:

of my being it discovers to me, although imperfectly, physical pre-ordained means which may prolong perfonality beyond the grave it affures me that I am a being capable of endless advancements towards perfection. By the continual progress which in my present state I am able to make towards virtue and truth, it teaches me to judge of those improvements which I may make in another ftate, wherein all my faculties will be perfected. Finally, from those philofophical notions which reason forms of the divine attributes and natural laws, it deduces new confiderations, which add greatly to these different probabilities.

But reafon discovers to me, at the fame time, that it is not within the compass of my prefent faculties to allow me more than fimple probabilities as to existence after death (b). Nevertheless, my reason itself makes me perceive most forcibly how much it would contribute to my happiness, to have more than fimple probabilities respecting my

(b) Vide part xvi. ch. ii.

future

future ftate, at least such an aggregate of probabilities, as would be equivalent to what I call moral certainty. My reason furnishes me with the best proofs of the fupreme intelligence of the author of my existence. It deduces very fairly from that intelligence the fupreme WISDOM of that great Being (i). His goodness will be that fame WISDOM em.. ployed in procuring the greatest happiness of every fentient and every intelligent being. This adorable wISDOM having introduced into its place the system of human nature, must undoubtedly have willed every thing that could contribute to the greatest perfection of that system. Now nothing could more affuredly be fitter to produce the greatest perfection of this fyftem, than to give to those beings of which it is compofed a moral certainty of their future state, and to lead them to confider the happiness they will enjoy in that state, as a consequence of the moral perfection which they have endeavoured to attain in their prefent ftate,

() Vide part xvi, ch. iii.

And

And fince the actual ftate of humani

ty did not admit that the sole strength of reafon should be fufficient to convince man of a future ftate, it was undoubtedly confiftent with the character of infinite wis DOM, to give him by fome other means an affurance so neceffary to the perfection of the moral system.

But, because the plan of wisDOM required, that intelligent but very limited beings, fuch as men, fhould inhabit the earth, it could not alter the faculties of these beings, fo as to give them a fufficient certainty of their future state.

It was therefore neceffary for wÌSDOM to employ in this design a means of such a nature that, though not included within the actual sphere of the human faculties, it should at the same time be fo well adapted to the nature, and to the most rational exercise of those faculties, that man might, by this new means, acquire the degree of certainty which he wanted, and fo anxiously fought after.

It was then from the hand of the fupreme being alone that man could receive

this so desirable certainty. But what particular method could the fupreme WISDOM take to convince man of the great defign projected for him? By what particular fign could man be affured that divine wISDOM itself had spoken ?

I have admitted that nature has a legislator, and to admit this, is admitting at the fame time that this legiflator can fufpend or modify, at his will, the laws which he has given

to nature.

Thefe laws are therefore in some fort the language of the author of nature, or the phyfical expreffion of his will.

I therefore easily conceive, that the author of nature may have employed this language to make known to men with certainty that which it was of the utmost consequence for them to know, and to know well; and that which reafon alone was not able to discover to them.

Thus, because I evidently fee that the legislator of nature can alone modify its laws, I think myself authorized in reason to admit, that he has fpoken, whenever I can

be

be reasonably convinced that certain striking modifications of these laws have taken place, and can clearly discover the defign of these modifications.

I fhall confider, therefore, these modifications as particular figns of the will of the author of nature with refpect to man.

I fhall give a name to thefe fpecies of modification, were it only to point out the alterations they have effected contrary to the ordinary course of nature.