thens] conceived the Soul of Man had to the Soul of the World, whereunto it ever bath an infeparable Conjunction. Now I wou'd not have Eftibius over-rate his Fancy or Invention in this Simile; for Mr. Blount, who embrac'd it as eagerly, confeffes nevertheless that it was a plain Heathenish Invention. And this, in Eftibins's own Stile, is, I fear, piercing him with an Arrow out of his own Quiver. This pretty way of Argumentation may pass with fome Gentlemen however; efpecially if what went before, has gone down with them; for it is much at one to use Similes instead of Arguments, and to quote Poets for Philofophers.

The fecond grand Argument is this, What

was to have been immortal in a State

Pag.213. of Innocence, became mortal by Tranf greffion: But whole Man was to have been immortal in a state of Innocence; Ergo Whole Man, &c. He calls this a grand Argument, but in truth it is at best but a grand Sophism; that is, a grand Cheat put upon those that are convinc'd by it. Death, in our Notion, is Diffolution; now is there any thing in the Fall that contradicts this Notion ? Wou'd not Human Nature, had it continu'd · for ever undiffolv'd, have been properly ftil'd Immortal? Again, had this Difolution been threatned exprefly, and in that very Word to lapfable Man, might not

this have properly been call'd dying of the Perfon; tho' his Soul, a part of him, furviv'd? If not, the only Question is about the Propriety of the word Death; and I leave him to bestow his next learned Pains upon that.

But let us try to point out the Fallacy of this Sophifm, as we have prov'd it must be fallacious; the Threat runs in these Words, In the Day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt Surely die. The Question is, what is to be understood by thou? which strictly taken implies the whole Man, or more properly, the Perfon of Man; that Being, as refulting from the Union of Soul and Body, fay we, of Body and Life, fays Eftibins. In the firft Place, whole Man may as well be understood for a part of him, as a part must be understood for the whole: but waving that, and fuppofing that the Perfon of Man does properly die, or undergo Death, his Soul is not thereby involv'd in the fame Fate with his Body; for what is Death, in Eftibius's Notion, but a Separation of Life from the Body? does then Life die? That, he fays, is a Solæcifin to affirm, p. 211. but it returns to God, as the excluded Ray to the Sun. Well then Life must go to make up the whole Man; but the whole Man, in this Senfe, cannot die without a Solacifm: Therefore Eftibius must interpret the Threat

T 4

ning

ning to extend to the taking away, not killing his Life; and then may not this as well fignifie the taking away, not killing his Soul? If he will but ftand to this meaning of his own, which is not only his but Mr. Blount's, and all theirs that hold the fame Opinion, I will admit the whole Syllogifm, as unconcerning the Argument; fince whole Man's becoming mortal by Tranfgreffion, which is his Conclufion, cannot be fo understood as to exclude a furviving Part of him. But then let him not vainly imagine his Syllogifm the more perfect, because I have deny'd no Propofition of it; for admitting the whole, in the Senfe that I have done, is in a true and proper Senfe, rejecting the whole.

He urges farther upon this Head, If the Body by the Curfe only became morFug.214. tal, then the Bodies only of the Reprobate, not Souls, can be liable to Damnation, becaufe that only is punishable which finned, as the Civilians fay, Pana fequitur Culpam; and that only finned which fuffered the Punishment, that is the Body only, if the Soul be immortal, and was not doom'd to bear its Share in the Punishment, Death. I answer, It, The Body, understood in Contradiftintion from the Soul, is, as I have often faid, neither concern'd in Sin nor Punishment. adly, The Soul does bear its Share, as he

calls

calls it, in the Punishment, Death; which are the Pains and Terrors, at leaft preceding Death; the inevitable Confequence of its Union, and Sympathy with the Body. 3dly, There is, in the Scripture Language, belides a temporal Death, both a spiritual, and an eternal Death; in the Spiritual Death, the reprobate Soul has its Share in Punishment, even while united with the Body; in the eternal Death it has fo large a Share, that it cannot bear it, which is fufficient to clear up this Scruple, and that which follows it, If nothing died but Man's Pag. 216. Body, the Denunciation of the Curse was but a meer Bugbear, &c. To which he makes his Adverfary reply, That by his Tranfgreffion once, he became afterward fubject to Sin; and so to final Condemnation. To which his Answer is, Before he finned he was fubject to Sin. And who, I wonder, is his Adversary in this? but what's this to eternal Mifery being included in the Threatning? which is one thing, tho' not all his Adverfaries have to fay. But whether God made Death intelligible to Adam, in this large Senfe, or not; and whether or no he understood his Nature to be compounded as we do; yet, methinks, the threatning of Death cou'd,upon no imaginable Suppofition, be a meer Bugbear to one in the higheft Enjoyment, and Perfection of Life.

The

The only thing he farther urges, as a Confirmation of this Argument, is the Unfuitableness to Divine Justice, that the Body fhou'd fuffer, more than the Soul which Ibid. efcapes the first Death, being grounded, as I have juft fhewn, on a falfe Notion both of the fuffering of the Body, and efcaping of the Soul, I need only mention, and pass on to his.

Third Argument, drawn from the Na

ture of the Refurrection, which it Pag.217. seems our Opinion perplexes, if not totally fubverts. This is what one wou'd not eafily find out at firft Sight, but wou'd rather be apt to ask himself, if he can doubt of it, fuch Questions as thefe; Why may not my Body be rais'd, by the Power of God, as well to be re-united to my Soul, as to be re-impower'd with Life; Does not the Refurrection relate wholly to my Body, and the material Parts of it? how then can I expect to find out by that, no medium, whether Life and Soul is the fame thing? But these are only first Thoughts, and Eftibius has done with all fuch, tho' in reality his Second Thoughts upon this Argument are only the fame, a fecond, or rather many times repeated; for all the Support of this Objection is the old Mistake, if I may fo call it, that the Body properly fpeaking, fuffers in another Life. I fay,