self-conceit. Some are blind for want of eyes; but it is an old proverb, that none are more blind than those who will not see,

These examples are sufficient to illustrate the distinction I am insisting on, and to make it evident, that by incapability, we often mean something very different from want of natural capacity. We may also perceive from these instances, that there is a real necessity for using such words as capable, incapable, cannot, &c. in this diversity of signification, in which we see they are used, in common speech, as well as in the scriptures. For whenever any thing, whether in ourselves or without us, is really absolutely inconsistent with our doing a thing, we have no way fully and strongly enough to express that inconsistence, but by saying we are unable, we cannot, it is impossible, or using some word of like import. And now it is certain that want of a heart, or inclination to do a thing, may be, and is, as inconsistent with our doing it as any thing else could be. Covetousness is as inconsitent with liberality as poverty, and may as effectually hinder a man from doing deeds of charity. Indolence is as inconsistent with industry, as bodily weakness and infirmity. The want of an upright heart and a public spirit, is as inconsistent with the character of a good ruler, as the want of wisdom and understanding. And the want of all principles of virtue must be as inconsitent with acting virtuously, as even the want of those intellectual faculties which are necessary to moral agency. And so on the other hand as to doing evil things. There is no possibility of doing them, that is, knowingly, designedly, and as moral agents, without an evil disposition. Our free and moral actions are, and must be, as invariably guided and dictated by our minds, as they are limited and bounded by our natural power. That is, every one must act

his own nature and choice; otherwise he does not act himself; he is not the agent. And if, when we would express this sort of necessity, we should not use the same phrases as are made use of in cases of natural necessity; but, for fear of a misunderstanding should carefully avoid saying a man cannot, whenever we mean only that he has not such a heart as is necessary, and only say that he will not, in all such cases; our language would often sound odd, being out of common custom, which governs the propriety of words; and not only so, but it would not be sufficiently expressive. Should we be afraid to say it is impossible for a man to love God, or come to Christ, while his heart is altogether wicked and full of enmity against God and Christ; people would be ready to think we imagined this might sometimes happen, and that there was no real impossibility in it of any kind. Whereas there is as real, and as absolute an impossibility in this case, as in any supposable case whatever. To be more guarded therefore, than the scripture is, in this matter, would be to be unguarded. The apostle demands, "can the fig-tree, my brethren, bear olive berries? either a vine, figs?" And the prophet, "can the Ethiopian change his skin? or the leopard, his spots? Then may ye also do good, who are accustomed to do evil." And our Saviour says, "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit; neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. A good man out of the good treasure of the heart bringeth forth good things. And an evil man out of the evil treasure bringeth forth evil things." There is as certain and never-failing a connection in this case as in any natural connection whatever. Which ought by no means to be dissembled, but openly maintained. But then it is certainly of a quite different, and even a directly opposite nature, to all intents and purposes of

moral agency. And it is of the last importance, in my apprehension, that this also should be maintained and manifested to every man's conscience.

Because a man must act according to his own heart, or as he pleases; does this destroy his freedom! It is the very thing in which all free agency consists. The pulse can beat; the limbs can move in some bodily disorders, or when one that is stronger than we takes hold of them; whether we will or no. But God does not consider us as accountable for such actions as these. And we should, and that not without reason, think it very hard, should he blame or punish us for them. For an honest and good man's pulse may beat as irregularly as the worst villain's in the world. Or his hands, in a convulsion, may strike those around him, in spite of all he can do to hold them still. Or one may be carried by force along with a gang of thieves, and be taken for one of them, though no man hates such company and actions as theirs, more heartily than he does. Such involuntary actions every one sees a man is not, and ought not to be accountable for. And the reason is, no bad inclination of ours, or want of a good one, is necessary in order to them. They are so free, as to be independent of us, and out of our power. If all our actions were like these; no ways necessarily connected with our disposition, and choice, and tem per of mind, we could not be accountable creatures, or the subjects of moral government. If a good tree could bring forth evil fruit, and a corrupt tree good fruit; if a good man, out of the good treasure of his heart, could bring forth evil things, and an evil man, out of the evil treasure, good things; the tree could never be known by its fruit. It could never be known by a man's actions, any thing what his heart was. So that,

B

if they were dealt with according to their works, the most upright and well disposed would be as liable to be punished; and the most ill-natured and ill-disposed, as likely to be rewarded, as the contrary. Whence all moral government must be at an end.

Certainly, if we are justly accountable, rewardable, or punishable, for any actions; if any actions are, or can be, properly our own, it must be such as are dictated by ourselves, and which cannot take place without our own consent. An inability, therefore, to act otherwise than agreeably to our own minds, is only an inability to act otherwise than as free agents. And that necessity which arises from, or rather consists in, the temper and choice of the agent himself, and that which is against his choice and his very nature, are so far from coming to the same thing at last, that they are directly contrary one to the other, as to all the purposes of morality, freedom, accountableness, and desert of praise or blame, reward or punishment.

And this is agreeable to the sense of all mankind, in all common cases. A man's heart being fully set in him to do evil, does not render his evil actions the less criminal, in the judgment of common sense, but the more so: nor does the strength of a virtuous disposi tion render a good action the less, but the more amiable, and worthy of praise. Does any one look upon the divine Being, as less excellent and glorious, for being so infinitely and unchangeably holy in his nature, that he cannot be tempted with evil," or act otherwise than in the most holy and perfect manner? Does any one look upon the devil as less sinful and to blame, because he is of such a devilish disposition, so full of unreasonable spite and malice against God and man, as to be incapable of any thing but the most horrid wickedness? And as to mankind: who is there that does not make

a difference between him that is incapable of a base action, only by reason of the virtuousness of his temper, having all the natural talents requisite for the most consummate villainy: and him that is incapable of being the worst of villains, for no other reason than only because he does not know how? Does any one think that only the want of a will to work, excuses a man from it, just as much as bodily infirmity does? Or, do we any of us ever imagine, that the covetous miser who, with all his useless hoards, has no heart to give a penny to the poor, is for that reason equally excusable from deeds of charity, as he who has nothing to give?

We certainly always make a distinction betwixt want of natural abilities to do good, and the want of a heart; looking upon the one as a good excuse, the other as no excuse at all, but rather as that in which all wickedness radically consists. A natural fool no one blames for acting like a fool. But "to him that knoweth to do good, and doth it not; to him "it is sin," in the sense of all mankind, as well as in God's account. "If there be first a willing mind," we always suppose it ought to be accepted according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not." But the want of a willing mind, or not having a mind to do well, is universally considered as a crime, and not as an excuse. Nothing is more familiar to us, than to distinguish in this manner. Nor can any man of common sense help judging thus.

Now this distinction is as applicable to the case before us, as it is to any other case. Some may be unable to comply with the gospel, through the want of those powers of mind, or those bodily organs, or those means of grace, without which it is impossible to understand the character of Christ, or the way of salva