Summary of the Author's Reasoning on Miracles and Teftimony. p. 262 IX. Continuation of general Difficulties :- That the Doctrine of the Gospel does not feem favourable to Patriotifm: That it has been productive of great Evils on Earth.-Anfwers. p. 279 X. Conclufion of general Difficulties:· Obfcurity of the Doctrine, and its XI. General Confiderations on the Nature and Connection of the Proofs.-Con- ERRA TU M. P. 19, 1. 11, after courfe of nature, instead of a period put PHILOSOPHICAL AND CRITICAL INQUIRIES CONCERNING CHRISTIANITY, BOOK I. CHA P. I. ON THE ORDER AND LAWS OF NATURE, AND THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE FIRST CAUSE, TH HAT there exifts, diftinct from the universe, a fupreme intelligent cause of that univerfe, is a truth, which no rea sonable and thinking man can controvert or deny. It is a truth obvious even to sense, it is conformable to the most natural fentiments of the human mind, it is established by the universal consent of almost the whole human race, it is confonant to the clearest principles B principles and the most fublime discoveries of natural philofophy, and has been proved by a variety of the most convincing arguments, which have never yet been, and we may venture to affert never can be confuted. I fhall not therefore take up any of the reader's time, in attempting to prove the existence of a first caufe (a); I fhall only observe, that this first cause, must be self-existent, must exist by an absolute neceffity in its own nature; if it did not, it would depend on another cause; and if this were not necessary, it would depend on a third cause, &c.; and I fhould fall into an abfurd pro (a) The tranflator has omitted the two first chapters of the original, on THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL, and THE BEING OF A GOD; both which subjects the author has treated with his ufual ingenuity and force of argument. But in this country, where there are few, if any, materialists or atheists, it seemed unnecessary to enter upon the proof of truths fo generally acknowledged. Befides which, it was the tranflator's profeffed defign to confine himself solely to those parts of the author's work which relate to Chriftianity, or were indifpenfably neceffary to introduce the subject, greffion greffion of causes, or rather of effects, ad infinitum. The caufe therefore of the universe exifts of itself; its effence is to exift; and whatever is, derives its exiftence from it, I pretend not to penetrate into the nature of that cause, or to decide what necessary exiftence is, in itself: How should I attain to fuch knowledge? I who am bewildered, confounded by an atom, and who cannot arrive at the intimate knowledge of any one being! But I am conftrained to admit, that that cause, whatever be the mode of its being, poffeffes whatever is requifite for the production of that fublime effect, which I call the universe. I therefore ftudy this effect, and attempt to arrive at fome philosophical notions concerning the attributes of this caufe. I firft obferve, that this neceffary caufe enjoys the greateft power that it is poffible for me to conceive; for can I conceive any power greater than the power of creating? The univerfe exifts; and yet it is in its very nature contingent; it has not therefore existed for ever; what a power muft that be, which called it from nothing into B 2 being, being, and which has given an actual existence to every thing that was poffible! When I turn my attention to that affemblage of things, which I distinguish by the general word nature, I perceive that this affemblage is an admirable fyftem of various relations; and the more I repeat my obfervations, the more I fee thefe relations, multiplied, diverfified, and extended; I am foon convinced, that every thing is carried on in nature conformably to fettled laws, which are no other than the natural refult of these relations, that link together all these beings, and direct them to one common end. It is true, that I do not perceive any neceffary connection between one moment and that which fucceeds, between the action of one being and that of another being, between the present state of a being and its ftate in fucceeding moments, &c. But I am fo conftituted, that what I have always obferved to happen, and what all those who came before me have obferved to happen, appears to me to be a moral certainty. Therefore, it will never enter into my ima gination |