ceffarily the refurrection of a certain man, and his afcenfion into heaven; if the miracles which this man had pretended to perform before his death, and which were attested to me by ocular witneffes, were indiffolubly connected with those which have already been noticed; if these miracles were numerous and various; if they had been wrought for the space of many years; if, I fay (and as I fuppofe), all this were true, it would be impoffible for me to conceive that the witnesses in question fhould have been deceived, refpecting fo many palpable, plain, and different facts.

It appears to me, at least, that had it been poffible for them to have been deceived concerning any of these extraordinary facts, it would have been phyfically impoffible for them to have been deceived in all.

But, above all, how can I conceive that thefe witneffes fhould have been deceived, as to the many and various miracles which they themselves wrought?

CHAP.

I

2

Shall not on this occafion engage in any fubtle difquifitions concerning the reality of the objects of our fenfations, the illufion of the fenfes, or the existence of bodies; these metaphyfical fubtleties do not effentially belong to the examination of my fubject; I have difcuffed them at large in feveral of my other writings, and have said on that fubject whatever found philofophy suggested to me.

f

I know perfectly well, that the objects of our fenfations cannot be in themselves, what they appear to us to be; I fee objects which I denominate material; from the effential properties of thefe objects, I deduce E 2

the

the general notion of matter. "" I will not "affirm (p) (to repeat what I said in ano"ther place), that the attributes by which "I am acquainted with matter, are pre

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cisely what they appear to be: it is my "foul which perceives them; they there"fore bear a relation to the manner in " which my foul perceives them; they may, "then, not be exactly that which they appear to be. But, moft affuredly, that "which they appear to be, results neceffarily "from what they are in themselves, and"from what I am in relation to them. As, "therefore, I can affirm, refpecting a circle, "the equality of its radii; so I can affirm,

respecting matter, that it is extended and "folid; or, to fpeak more accurately, that "there is fomething out of me, which gives "me the idea of folid extent. The attri "butes of matter, with which I am ac

66

quainted, are therefore effects; I obferve "these effects, although I am ignorant of "the causes. There may be other effects,

(p) Preface to the Analytical Effay.

" of

"of the existence of which I have not the "least fufpicion: Does a blind man suspect "the use of the prifm? But I am at least perfectly convinced that the effects, which

<< are unknown to me, are not contradictory to those which I know."

6.6

I have explained, in Chap. ii. of Part xiii. of the Phil. Pal. that material objects, in the eye of what I efteem true philofophy (q), are fimply mere phenomena, fimple appearances, depending partly on our manner of seeing and conceiving;-these phenomena, however, are no less real, permanent, and invariable—they are no less the refult of the immutable laws of our being. These phenomena, therefore, ftill remain a folid bafis for our mode of reasoning.

Because, therefore, the objects of our fenfations are not in themselves what they appear to be, it does not follow, that we cannot reason on thofe objects as if they were fo. It is fufficient for us, that these appearances never change. I might fay ftill

(4) The Philofophy of Leibnitz.

more:-if the (r) doctrine of an ideal world were strictly demonstrated, it would in no refpect change the order of our fenfible ideas, nor the judgment we form of those ideas; the univerfe, though purely ideal, would not exift lefs to every individual foul; neither would it reprefent or offer the lefs to our foul, the fame things, the fame combinations, and the fame fucceffion of things, which we contemplate at present.

It is well known, that the pious and learned prelate (s), who fo openly declared himfelf the advocate of this fingular system, affirmed that it was of all fyftems the most favourable to that religion to which he dedicated his time and fortune.

If I pretended, therefore, that our state of ignorance concerning the particular nature of the objects of our fenfations could weaken the teftimony afforded to miraculous facts,

(r) A philofophical opinion which admits of no bodies in nature, and reduces every thing to ideas; a clear account of this fingular doctrine may be seen, in Chap. xxxiii. of the Effay on Pfychology.

(s) Berkley, Bishop of Cloyne.

I fhould