DEAR SIR, 15 LETTER I. 1825. THE first subject to which I will call your attention, is the knowledge of the existence and attributes of the Deity. But whence is this knowledge derived? Independent of Revelation, there are only two ways by which it is contended that we can arrive at that knowledge. Those are from the light of nature, and by abstract reasoning. Both these paths have been trod in the proudest days of dialectic philosophy without leading to the truth. The former would naturally invite the steps of men, and the latter may be traced through Augustine to the Platonic school. But have any of the supporters of these systems, given to the world such a clear and demonstrative proof of the existence of a God, that men might implicitly rely upon it, had they not an assurance of his being from the Deity himself? Have now, the disciples of the French school of " free-thinkers," or the followers of Godwin and Palmer, or our own metaphysicians, an argument, or a series of deductions, which fully establishes the existence of a God, either from the principles of natural philosophy, or by the reasoning powers of the mind? I am assured that they have not; and shall attempt to show, that it is impossible for man "by searching to find out God;" and that it is only from the revelation of the Deity himself, that we can have a knowledge of his existence. If I succeed in establishing this position, I am convinced that I shall not be doing the cause of Christianity a disservice. Could the being of a God be proved independent of Revelation, such a god, as in the case of the god of the deist, would be of no service: for we should yet be ignorant of his will. The deist, indeed, argues that the physical and moral laws of nature are the will of God; but the latter are equally questionable with the existence of the god of nature; and, if reduced to the former, few men will be content with the mere mechanical principles of creation. It has appeared to me to be an error in the pious and the learned, to show too great an anxiety on this subject. In conceding to the worshipper of nature the argument upon which his system rests, it is thought by some, to be an important acquisition, to bring him to the acknowledgment of a God. On the contrary, the concession made through this praiseworthy motive, fixes him more blindly in the mazes of his error. Put the deist to the proof of the existence of his deity, and of the moral laws of creation, and he will be driven from the strongest hold of infidelity, and either be compelled to acknowledge the Revelation of the God of Scripture, or become an atheist. By exalting the faculties of the mind, in granting such an important discovery, as the being of a God, to their natural powers, there is taken from the Scriptures a great portion of that interest, reverence, and sublime awe, with which they are approached by those, who consider them as the only source of the knowledge of the mysterious being of the true God. Having once conceded to the deist the exist ence of his deity, we cannot find fault with him for furnishing that deity with a code of laws. It would, however, appear from the language of his worshippers, that there is something too subtile in his legislation for their understanding; they are, therefore, to wait until "the energy of intellectual power" has arrived at its ultimate degree" of moral and scientific improvement," before" the sublime principle" be capable of" discerning" and " understanding" the natural system. With such trifling as this (for it is the principle of the most popular infidel work of the day) the advocates of nature amuse and deceive themselves; and tell us of the laws, and principles, and perfectibility of nature; say, that they shun alike the errors of ignorance and superstition; and proclaim that nature has en с |