at every step the first principles on which it is founded, they have a tacit confidence which the mere empiric can never reach. I use the word empiric in its philosophical sense, not as a term of obloquy or reproach. pp. 82, 83.

The non possum non vehementer mirari, which occurs in the: motto Mr. Penrose has adopted from the "De Augmentis," does not precisely relate to the deficiency which he aims to supply. The unoccupied tract in the field of Moral Philosophy which Lord Bacon pointed out, still remains unenclosed and uncultivated. Happily, however, in this, as in so many other cases, Practice, directed by religion, good sense, and experience, leaves little but a formal and purely scientific deficiency to be filled up.

In the beginning of his seventh book, Bacon says, that moralists have, as it were, in their descriptions of man in the ab stract, set us a fine copy, but have left few instructions relative to the management of the pen, or the formation of the letters. And he attributes this neglect to the cause which had, till his time, impeded the progress of other sciences; namely, the reluctance of proud and purblind philosophers to converse with vulgar fact, to make themselves acquainted with particulars, and to adapt speculations to practical purposes: Fastidiant Scriptores versari in rebus vulgatis et plebeiis, quæ nec satis subtiles sint ad disputandum, nec satis illustres ad ornandum.* Another cause should, however, be named as having operated to obstruct the progress of science in this branch of Morals. The culture of the will,' to be treated scientifically, requires, as he distinctly states, a knowledge of the varieties of human nature, (characteres diversi dispositionum) as well as of the mor bid affections of the mind, and of their remedies. But these varieties fall under no obvious distinctions of genera and species. Now the step of science must faulter when she essays to enter upon the analysis and subsequent classification of individual diversities. It has seemed, therefore, to be tacitly acknowledged, that human nature is to be known as a matter of science, only in the abstract, and that the world of facts relative to human nature in the concrete, must be left in wild confusion, or at best collected into petty heaps by the unguided tact of observers. It is, perhaps, at the present time, a general opinion, that the infinite varieties of human nature follow no general laws; or, that these laws are too complicated, and too much obscured in their conjoined operation, to be ascertained. If this subject shall ever receive light,-we will not affirm that

* Lib. vii. cap. 1.

it is of much more importance than the better classification of sea-shells, if it shall ever receive light, it will be in following upon the road which Bacon's giant tread has already trampled broad, firm, and smooth. Individual facts must be perfectly and separately analysed; and the correspondence between forms and physical appearances and the qualities of the mind, must be employed, not, indeed, as the guide to discovery, but as the natural means of noting those discoveries which may be made. If we might conclude with a conceit, we should say, that neither Physiognomy nor Phrenology must aspire to hold the lantern to the discoverer in this region; but they may carry his inkhorn.

Art. III. The Naval History of Great Britain, from the Declaration of War by France, on February 1793; to the Accession of George IV. in January, 1820; with an Account of the Origin and progressive Increase of the British Navy; illustrated, from the Commencement of the year 1793, by a Series of Tabular Abstracts, contained in a separate Quarto Volume. By William James. Two volumes. 8vo. pp. 1194. Price 11. 16s. London. 1822.

IT

T is, in many respects, a most unfortunate circumstance, that the study of history tends to foster a habit of scepticism. Independently of dishonest intention or partial feeling, there are so many sources of uncertainty even in actual inspection, that, while we are on our guard against the proverbial exaggerations of rumour, the statements of the looker-on seem to require a scarcely less suspicious investigation. Relative position, more or less comprehension of the real nature of the transaction, calmness or agitation, with a thousand varieties of intellectual or physical constitution, will have a decided influence on the views and descriptions of the most unbiassed spectator. The main facts will be substantially correct, and will appear to be confirmed by the result; but there may remain a number of accessories, which, if correctly observed, and fairly brought forward, would necessarily have influenced the estimate of the by-stander, and given a different colour to the business as a whole. With how much caution, then, should we receive those official narrations which are drawn up under every possible inducement to erroneous detail. The hurry of preparation, the confusion and anxiety of actual conflict, the depression of captivity, the humiliation of failure, or the intoxication of victory, place, for instance, military despatches among the most questionable of records, even when their simplicity, and the arithmetical minuteness of their returns, seem to guarantee their unimpeachable fidelity. Lord Howe was

distinguished for that species of steady courage which enables an officer both to look coolly on that part of the conflict which comes within his own range of observation, and to sift the statements of those on whom he is compelled to rely for more distant transactions. Yet we find his Lordship, in his letter describing the actions connected with the victory of the first of June, 1794, affirming that a French line-of-battle ship was sunk during the engagement; whereas the only vessel which was thus lost, did not go down until the fleet of admiral Villaret was, with the exception of a single frigate, completely out of sight. The blunders which have been multiplied, in every possible way, by unofficial writers, have rendered their narratives quite unworthy of trust. Captain Schomberg, in his "Naval Chronology," relates, that, in May 1793, the Hyæna of 24 guns and 160 men, commanded by Capt. William Hargood, being on a cruise off Hispaniola, fell in with la Concorde, French frigate of 40 guns and 320 men. After a severe and spirited conflict, in which the Hyæna was dreadfully shattered, her first lieutenant and many of her crew killed and wounded, Captain Hargood was obliged to surrender.' On the 11th October of the same year, the Captain and his officers were honourably acquitted by a court-martial, on the express ground that every means had been used to prevent the Hyæna from being captured.' Mr. James's statement is as follows:

On the 27th of May, the Hyæna, when abont two miles off Cape Tiberon, discovered a French frigate approaching her. Capt. Hargood immediately called his officers aft, and, with their concurrence, hauled down the Hyæna's colours. Whether the Concorde's guns were of iron or of wood, and whether or not her shot could “ kill,” "wound," and "shatter," seems to have been a mere matter of conjecture.'

But a circumstance which has the most important bearing on the correctness of all the official narratives of naval contests, arises from the mode of rating the vessels of the English fleet. In 1779, an important innovation began to be made in the armament of ships. A new kind of ordnance, said to have been the invention of General Robert Melville, and named carronade, from the Carron iron company at whose foundery it was cast, came partially into use. Although shorter than the navy 4 pounder, and lighter, by a trifle, than the navy 12 pounder, this gun equalled, in its cylinder, the 8 inch howit zer. From its tremendous effects on timber, the inventor had denominated this formidable engine, the Smasher. After encountering many difficulties in its introduction, this arm has become a favourite in the English navy, since, though its VOL. XVIII. N.S.

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limited range renders it useless at a distance, it is dreadfully effective at close quarters. But, notwithstanding the power of this artillery, it was not taken into the account in the rating of the ships which carried it. The practice had been to reckon the long guns only, in settling the rank of men-of-war, and the carronade was not permitted to interfere with this arrangement. Hence originated a series of misstatements which gave a character entirely erroneous to much of the naval history of the late war. Victories in which every advantage was on our own side, appeared to be gained by us against fearful odds; and the gallantry of our opponents was most unfairly thrown into the shade. The plan adopted by Mr. James must have cost him great labour in the acquisition of the necessary formation; but, in return, it very effectually answers the purpose of displaying the positive and relative strength of the vessels engaged. He attaches to each distinct narrative two tables; one containing a specific statement of the armament of either party in guns of different calibre, and in men; the second giving a comparative estimate of the respective forces in ships, guns, broadside weight of metal, crew, and tonnage. In fact, he seems to have spared no pains in the collection of his materials; and in the use of them, he has displayed considerable talent and exemplary impartiality, without any abatement of genuine English feeling. We should not, indeed, do justice to his work, if we did not express a very high opinion of its value.

He commences with an introductory history of the British navy, not very well written, but drawn up from authentic sources; beginning with the Great Harry, built in the third year of the reign of Henry the Seventh, and tracing the gradual changes and improvements down to the war of the Revolution. He intermixes, indeed, with his researches, rather too large a portion of very unedifying criticisms on the inappropriateness and ambiguity of certain terms of distinction applied to the different parts and appendages of a ship of war; we can readily excuse, however, the little annoyance occasioned by these ill-judged interruptions, in consideration of the important information which accompanies them. When he fairly launches into the directly narrative part of his subject, he secures our attention by the clearness and discrimination of his details, and by the new light in which he places many events of which we had been accustomed to take a very different view.

Among the most gallant actions which distinguished the commencement of the war, the engagement between the Thames and the Uranie stands conspicuous. The latter mounted 42 carriage guns, and her broadside weight of metal

was 394 pounds, while the former had only 32 guns, and her broadside carried only 174 pounds. Yet, Capt. Cotes and his gallant crew maintained a desperate contest during more than three hours, when the Uranie hauled off, both vessels being dreadfully shattered. The result was every way singular. The Uranie, when she lay-to to repair her damages, was evidently pumping with all her remaining strength; and when, after an anxious and hurried preparation of the Thames for a renewal of the battle, her crew looked round them for their antagonist, the Frenchman was no where to be seen, either from the deck or the tops. It did not appear possible that the Uranie should have run out of sight; and it is certain that she was never afterwards heard of under that name. The Thames was immediately afterwards taken by a French squadron; and though her officers were principally resident as prisoners at Brest, in which harbour, or in the neighbouring port of Quimper, the Uranie must necessarily have sought shelter, they could never, by the most diligent inquiries, obtain any tidings of her whatsoever. The inference is, that she must have gone to the bottom under the well directed fire of her puny opponent. There is, however, some suspicion entertained, on what grounds does not appear, that the Tortue, captured in 1797, might have been the Uranie with a new name.

It was during the first year of the war, that the occupation of Toulon by the allied fleets and troops under the direction of Lord Hood, took place. The troops landed on the 27th of August 1793, and the evacuation was effected on the 19th of December. We have made this slight referénce only as introductory to the following interesting narrative.

On the 3d of January, the British 32 gun frigate Juno, captain Samuel Hood, quitted the island of Malta, with 150 supernumeraries, (46 of them the Romney's marines, the remainder Maltese,) for the use of the British Mediterranean fleet; which captain Hood, being unapprised of the evacuation of Toulon, expected to find at anchor in that port. A strong lee current and a succession of foul winds, prevented the Juno from arriving abreast of the harbour's mouth, until about ten o'clock on the night of the 11th; when captain Hood, not wishing to run the risk of being again thrown to-leeward, especially with so many men on board, determined to get into Toulon as quickly as possible. The Juno having no pilot or person on board, acquainted with the port, two midshipmen, with night-glasses, were stationed forward, to look out for the fleet. No ships making their appearance in the outer harbour, captain Hood concluded that the strong easterly gales had driven the fleet for shelter into the inner one on entering which he saw a vessel, with the lights of several others; and he had now no doubt on the subject. The Juno proceeded under her topsails; until, finding she could not weather a brig that lay off Pointe