او

And if it be an Objection against neither Party, what Service can it do either to anfwer it? But let us fee whether more than this has not been long fince made of the Notion: Aristotle I find arguing thus Εἴπερ δ' ἔσιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν παντὶ τῷ αἰσθανομήνῳ (ώματι, ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δύο εξ ώμαία, ἐ ῶμα τὶ ἡ ψυχή. Τοῖς δὴ ἀριθμὸν λέγεσιν, DeAnima ἐν τῇ μία τιμή πολλὰς τιμάς, ἢ πᾶν Lib.1.c.5. σώμα ψυχών έχειν, εἰ μὴ διαφέρων τὶς ἀριθμὸς ἐλύεθ καὶ ἄλλῳ τις 7 ὑπαρχεσῶν ἐν τῷ Capali silu. If the Soul is co-extended with the Body, and fenfitive in every part of it; then Man is compounded of two Bodies, if the Soul be Body; but those that say the Soul is compounded of Parts, make many Points in one Point; or make every single part of the Body to have a diftinct Soul; unless there can be conceiv'd any Number of Parts in one and the fame Subject, different from thofe that are corporeal. The Argument proceeds upon two Suppofitions. ft, That the Soul receives Senfation from every part of the Body. 2dly, That it receives this Senfation in one fingle Point; not as Impreffions are made upon a continuous Substance. Now if all the Qualities that a Body is capable of, are co-extended with that Body, and so confequently the Divifion of a white Body, for inftance, divides alfo the Whiteness of it; then the Objection, with Ariftotle's Management, will bear hard upon Eftibius 3

and,

and, as fo manag'd, I leave him to answer it. If he is ready, as he fays he is, Ibid. to answer any stronger Objection that can be urg'd against him from Philosophy, I must rejoin, it is his Strength, and not his Readiness that I difpute.

Pag. 253.

His Reafon (to which he reduces the next Set of Objections) is not unlike his Philofophy. He objects to himself (and I wish he have well confider'd the Objection) the Danger of Atheism and Irreligion, attending the Belief of his Doctrine; to which he answers, Whatever is grounded on Scripture, I know cannot lead to Atheifm, or be irreligious. But would not the Conclufion be as good, by a Tranfpofition, Whatever leads to Atheism and Irreligion, cannot be grounded on Scripture? This therefore is an Answer that may have another in the Belly of it; for fuppofe a Man that is not fatisfy'd with this Answer, but ftill believes (as well he may) the Tendency of Second Thoughts to Atheism and Irreligion; and yet happens to be convinc'd by that seventh Chapter that the Doctrine is found in Scripture; what muft this Man's Conclufion be with regard to the Divine Authority of Scripture? I Think it an Error of very dangerous Confequence (to call it by no worfe Name) for any Man, imagining he has found an Opinion countenanced

it

in Scripture, to overlook the Tendency of and this Answer looks too like fomething of that nature. But he's willing to answer farther, This Doctrine does Pag.254. not conclude that Man wholly perishes, and shall never revive again. If the Reader does not already believe it does conclude that Man wholly perishes, I defire him to fufpend his Judgment till he has perus'd the last Chapter of this Difcourfe. In the mean time, to what he replies to the Encouragement his Doctrine gives to Wickedness, that Time is no Measure for the Dead but Pag.255. the Living only; and if a Man were to fleep feveral Years, and as foon as he awak'd, were fure to be hanged; I do believe it wou'd afford him but little Comfort, to think he fhou'd have fo long a time to fleep, before his Sentence were executed; and again, There is no Measure of Time to the

Far. Th. p. 88.

Dead, and a thousand Years not fo much as one Day. I answer, if this proves any thing, it proves that there is not any real Difference of Torment (above a Minute, or at moft a Day) to the wicked, according to his, and according to our Notion. I know Time is no Measure for the Dead, in his Senfe; but the Queftion is not, what Perception they will have when dead; but, which State (of Torment or Infenfibility) wou'd they chufe while they are alive, to

foll ow

Far.Vind.

follow upon their Death; and I think it is a Determination of Nature it felf præftat non effe, quam miferum effe: But all this is oppofing only a mistaken metaphyfical Notion to Matter of Fact; wou'd not that Man he mentions chufe rather to fleep feveral Years, before his Execution, than be in Torment or Mifery all the while, and yet to be executed at last? and do not Men abuse the diftant Profpect of Death, tho' it is as inevitable as Judgment? This he has been told already, and daily p. 56. Experience will tell him as much. I know the Confideration of Judgment is alone abundantly fufficient; or where it is not fo, I am fure nothing can be fufficient: But this is no warrant for Eftibius to make nothing of the intermediate State, unless, in a Difpute about the Nature of that State, it is lawful for him to take it for granted there is no fuch State; but if he may not be allow'd thus much, he may as well make nothing of the Rewards and Punishments of Virtue and Vice in the Prefent, as in the intermediate State; and indeed Confcience is juft fuch another Heathenish Invention, as the Soul. The next Objection he draws from The Authority of the Fathers, Pag.255. the Novelty of his Doctrine, the Liturgy of the Church of England, and the Athanafian Creed. I must confefs I fhou'd

never have made thefe Objections to Eftibius, for a very good Reafon; but the Keafon is plain why he objected them to himself; his Reader by this time might have forgot that as the Fathers had a great deal of Piety, fo their Ignorance is equivalent (that is, as great as their Piety; fo that they cou'd not be far from natural Fools; for their Piety was fo great as to carry all of them thro' many Difficulties, and fome of them to Death) and pardonable in nice Points of Religion. Methinks it might become a Man that so often makes the Charge, once at least to make it good, by a large Catalogue of their Errors; which it must be very easie to produce when the Authors are fo very ignorant, and yet fo very fcripturient: But inftead of this, Eftibius is content to make two

general Reflexions. We find (fays he) Pag.256. feveral of them embraced Error; efpecially where the Cafe in question feem'd very dubious. That there were Errors amongst them is doubtless, because there was Oppofition; but that the embracing any particular Error, or many Errors, especially in dubious Questions, thro' the Courfe of a Man's Life, fhou'd fix upon him the general Character of Ignorance, is a little hard upon us; for at this rate all Mankind must be grofsly ignorant, Eftibius only excepted; which is an Opinion I never met with before, out of

Bedlam.