary, is it not clear that St. Paul did not know of the divisions among the Corinthians until informed by them of the house of Chloe? So, a special vision was required to inform him that he could remain safely in a certain city. And is it not true, that many who "believed came and confessed, and showed their deeds"? (Acts xix. 18.)

The only way in which the apostles could know the secret sins or deeds of individuals, was by their confession. As the apostles had the right to remit or retain, they had the right to know the sins committed; and as the power, unless exclusive, would have been idle, it was the duty of all to apply to them. The facts being peculiarly within the knowledge of the party committing the sins, it was his duty to state them. The power given to the apostles to do certain things, imposed upon the parties governed, the corresponding duty to obey the apostles in respect to those things. As all sins are but transgressions of the law, the Church has the right to know them for two reasons: 1. Because her jurisdiction extends to all violations of the law she was left to execute; and her safety, success, and purity require this knowledge; 2. Because it is necessary for the safety of each individual member.

§ 3. Did these powers descend to the successors of the Apostles? I have endeavored to show, in another place, that Christ did create a permanent system; and for that reason, the provisions of His code were generally permanent. In other words, the permanent provisions of any permanent code must constitute the general rule, while the temporary provisions would constitute

the exceptions. All the provisions of such a code are, therefore, prima facie permanent; and the exceptions must be so marked, either by express words or by the nature of the power conferred or command given, as to show that they are temporary only. He who alleges exceptions to a general rule, or to a prima facie case, must show them. This rule results from the plainest principles of right reason. When we look into the Constitution of the United States, (which organized a permanent system of gov ernment in the contemplation of the theory itself,) we find that there is not a single permanent provision expressly marked, as such, while the temporary provisions are so marked. Where permanent powers are conferred, they are given without any limitation, as to time, as the power to collect taxes, borrow and coin money, regulate commerce, declare war, &c. But the temporary provisions are expressly marked, so as to be readily distinguished from the permanent features of this instrument; as, for example, in clause 3, section 1, and in clause 1, section 9, and in clause 2, section 3, of article 1, and in article 5. It is much easier to expressly mark each of the few exceptions than to expressly mark each of the numerous cases coming under the general rule.

It would seem clear that this rule is equally as applicable to the system of Christ as to that of any other lawgiver. That He did organize a permanent system, is certain; and that the great and overwhelming mass of the provisions of His code are permanent and component parts of this system of law, is equally certain.

But we are not left without express authority to sustain this view.

These positions would seem to be true: 1. That the act of conferring these powers upon the apostles was a command to exercise them in proper cases; 2. That the powers are such, in their very nature, as may come down, through the Church, to the end of time.

Now, in the commission, the apostles were expressly commanded to teach all nations to observe all things whatsoever they the apostles-had been commanded to observe. As I have elsewhere endeavored to show, this wide commission, by its very express terms, carried forward to the successors of the

apostles, in their proper capacities, all the powers, promises, and duties incumbent on, or given to, the apostles themselves, except those marked as temporary, either in express words, or by the peculiar nature of the act to be performed.* The apostles having been commanded to exercise these powers, and they, being permanent in their nature, and nowhere marked as temporary, must still reside in the Church, the permanent institution created by Christ Himself. Those who once concede that these powers were originally conferred upon the apostles, will find it very difficult to escape this conclusion; for if they can defeat the present existence of these powers in this case, they can, upon the same basis of reasoning, defeat all the powers of the Church, and the entire system itself.f

But let us inquire into the purposes for which these powers were originally delegated. They were certainly bestowed by

* That the apostles exercised powers of government over the Church in their day, cannot be denied. That this exercise of power was supreme over the individual members of the Church, must be true. That a portion of these powers came down to their successors, must be admitted. How, then, shall we distinguish between those duties which were personal to the apostles and those not so? In other words, how shall we distinguish between the permanent and temporary provisions of the code? We must make the distinction. I cannot conceive of any other possible and efficient rule than the one I have given.

Bishop Porteus seems to have been aware of the decisive strength of this position; and, therefore, insisted that the words of Christ did not confer upon the apostles any real power to forgive sins, but only "a power of declaring who were truly penitent, and of inflicting miraculous punishments on sinners, as likewise the preaching the word of God," &c. (Cited End of Con., Part iii., p. 83.) plain a passage could have been tole

But how such a misconstruction of so rated by any learned man, is surprising. The text is exceedingly explicit, and the two main words, remit and sins, upon which the sense depends, are remarkably definite and certain in their meaning. It so happens that these terms can mean nothing else in that connection but the view I have taken. Lawgivers are not wont to indulge in the use of mere surplus words. Their aim is to be concise and certain. Now could Bishop Porteus, or any other man, select words more concise and certain than those used by our Lord, conceding that He intended to confer the real power to forgive and retain sins? What form of words could be used in such a case more clear, without useless verbiage? I cannot conceive of terms more clear and concise. And if this be true that Christ did use the most concise and certain terms possible, to confer a real power, then what right have we to say He still did not intend to make such a delegation of power? It was our Lord's practice to use concise and certain terms.