gination to form the leaft doubt, that, the fun will not rife to-morrow, that the buds of trees will not bloffom in fpring, or that fire will not reduce wood to afhes, &c.

I confess that my opinion is here purely analogical (b): fince it is very evident, that the contrary of that, which I think will happen, is ftill poffible; but this fimple poffibility cannot in the leaft counterbalance in my mind that multitude of constant experiences, on which my analogical belief is established.

It seems to me, that I fhould do violence to common sense, if I refused to take analogy for my guide in things of this nature. I should lead a life of mifery, I should not even be able to provide for my own prefer

(b) When I have examined feparately a certain number of things, and have conftantly found in all of them, the fame effential properties, I think I am authorized to draw this inference; that the things which appear to me precifely fimilar to them (but which I have not examined with the fame attention) are also endowed with the fame properties. This manner of judging is filed by logicians analogy.

vation. For, if the knowledge I have of the aliments which have always nourished me, were not fufficient to establish the certainty I have, that these aliments will not fuddenly, and without cause, be changed into poison, how should I venture to eat of them again?

Reason therefore compels me to admit, that there exifts in nature a certain constant order, on which I may establish opinions, which, though not demonftrations, carry a fufficient probability to fatisfy my wants.

My fenfes manifeft this order to me; the faculty I poffefs of reflection, discovers to me its most effential confequences.

In my apprehenfion, therefore, the order of nature is the general refult of the (c) relations which I perceive between beings.

I view these relations as invariable, because I have never feen them, neither has any one ever seen them to vary naturally.

(c) By thefe relations I understand, in general, thofe properties, thofe determinations, by the means of which different beings are directed to the fame end, or concur to produce a certain effect. Anal. Eilay, § 40.

The

The intelligence of the firft caufe may be reafonably deduced from the contemplation of these relations; because the greater mumber and variety of parts there are in a whole, all concurring to a common end, the greater is the probability that this whole is not the work of a blind caufe; because, as I have fatisfied myself that matter is contingent, and that motion is not effential to matter, I can place, neither in matter nor in motion, the efficient reafon of that which is; becaufe affigning the efficient reafon of a thing, is not fimply giving a cause to that thing, it is affigning a principle by which one may clearly conceive why that thing is, and for what reafon it is as it is, and not otherwife. Now, it is only in an intelligent felf-existing caufe, that I find fufficient reafon for the mode of being of the universe; and it is only in the power of the first neceffary cause,

that I find the efficient reafon of the existence or of the actuality of the universe.

If the laws of nature refult effentially from the relations which exift between various beings;

B 4

beings (d); if these relations, confidered in themselves, do not exift neceffarily; it appears to me, that I may hence conclude, that nature has a legiflator. Light has not bestowed on itself the properties of light, and its laws of refraction and reflection are the refult of the relations it bears to different bodies, either fluid (e) or folid.

I should not therefore express myself with accuracy, if I said that the laws of nature have adapted the means to the end (ƒ). Because, the laws of nature are only fimple effects; and, according to my ideas, effects

(d) The laws of nature are in general the result, or the confequences of the relations which exist between beings. Anal. Effay, par. 40.

(e) Light propagates itself in a straight line. Its refraction is that property, by means of which its rays are bent in paffing from one medium into another medium of a different nature; viz. from air into water, or from water into air. The reflection of light is that property by which it reverberates, or appears to reverberate, from bodies. Experience difcovers thefe properties, and their laws. Geometry calculates them.

(f) Encyclopedia of Paris, on the word, Leaves of Plants.

fuppofe

fuppofe a caufe; or, to speak in other words, the actual existence of a thing supposes the relative existence of another thing, which I confider as the reason of the existence of the first.

If nature has received laws, he who has imposed those laws on nature has, without doubt, the power of fufpending, modifying, or directing those laws as he pleases.

But if the legislator of nature be as wise as he is powerful, he will neither fufpend nor modify thofe laws, unless they h in themfelves infufficient to fulfil the views of his wisdom; for wisdom confifts as much in not multiplying the means without neceffity, as in the choice of the best means to arrive at the best end.

Now I cannot doubt the wifdom of the legislator of nature, because I cannot doubt the intelligence of that legislator. I obferve, that the more man becomes enlightened, the more traces he discovers in the universe of a creative intelligence. I remark even, with astonishment, that this intelligence is not difplayed with less splendor in the structure of

a mite,