Notice, that can certainly be depended upon, even of a Senfible Object, any farther than it concerns, and affects our own Body; and that, properly fpeaking, is only an Information that we have fuch a Sensation; fo that our Abstracted Reason is the true Ground, and Foundation of the certainty even of our Senfible Evidence.

And this Confideration may serve to wean us thus far from Senfual Credulity, that we may be fure our Reasoning about Things is nevertheless certain, even tho' we have no Senfible Ideas of them: For if the fame Operation, upon which we depend in our Reafoning about thefe, conclude as ftrongly for the Existence of Things remote from Senfe, we may with equal Affurance depend upon it.

Having, therefore, evinc'd the Neceffity of Incorporeal Substance in General, and prov'd, at large, that fuch only can be a Thinking Substance; this demonftrates that there is fuch a Subftance in Human Nature: And as the Paffive Qualities which we find in Matter, affure our Reason that there is a Material Subftance exifting without us; fo the Active Powers of Thought do as neceffarily inferr an Immaterial Substance within us.

The Word Immaterial is indeed a Negative Term; but confider it as expreffing fome

fomething that thinks, which Matter cannot do, and you will be convinc'd that, as perfect Unity, or Indivifibility of Effence is, in the Divine Nature, a greater Perfection than Divifibility wou'd be; fo it must be a proportionable Perfection in that, which is not liable to Phyfical Division : But Negatives are no Perfections, tho' we may be forc'd to exprefs fome Perfections by Negative Terms. I conclude therefore, That we have as evidently discover'd Two distinct Subftances in our Nature, as every Man discovers One, which is the Material.

SECT. XI.

Of the Union of Soul and Body.

BUT

UT fome Philofophers have not been fo much perplex'd to find Two diftinct Subftances in Human Nature, as to find out the Reason why they make but One Nature and Perfon; and this, I think, is the laft Obstacle in our Way to our main Conclufion.

And here I frankly own, That when all the Philofophic Attempts that have been, or can be made, have had their utmost G 2 Effect

Effect; the Reafon of this Union will refolve entirely into the fole Power, and Will of the Creator.

But do we not now recurr to Omnipotence to folve, what others esteem a Contradiction; and fo we are not guilty of the fame Abfurdity we charg'd upon them? For they esteem it a thing in its own Nature impoffible to be done, That Two Natures not only fo distinct, but fo contradictory, as Material and Immaterial, fhou'd be thus United, unless by Virtue of fome Tertium quid as a Cement; which, they clearly conceive, there cannot there cannot be in Rerum Natura.

In order to state this Matter aright, we must explain, fo far as it is explicable, what we mean by the Union of Soul and Body, in the one Perfon of Man.

1. By this we do not understand fuch a confounding or blending of these two Subftances, whereby they become as it were one Substance, but we maintain that, Tho' there is a reciprocal Action and Paffion between them, yet each hath preferv'd its chief Properties, naturally independent on the other, and incommunicable to it. From which it follows:

2. That this is not fuch an Union as is indiffoluble; for fo long as the Substances, and their chief Properties continue in

their respective Natures feparate, and diftinct; they are feparable in all other Refpects: The difannulling of that Law, whereinfoever it confifts, whereby they are united; can affect the Properties of neither, fo far as to difplace it from that Rank of Being, in which it was, before the Union commenc'd.

3. We find that this Diffolution is brought about by Natural and Phyfical Caufes; and therefore, that the Union is not fuch as can refift them; nay, it is in every fuch Diffolution, a diforder of the Corporeal System, that immediately precedes, and is the Efficient Caufe of it. Notwithstanding which,

4. A farther Inftance or Effect of the Union is this; that the Action and Paffion is reciprocal; it is the Soul that moves the Body in Life, and takes her flight from it at Death: On the other hand, the Body conveys Motion to, and as variously moving, caufes various Senfations in the Soul: Nor have we reason to think that the Soul can exert, during the Union, her most abstracted Powers, without fome Ufe, and Influence of the Body.

5. And lastly, the highest Inftance or Effect of this Union, is the Vital Congruity; by which the Adherence and Sympathy becomes Natural; fo that a Body in reft G 3

will

will as foon move of it self, as a Soul and Body difunite, but by External Force and Compulfion. I call it External, notwithftanding that fuch Motions as cause the Diffolution, may be rais'd within the Body; for fo it is, with regard to that Part of the Body, be what it will, to which the Soul is immediately united. Thus far I hope we do not offend, in endeavouring to explain the Union of Soul and Body, in fuch Inftances and Effects of it, as fall within our Knowledge. As to the Union, confider'd fimply in it felf, we confess our perfect Ignorance in the Manner of it; and, as to the Caufe of it, we freely own we are able to conceive none, but the First Caufe of all Things. Now we are to confider, Whether there is to be found any Contradiction; either, Firft, In what I have explain'd: Or, Secondly, In what I have confefs'd inexplicable in this Union. First, As to what I have explain'd, there is no Contradiction in any Part of it: not,

1. In this, That the Union does not detroy the Distinction of Natures. To do this might, poflibly, be a Contradiction; but not to do it can be none: And fo long as we maintain, That the Soul is not turn'd into Matter nor the Body into Spirit; there is hitherto no more Contra

diction