be quenched. It may be a question worthy of consideration, whether any crime, be it greater or less, will not deserve the same punishment forever, that it deserves at first. Perhaps suffering pain can never take away blame-worthiness on account of sin : and perhaps as long as blame-worthiness remains, just desert of punishment must remain. Both these I believe, are real truths, and that they would be felt as such by every man's conscience, could all misapprehensions be prevented.

That suffering doth not, in any measure, take away the blame-worthiness of one who hath committed sin, may easily be perceived to be a plain dictate of common sense. After any criminal hath been punished as much as the laws of men require, is he ever thought to be at all less blame-worthy than he was before? The damage which his crime has done, or had a tendency to do, to the public, or to individuals, may be compensated or prevented by his punishment; but does any one suppose he is for that reason blameless, just as if he had never offended? Is he ever thought to be any freer from actual guilt, than if he had been permitted to escape with impunity? Has he less sin to repent of, or less reason to judge and condemn himself, because he has been imprisoned or scourged, or branded, according to law? The lash may change the Ethiopian's skin, or the leopard's spots; but it can never inake a criminal innocent. Nothing is more evident than this, that crimes are not to be obliterated, and innocence restored, by involuntary sufferings. Sin is ever so written with a pen of iron, and the point of a diamond, as never to be effaced in regard to the ill desert, or blame-worthiness of the sinner.

That as long as blame-worthiness remains, just desert of punishment must remain, is what I apprehend

would also appear a plain dictate of common sense, were it not for some confusion of thought arising from inadequate comparisons; or from confounding ideas which are really different. I know we are apt to think that when a culprit hath suffered a certain number of stripes for a crime, for that particular offence he deserves no more. But I suppose the only reasons why we think thus are, either because in that case we measure desert by the law of the land, which is the judge's rule, beyond which he has no right to go: or else, because we measure desert by the supposed need there is of punishment. To punish beyond law, is wrong in a judge; it is illegal. To punish beyond necessity, is wrong in a legislator; it is unmerciful. But deserv ing punishment according to human laws, and deserving it in justice, are two things. Whether it would be necessary to punish, and whether it would be just, are also two things. In point of strict justice, abstractly from mercy, and from all idea of a limiting law, I think it must be a clear case, that blame-worthiness and punishment-worthiness, are ever exactly commenThat just as much, and just as long, as blame is deserved, punishment is deserved. Until therefore the sinner can stand up before his eternal Judge, and truly say, I have suffered so much, or so long, that I am become perfectly innocent, and deserve not to be faulted at all; he cannot plead releasement from prison, and from all further pains and penalties, as a matter of absolute justice. But I believe a sinner may suffer to all eternity, before he will be able truly to say this, of whatever magnitude his sins may have been.

surate.

This way of accounting for endless punishments, is far from supposing that all sins are of equal demerit. It does not go upon the supposition that they all, nor any of them, deserve infinite punishment. It only sup

poses that the ill desert of every sin, is durable, unalterable, and everlasting. The degree of punishment, which men deserve, is in proportion to the numbers and aggravations of their iniquities: but that degree of punishment, whatever it may be, they will deserve forever. Little things may be as lasting as things that The soul of man is not infinite, yet we sup pose it will exist without end.

are great.

If neither of the foregoing solutions should satisfy; there is yet another way of vindicating the sentence of eternal condemnation, as perfectly just. It may be considered as a sentence of reprobation to endless sin, and to endless misery as the necessary consequence. Certainly it is a righteous thing in God to say, whenever he sees fit, He that is unjust, let him be unjust still; and he that is filthy, let him be filthy still. The most High is not under obligation in justice, to keep his creatures from falling into a state of sin and misery; surely then we cannot suppose him under any such obligation to recover falien creatures to holiness and happiness. Those finally left to themselves will forever sin; and for this they will deserve to be forever vessels of wrath. Sin can never be innocent, or undeserving of punishment, by reason of the peculiar circumstances in which the sinner is placed. Being in a state of probation, and in a world of hope, is not certainly the only thing which renders impenitence, blasphemy, malice, or any kind of iniquity, culpable, and worthy of divine indignation. It is true we read that in the other world, every one shall receive according to the deeds done in the body, whether good or bad. But this needs not to be understood as implying, that nothing shall ever be received for things done after this life is ended. It may only mean that all, by the sentence of the Supreme Judge, will commence their

fixed future existence in a degree of happiness or misery, proportioned to their good or evil conduct in the present probationary state. There are ways, undoubtedly, in which the perfect justice of God's holy law in its penalty, as well as in its precepts, may be fairly and fully vindicated.

We proceed to the vindication of its perfect goodness. A good law, is one that is necessary and well adapted to answer good ends. However pure or equitable a law may be, yet if it be needless, and will do no good, it cannot well be called a good law. A law perfectly good, lays no duty on the subject, nor any penalty on the transgressor, however justly it might be laid, but what is requisite for some important or beneficient purpose.

We

That the divine law, in the preceptive part of it, is thus perfectly good, may very easily be evinced. may be sure that the commandments of God are perfectly good, because they require perfect goodness, and nothing but goodness. From those summaries of the moral law, which are given both in the Old Testament and in the New; and indeed from an attentive perusal of the whole book of the law, it is easy to see that the law of kindness, comprehends the whole law of God; or that every duty enjoined in the law and the prophets will readily and necessarily flow from love of God and our neighbour. Love is the fulfilling of the law; and such a law must certainly be dictated by love. No laboured proof will be required to convince any man that a law is good which obliges all others to be perfectly benevolent and good to him; and will any one be so inconsistent as not to acknowledge that it must be likewise a good law, which commands him to be perfectly benevolent and good to all others.

Besides, it is easy to show, tha ah the duties enjoined upon us are necessary for our own good, as well as for the glory of God and the good of our fellow creatures. We may truly say as Moses did, Deut. vi. 24. The Lord commanded us to do all these statutes, for our good always.

Is not this evidently the case in regard to the personal duties of sobriety and temperance? Certainly it would not have consisted with a perfect attention to our private temporal happiness, for God to have given us a law allowing us to live in luxury and excess, in gluttony and drunkenness. It is requisite for our worldly interest, for our bodily health, and for our best enjoy. ment even of the pleasures of sense, that we should deny ourselves those inordinate, sensual gratifications which are made unlawful in the word of God. Fleshly lusts war against the soul, and against the body too. To abstain from them as we are commanded, is necessary for the comfort of the life that now is, as well as in order to the happiness of that which is to come.

Is not this evidently the case in regard to the commands of righteousness and charity towards our neighbour? It is generally found to be most for the security and advancement of a man's wealth and outward estate, and is always most for his real happiness, to do justly and love mercy; to provide things honest in the sight of all men, and to be as liberal as the divine law requires. All the commanded social affections, are delightful affections; and all the forbidden unfriendly passions, are painful passions. Had nothing been in view but only our own felicity, the feelings and duties of humanity could not have been enjoined otherwise than they are.

Is not this also evidently the case in regard to the duties of religion? The tempers and exercises com