The Idea of Motion being thus clear, and the fame to every Man, we have the greater Hopes of being able thoroughly to comprehend the Effects of it in Bodies moving; for that Motion it felf is not Thought, every one must grant that reflects upon them as two different Simple Ideas, and understands that the Difference between any Two Simple Ideas is Effential and Eternal: And as Motion it felf cannot, fo neither can the Communication of it be, poffibly, conceiv'd to be Thought; Whatever Difficulties to our Apprehenfion this Communication carries, as to the Manner of it, thus much is clear, That every Body operates on another by Contact only; and if this Contact were Thought, the most coherent Bodies wou'd have the greatest Share of it, and fo there wou'd be most Thought where there is leaft Motion.

All we have to do then, is to inquire into the Effects in the Body mov'd, subsequent upon the Contact with another, and the Motion receiv'd from it. And here, tho' I cannot enumerate all the Effects producible in Bodies by Motion, yet thus much I clearly conceive, that they all depend upon, and are refolvable into this one, viz. Change of Place Thus if the Motion imprefs'd upon a Body moves the whole of it, without caufing any Internal Commotion of its

Parts, the Body receives no Alteration but what a different Situation, that is a different Place gives it: If the Internal Parts are put in Motion, all the Alteration the Body then receives, is nothing else but their changing Place with one another; or changing Place, fo as to leave the Body; or laftly, forcing other Particles of Matter to change their Place, fo as to come to it.

What other Effects of Texture, Figure, Colour, Hardness, &c. follow upon this, fhall be confider'd by and by; in the mean time Change of Place being the immediate, and only proper Effect of Motion, I defire any Man to conceive it barely poffible, if he can; that a Body fhou'd think because it is in one Place, and be fenfeless because it is in another. I defire this may be well confider'd; a Body in Motion feems indeed to be, fo far, active; but, upon Examination, all its feeming Activity will be found to be nothing elfe but a Paffive Removal and whatever New Qualities it gains, they are all entirely owing to its New Place: But now the Notion of Place, whether conceiv'd as a Part of the Infinite Immaterial Extenfion, (call'd a Part only from the External Denomination of Bodies in it) or only as a Modus and Denomination of Material Extenfion; is however one of thofe Simple Ideas which, as fuch, must bẹ

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always

always the fame: And therefore (not to demand what Place, has to do with Thought) I only urge this as an impoffibility, That a Body fhou'd Think, by virtue of being in one Place, and not in another.

If we carry this Notion along with us, it will eafily appear as impoffible for any particular Motion, as for Motion in general to graft on Matter this Property: To talk of a determinate Course, a peculiarly modified Chanel, Action or Reaction, Percuffion or Repercuffion of Animal Spirits, being able to do the Feat, is equal Nonfence as to imagin a Stone tumbling down an Hill, and a Wave Rolling on the Sea, the one in terrible, the other in tumultuous Thoughts; for what really happens to the former, which is change of Place, happens to the latter, and no more; the different Dimensions of their Parts, with the different Determinations of their Motions, is no Exception to this, that they all do nothing really but change Place; and therefore Motion alone is not, really, capable of producing Thought in a Body moving.

2. The next Refuge is to Generation, that is, that Thought is generable, and fo corruptible, in Bodies, as other Qualities are: We are only concern'd immediately with the fuppofed Generation of Thought, bur

if that be abfurd, fo must be the Corruption of it too.

This Notion, together with that already confuted, makes up the two oldest Forms of Atheism, to prove nothing but Matter in the Universe; viz. the Hylopathian or Anaximandrian, and Atomic or Democritic; the former afferting that Thought has its being, as other Corporeal Qualities have, by Corporeal Generation, and fo is corrupted and destroy'd as they are; and the latter, that 'tis nothing elfe but a determinate, tho' they knew not what, Motion of Atoms.

Now the Reason why these two Sects differ'd from each other in Hypothefis, tho' in Principle they were the fame, was this; neither cou'd imagin the other's Hypothefis wou'd ferve the Defign; the Hylopathian, not being able to conceive that Matter and Motion cou'd think, Philofophiz'd by Real Qualities, and plac'd Thought amongst them; the Atomic, finding the Abfurdity of that Fiction of Real Qualities, recurrs to the Principle of Matter and Motion, more accountable indeed in it felf, but never the better fitted to folve the Phenomenon.

The former is indeed abfurd enough in it self, for the most stupid Atheist to stand by; thus to multiply Beings without neceffity, and contrary to fenfe; to fuppofe a Train of Abstracted Qualities and Sub

ftantial

stantial Forms, as it were hovering over a Body, to take poffeffion of it, upon fuch and fuch Motions; as it was not the Opinion of the oldeft, fo it has been rejected by all the modern Atheists, and need not be elaborately confuted to the leaft Proficient, now-a-days, in the School of Science.

But ftill it must be confefs'd, that our Idea of thefe Qualities, refulting from Motion in Bodies, is fomething very different from our Idea of Motion in it felf; and therefore, notwithstanding what has been faid upon that Topic, it may, at first fight, be judg'd a Refuge for our Adverfaries.

But let us recollect, that there is nothing really happens to Body, or the Parts of Body, in its alteration, but change of Place; and that, confequently, all the new Qualities it puts on, muft depend upon that; and then we shall gain the Reason why our Idea of these Resulting Qualities, is fo different from that of Motion from whence they refult, viz. That one is, in fome sense, a real, the other only a relative Change. Change of Place, tho' it makes no Alteration in the Nature of Matter, yet, if we fuppose but one Monad of Matter created, we can frame ftill a determinate Idea of its Motion, and the changing of its Place; fo that this Operation upon it is fo far real, that it

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does