If, in phyfics, I had reafoned only from known facts, I muft neceffarily have rejected, without examination, the wonders of electricity, the prodigy of the polype, and a multiplicity of facts of the fame kind; for, what analogy could I discover between these prodigies and those facts which the ordinary course of nature presents to my confideration? And yet I believed thefe prodigies; because, in the first place, the evidence for them appeared competent: Secondly, becaufe, in found logic, my ignorance of the fecrets of nature was not a fufficient authority to oppose to weighty teftimonies. But, as a greater number of moral proofs are requifite to make a miraculous fact appear probable, than to render probable a phyfical prodigy, I think alfo that I difcover, in the teftimonies adduced in favour of the miraculous facts in queftion, characters of truth, proportioned to the nature of the facts.

I have pointed out what appeared to me to constitute the difference between a miracle and a prodigy (t). I have not termed

(t) Vide Part i. Chap. vi.

miracles

miracles fupernatural facts. I had seen sufficiently that they might be the refult of a preestablished arrangement; I therefore fimply called them extraordinary events, as opposed to those events which are conformable to the ordinary course of nature. If the testimonies were in actual contradiction to each other, it would follow, that the witneffes, who attest the resurrection of a dead man, must atteft, at the fame time, that this refurrection was produced according to the ordinary courfe of nature. Now I well know, that, fo far from attefting this, they have attributed the miracle to the intervention of omnipotence.

I cannot therefore logically argue, from the uniformity of the course of nature, againft the testimony which affirms that this uniformity is not conftant; for, I must once. more repeat it, the experience which attefts the uniformity of the courfe of nature, does not in the least prove, that its courfe máy not be altered or modified (u).

(u) Vide the French tranflation of Campbell on miracles, and especially the notes of the tranflator.

CHAP.

СНАР. VIII.

REFLECTIONS ON MORAL CERTAINTY.

T is plain, therefore, that moral ought not

I to be confounded with phyfical certainty.

This last may be reduced to an exact calculation, whenever all the cafes poffible are known, as at games of hazard, &c.; or to approximations, when all the poffible cafes are not known, or the experiences are not fufficiently multiplied, as in those things which concern the duration or accidents of human life, &c.

But thofe things which we call moral, cannot be reduced to calculation; in this cafe, the unknown fo far exceed in number the known circumftances, that there is a want of data to proceed upon.

In the compofition of man, the moral and phyfical are mixed together, and hence arises a greater complication. Of all terrestrial

beings,

beings, man is the most complicated. How then can the algebraic expreffion of a moral character be given? Are we fufficiently acquainted with the foul? with the body? with their mysterious union? Can we, with any precision, eftimate the various effects of so many circumstances acting continually on that compound being? Can we—but let me rather request the reader to re-confider what I have faid in Chap. v. and vi. of Part xiii. of the Phil. Pal. concerning the imperfection of morals.

Shall I however conclude, from what has been faid, that there is no moral certainty? Because the fecret of man's compofition is unknown to me, fhall I conclude, that I am wholly unacquainted with man? Because I cannot discover the cause why the vibration of certain fibres in the brain is accompanied with certain ideas, fhall I deny the existence of thofe ideas? It would be denying the existence of my own ideas. Because I do not fee those infinitely delicate fibres, the actions of which feem to influence the understanding and will, shall I

doubt

doubt whether there is an understanding and

will? This would be doubting whether I myself have an understanding and will, &c. &c.

I am well acquainted with certain general facts, the refult of the conftitution of man, and I clearly perceive that moral certainty is built on these results. I know well enough what, and how far, my fenfes can or cannot effect concerning matters of fact, to be well affured that certain facts may have been seen and felt. I am fufficiently converfant with the faculties and affections of man, to be morally certain, that, in fuch or fuch given circumstances, witneffes may have attefted the truth. I am even obliged to confefs, that if I refused adhering to these principles, I fhould renounce the most common maxims of reason, and that I should controvert the civil order of all ages and all nations.

If then I feek after truth with an honeft heart, I shall not fubtilize a question plain enough in itself, and of the highest importance. I fhall endeavour to reduce it to