difficulty and darkness attending our enquiries into the metaphyfical nature and effence of the Son and of the bleffed Spirit, and of their unity with, and diftinction from the Father; and fince the Spirit has not condefcended to reveal this myftery to us, in his word, in evident and exprefs language; I think we may be content to take this matter on the foot whereon it stands in Scripture, without affecting to discourse of it in clearer ideas, than thofe under which the holy Spirit has thought fit to reveal it. CHA P. II. That fuppofing we could attain to clear ideas of the Trinity, yet Mr. Watts has not answer'd his defign of affording us fuch. W HAT has been advanced in the pre ceding chapter makes it appear, that the Doctrine of the Trinity is a matter of fo fublime a nature, that it is not poffible for us to attain to clear ideas of the way and manner, how three perfons can be one God; fo that the safest way is to cleave to this affertion; what the Scripture has declared in fact to be, must be true, how little notion foever we may have of the modus of it. However, if we were to fuppofe it probable, that a scheme fhould be invented, that might have clear ideas annex'd to it, ftill I muft maintain, that Mr. Watts has been far from furnishing us with such a scheme; nay, I cannot but think, he has brought in more darkness and inconfiftency, than most who have wrote on this matter. This is a charge which 2 cannot cannot but fenfibly affect any author, much more one who bears the character of a clean and polite writer; and therefore, for the fupport of it, I fhall be very careful to produce our author's own words, without adding any thing that may serve to give them an obfcure or uncouth turn; looking upon fuch an artifice to be too mean for me to ufe, as well as unworthy of the cause in which I am engaged. b Our author takes a notice of a diftinction in the Divine Nature, which is "a diftinction of modes and properties, as when the different attributes of the Divine Nature, fuch as power, wisdom, and goodness, are reprefented as a facred Trinity." This he juftly rejects, as not affording a fufficient difference for the various afcriptions which are given to Father, Son, and Spirit in Scripture; therefore he tells us of another distinction, which is," that of Divine Powers, as when the Divine Effence, with its two different powers of mind and will, or principles of knowledge and efficiency, are reprefented as the bleffed Three, the Father, the Word, and the holy Spirit." This he thinks he can call real, in fome fenfe, because there is a plain reality in the diftinction, tho' it arise not to distinct fubftances. Now, I confefs, I have no clear idea how this diftinction is greater, or more real, than the other; for there is a real distinction between fimple attributes, as well as between them, when put into action: fo that here, I think, our author might, with as much clearness, have faid, that tho' there is only a modal diftinction between the attributes of wisdom and power; yet there is a real diftinction between the principles of 4 p. 214. knowledge Page 213. bp. 214. p. 213. knowledge and efficience. If any can form a us, He farther tells fus, "that whatsoever clear ideas we frame of God, by the light of nature, we derive them from an inward reflection on our own fouls, and their various properties and powers of understanding and will." Now, tho' I grant, that from the confideration, of our own. fouls, we may get an imperfect idea of an immaterial fubftance, which may give us fome faint image of the spirituality and immateriality of God, yet I do not fee, that Mr. Watts has put us into a way of gaining any clear ideas of God; for we can find no refemblance between infinite wifdom, and perfect omniscience, and our fhallow understandings, and ignorance of more things than we know; neither can our inability to put in practice what our finite understandings intend, give us a clear idea of the infinite power of God, who can do all things that his wifdom contrives, and his will defigns; no more can the variableness of our wills, which are more fickle than the wind, help us to an adequate conception of the immutability of the Father of lights, with whom there is neither variableness, nor fhadow of turning. He adds indeed, that we must "fuppofe the tranfcendent fuperiority of God to ourselves" that is to fay, when we have gain'd clear ideas of God, we must fuppofe him tranfcendently above our ideas. If this laft thing be fuppofed, as it really muft, by us finite creatures, I do not know how we can be faid to have clear ideas. Our Our author afterwards afks, 8" Since the human foul has two diftinct powers; the knowing power, called the mind, and the active power, called the will, why may we not fuppofe the bleffed God to have two diftinct powers, called the Word and the Spirit; the one cognofcitive, and the other active." And he goes on to tell us, h that as the human foul has in it intelligence and volition, and a power of moving the body; fo if there were any fingle term which fignified both intelligence and volition together, he would choose to apply that to the divine Word; and if any fingle term fignified the power of operation, or moving the body, he would apply that to the holy Spirit, because he thinks this analogy and resemblance would come fomething nearer to the scriptural ideas of the Word and Spirit; the one being represented rather as an intelligent volitive power, and the other as an intelligent effective power." What light this rumbling ftuff is like to produce, I know not, if the ideas couched under this dark language be clear to our author, he has been very unhappy in choosing a dress wherein to clothe them. He acknowledges, i that his defign is not fo prefuming, as to express what the powers of the Deity are in themselves, but only to exhibit a fort of diftant human resemblance of them." So that he is to be commended for his modefty here, in not prefuming to give us clear ideas: and it must be readily acknowledg'd, that he has not attain'd to more than he has prefum'd. He infinuates, k" that we may call the Word a divine power or faculty of knowing and contriving all things, the Spirit an executive power 8 Page 218, b. p. 218, 219. ip. 219. p. 223. or or faculty which wills and effects all things:' and he fays, 1" when he represents the Word and Spirit by divine wisdom and power, he does not conceive of them merely as two attributes of the divine Nature, fuch as juftice, goodness, &c. but as fuch diftinct faculties, or perhaps more diftinct, than the understanding and will are in human spirits, which two are called powers rather than properties of the Soul;" tho' in another place, he thinks m divine properties may be used to express the divine Perfons. He owns, n" that the terms attribute, property, and power, may be used promifcuoufly for one another;" but he fays, "when there is a diftinction made between them, the terms property or attribute are applied to any fort of modes or qualities, that belong to a fubject; and that the term power denotes a diftinct principle of phyfical agency in the fubject, whereby it is render'd capable of acting in this or that manner." After this manner, he supposes the attributes of God to be qualities belonging to him as their fubject, but his Word and Spirit to be, in Scripture, reprefented as the phyfical principles of knowing, willing, and efficience (tho' it is to be observed, that there is not any footftep of fuch a way of fpeaking in Scripture:) he calls them powers, because this fort of idea admits of a greater diftinction, than the qualities we call attributes. I have tranfcrib'd all this, to let every one fee, that this ingenious author does not always deal forth clear ideas, or at leaft, does not clothe his clear ideas with plain language. I wonder why he fixes on the word power, to express what others call a divine Perfon; and my reafon against ! Page 224 m p. 205. p. 225. |