The following Difquifition contains fome of the most ftriking Thoughts, which I have ever met with upon the Subject. But they will not be underflood by inattentive Readers, nor by any that are not accustomed to clofe thinking. On the ETERNITY of GOD. F a rational Mind is very finite, as ours is, it can have but IF one Object under the Confideration of the Intellect at a time; and it can therefore will but one thing to be done at once. This we can eafily conceive from our own Experience. But if the Mind be lefs limited, or perfecter in kind, which, as not involving Contradiction, I have liberty to fuppofe, it will be able, as fuch, to have two Objects under the Confideration of the Understanding at once, and to will two diftinct Things to be performed at once: and its Power, correfponding to its other Perfections, will be able to perform both at once. And, without mentioning other intermediate degrees, we may imagine the Progreffion to go on. Now, if we fuppofe the Mind to become at laft infinite, or all limits to be taken away from it, it must (as fuch) have an infinite Number of Objects under the Intuition of the Intelle&t at once, or an infinite Number of Things all in view at a time; and this by the fame kind of Reason as a very finite Mind can have but one; and be able to will an infinite Number of Things all to be done at once; and its Power being alfo infinite, or without limitation, it will be le to perform them. all at the fame time, without Perplexity or Diforder. This, I fay, it will be able to do as infinite. Infinite Perfection directly implies this; and it would be abfurd to deny it, because we cannot conceive the manner of it. This firft ftep being duly weighed, let us next confider this infinite Mind as neceffarily exifting, and in that respect it must have had an infinite Number of Objects under the view of the Intellect, not only once, but always. Neceflity of VOL. III. Exiflence E Existence doth not limit Infinity of Perfection, but fhews that Infinity to be neceffary and eternal. It would not be having an infinite and neceffary Understanding, (i. e. a neceffarily infinite Understanding) to be able to comprehend an infinity of Things at once, and for a little time only, and then to wink and relax: we must own that fuch an Understanding must have had a Comprehenfion of infinite Things, (i. e. an infinite Comprehenfion) neceffarily and eternally. Thus then a neceffarily infinite Intellect must have had all Objects neceffarily and eternally in View, and under immediate Profpect. And this is the main Point gained. This is infinite Knowledge! And fuch a Being must have had infinite Knowledge by a phyfical, or natural Neceffity; even thofe who are least attentive, muft fee that the terms all along imply it. But mark, This is a phyfical Neceffity of Perfection, as it ought to be. To make the Being free here, would be to make it imperfect: we might as well fay, free to exift neceffarily or not, as free to have infinite Knowledge or not to have it. The next thing to be confidered is, that this Being having all Things always and neceffarily in view, must always and eternally will according to his infinite Comprehenfion of them; that is, muft will all things that are wifeft and beft to be done. There is no getting free of this Confequence. If it can will at all, it must will this way. To be capable of knowing and not capable of willing is not to be underflood; and to be capable of willing otherwife than what is wifeft and beft, contradicts that Knowledge which is infinite. Infinite Knowledge muft direct the Will without Error. Here then is the origin of moral Neceffity, and that is really of Freedom: for the Being is not determined to this conflant and eternal act of willing, by a phyfical energy or power conftantly acting, but from the knowledge of the eternal aptitudes and agreeableness of Things to each other; or in other words, from the Intuition of the eternal relations of its own Ideas, which are the Archetypes of Things. Indeed to will by phyfical Neceflity, or by the Deter mination mination and Impulse of an external phyfical Cause, is, when nearly confidered, a direct Contradiction; it is not to will, but to be involuntarily determined, the fame as to fay, to will whether a Thing wills or not, or to will against the Will. Perhaps it may be faid, when the divine Will is determined from the confideration of the eternal Aptitudes of Things, it is as neceffarily determined, as if it were phyfically impelled, if that were poffible. But it is unskilfulness to suppose this an Objection. The great Principle is at once cftablished, viz. That the divine Will is determined. by the eternal Reafon and Aptitudes of Things, inftead of being phyfically impelled and after that, the more strong and neceffary this Determination is, the more perfect the Deity must be allowed to be. It is this that makes him an amable, an adorable Being, whofe Will and Power are conftantly, immutably determined by the Confideration of what is wifeft and best, instead of a furd Being with Power, but without Difcerning or Reafon. It is the Beauty of this Neceffity, that it is as strong as Fate itself, with all the advantage of Reason and Goodness. This conftant act of willing proceeds from his Knowledge, it is true, but as proceeding from Knowledge, it is to be confidered as determined by Knowledge; and Knowledge must be considered as having a priority of Nature, though not of Time. Hence the wonderful nature of the divine Will, that it is both immutable, as proceeding from a neceffary phyfical Perfection; and yet infinitely rational, as being the Iflue of infinite true Knowledge, or the Knowledge of all Truth. It is ftrange to fee Men contend that the Deity is not free, because he is neceffarily rational, immutably good and wife; when a Man is allowed fill the perfecter Being, the more fixedly and constantly his Will is determined by Reafon and Truth. Liberty confifts in being determined by moral Motives (the more unerringly and constantly the better) in oppofition to being phyfically impelled, (which indeed takes away the act of willing, or any act properly fpeaking) and in felf-determination by the power of the Will amidst the indifference of phyfical Circumstances. E 2 Circumftances. And who, though ever fo much engaged on the oppofite fide, will venture exprefsly to fay, that to be determined by moral Motives is not a Perfection? Or, that to be felf-determined by the power of the Will, where physical Circumftances are indifferent, in order to effect a wife and good Purpose, is not a Perfection? But to go forward. If next we confider the actions of this Being as exerted upon his Creatures, in confequence of this eternal act of Willing, they are (as in confequence of that) guided by the abfolutely greatest Counfel and Wisdom, and therefore performed in the fitteft Time, Manner, and Circumflances. But what is chiefly to the prefent purpose is, that though vast Power is exerted, as in moving the heavenly Bodies, for inftance, yet it is exerted without ftruggle, effort or contention of frength, fo to fay. Eafe and Difficulty are not applicable to Infinity of Power: they are the marks of our limitation, but vanifh here. That Power would not be infinite, by which one Thing were done fmoothly, and another Thing with rugged labour and toil. Let him who hath the Terms [infinite Power] often in his mouth, confider only the import of them. To perform is equally eafy as to will to this Being, and that without a Figure, but upon the foot of Reafon and Argument. All this is fill implied in neceffary Infinity of Perfection. And this at length will help us to conceive that even the aclions of this Being no more change the manner of his exiflence than his willing them, there being no emotion, firefs or contention in performing the effect that might occafion an alteration. Nor can they be confidered as the manner of his exiflence; fince they are temporary, fucceffive (as in the motions of Matter) and not neceffary, as it must be. We shall better conceive this, if we confider why, and how, our manner of exiflence is conftantly changed; and this particular deferves our attention. In short, this happens in our bodies from motion, relative fituation, and a conflant flux of parts; from all which an immaterial Being must be free. In Our our minds the manner of existence is changed from a conftant pens from the finiteness of our minds. If we have any compafs It was from thefe Confiderations that Boëtius defines the Eternity of God to be, Vitæ interminabilis tota fimul & perfecta Poffeffio. For in a neceffarily infinite Intellect, all Things must be always and neceffarily prefent; from neceffary infinity of Knowledge all the Purposes of Wisdom and Reason must be willed by one indefinent act: no new Object can offer itself to the Understanding, no mutability therefore can happen to the Will, nor therefore can there be any rifing or falling of Pleasure and Happiness. And this is indeed, interminabilis Vita tota fimul & perfecla Poffeffio;+ which co-incides with this, That the manner of neceffary Exiftence is itself neceffary, and necefJarily the beft. Quod (fays this Philofopher) ex Collatione temporalium clarius liquet; nam quicquid vivit in Tempore, id *The words can hardly be tranflated, "The poffeffion of endless Life, at once entire and perfect," comes near the meaning of them. + Which miraculously appears, from comparing this with the things of time. For whatever lives in ume, proceeds from the paft, through the prefent, to the future, and nothing exifts in time, which can enjoy the whole space of its Life at once. præfens |