Extenfion, as far as our Thoughts can poffibly carry us, we meet with nothing of Thought but find our felves as far from it, as when we first enter'd upon the Confideration of Matter, in one grofs extended Bulk; Nor, laftly, does there refult, from all the Comparison we can make of these two together, any third Thing [Subftance or Attribute] in which they are united, and into which, their different Natures are clearly refolvable. 1 If to this it is objected, That in fact we find them united in one common Substance. of Human Nature; I answer, befides that this is to beg the Queftion of him, that that wou'd prove Human Nature to be made up of Two Substances; if we confider Man only as an Organical Body, constituted of Particles differing in Bulk, Figure, Situation, &c. and then confider again, Whether this organiz'd Piece of Matter is more capable of connecting, as a third Thing, Extenfion and Thought, than any other Part of Matter in the Univerfe; we shall find it is not, that we can conceive; which is all I aim at here, becaufe (as has been hinted) we are never the nearer Thought, for our refining upon Matter: By which we are led to one of thefe Conclufions either that Human Nature, as endu'd with the Faculty of Thought, is to us an unC accountable, accountable, unfolvable Instance in the Creation; or elfe another Principle muft be fetch'd in for the Solution of it. Now let us inquire, What has put the beft Reafoners and Philofophers upon the Neceffity of multiplying Substances in the Univerfe, for, Sine neceffitate Entia non funt multiplicanda, and we fhall find this, and only this; That they met with Properties different in themselves, and not connected by any Third Thing, that offer'd it felf to their Thoughts.. And therefore Spinoza's Distribution of Things into Corpora, & Cogitandi Modos, was illogical and unphilofophical. If he cou'd not, as he was confcious he cou'd not, reduce Cogitation to Extension, but was forc'd to place them in distinct and coordinate Claffes; why did he mention the Subftance of the one, and but the Accident of the other? He fhou'd have faid, Extenfionis & Cogitationis Modos, or Substantiam extenfam & cogitantem. In one Object we perceive nothing but Extension, and what follows that; in the other nothing but Cogitation, and what belongs to that; and therefore thefe equally conclude, if either conclude, for the Existence of their Subftances. Spinoza wou'd object here, That we know nothing of Immaterial Subftance, con fider'd fider'd in it self; and I wou'd answer, No more do we of Material; and as to their Properties, it is granted, That we do perceive Cogitandi Modos. If he fhou'd farther urge, That we know not so much of them, as of those belonging to Body, and fo make what is fenfible, the highest Degree of Certainty; I need not difpute that; becaufe, as I said, any the least Degree of the Knowledge of an Object, is a full Warrant to conclude for its Existence. But Spinoza has plainly betray'd his own Caufe; for he has unwarily laid down, and proved this Propofition, Que Ethic. p. F. prop. 3. res nihil commune inter fe habent, earum una alterius caufa effe non potest: From whence I argue, If there is nothing common between Extenfion and Cogitation, or, in his Words, between Body and the Modes of Thinking, then the one cannot be the Caufe of the other; and confequently they cannot proceed from one and the fame SubStance. But a more modern Author has offer'd another Objection against the Certainty of this Conclufion; We have, fays he, the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, but poffibly fhall never be able to know, whether any meer material Being thinks, or no; it being imC 2 poffible poffible for us, by the Contemplation of our own Ideas, without Revelation, to discover, whether Omnipotence has not given to fome Systems of Matter fitly difpofed a power to perceive and think. Lock's Effay, Book 4. Ch.3. I fhall have occafion to examin thi° Objection thoroughly in the fequel, but shall only confider it now, as it oppofes what I aim at in this Section. It feems then there is a fit Difpofition requir'd on Matter's fide, as well as an omnipotent Power from without, to make it think. If I fhou'd ask this great Thinker, in what Part of Matter, or under what Circumstances he ever found this Difpofition, I cou'd not reasonably expect a prompt Answer. I am fure, that in his Ideas of Matter and Thinking there is no fuch thing to be found: And therefore, if he is Master of the Secret, his Knowledge is far larger than his Ideas; whereas it is true, and the Subject of this very Setion, That our Knowledge is Ibid. narrower than our Ideas. Ibid. But to let the Intimation of Matter fitly difpofed pafs; I am furpriz'd to find a Philofopher of no Interest or Party, that neverfailing Argument against all that are not of his Opinion, and who pleads fo hard for . for rational and intelligible Solutions, him felf to recur to that of, I know not but it may be, nay, with a farther Fetch, I know not but Omnipotence may have made it fo; and this is a Cafe that most other Phi lofophers have thought capable of being reafon'd upon. Suppofe he had been talking of the Atmosphere, and, after feveral Experiments and Obfervations, to prove it no where 40 Miles high; fhou'd come to fhew how Rain proceeds from the Condensation of Vapours in that Atmosphere; but stop here, fays he; We have the Ideas of Rain and Atmosphere, but can never be certain, but that the Drops of Rain, as well as the Rays of Light, may stream from the Sun, for that Omnipotence may have fo fitly difpofed them, that they cannot Gravitate till within fuch a Distance from the Earth. Wou'd not this Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανής tend mightily to the Advancement of Sci ence? The Cafe I think is very parallel, and I fubmit it to Judgment, Whether fo great a Master of Reason wou'd not be thought, in the former Part of it, to fpeak like, what he so much detefts, A Man of a Party. I think however, the Author has here deferted his own clear Ideas; the chief Use of which is to distinguish Things, as Confufion, in our fimple Apprehenfion, is the C 3 Parent |