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The first is that of Subftance, by which I mean That, to us, unknown Nature, upon which all that we do know of the Nature of any thing depends, as to its Being; and which is, as to its Effence in general, independent on every thing but God.

The next is Attribute, by which is to be understood, abfolutely, all that belongs to a Subftance, and is not the Subftance it felf; or, all of the Subftance that falls under our Knowledge and Apprehenfion: but when taken relatively to other things appertaining to a Substance, is that which conftitutes the fpecifick Effence of it, according to our Denomination of its Effence. Thus by fome Extenfion, by others impenetrable Extenfion is call'd the Attribute of Body, as diftinguishing it fpecifically from things immaterial. I add according to our Denomination of its Effence, because, whether that Attribute flows immediately from its Effence or not, (which perhaps is only known to the Creator) it is fufficient if to it we can reduce, as to their Fountain-head, all the other specific Attributes, which we do apprehend to belong unto it.

Property I understand in a larger Senfe than Attribute relatively confider'd, and in a more restrain'd Sense than Attribute taken absolutely; viz. Any Attribute belonging to the fpecific Effence of a Subftance, whether deriving

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And by Mode, or Quality is meant a Property, which gives fome peculiar Denòmination to the Substance.

Human Soul, the Subject of our Enquiry, it is fufficient at prefent to define thus, a finite Spirit fo clofely united by the Will and Power of its Creator, to an organical_terreAtrial Body as to compofe one entire Naturë and Perfon. It is fufficient here to define the Soul as it is in this State, because our Knowledge of what it is now, is the only Foundation of our Knowledge, (fo far as the Light of Nature guides) of what it will be in another.

There is yet another Term which needs explication, and that because its different Acceptations has caus'd Oppofition, where there was no Contradiction: It is the word Idea, which fome understand, according to the Etimon of it, barely to fignifie, thofe Impreffions which by the Prefence of fenfible Objects, or the Power of Memory, are made on the Imagination. Others take it in the Cartefian Senfe, for the immediate Object of our Thoughts, while we do think; let that Object be of what Nature it will, or however it is reprefented to the Mind; and in this fenfe we have an Idea of whatever we can believe poffibly, or actually true.

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I fhall take it in this laft Senfe, tho' others have been cenfur'd for so using it; and justly too, if, in the main, they extend it to all knowable Truths, and when it serves a Turn, confine it only to fuch as are known by explicit Evidence; which is a Fault obvious in a whole Sect of very modern Philofophers.

From these Terms thus explain'd, several Controverfies arife, which yet I think it an improper Method to engage in here; it being fufficient that they are clear and intelligible and whether they are proper Vehicles of any Truths, will beft appear by the Application of them. This is all I think requifite to premife for the better understanding of what follows.

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SECT. II.

What fort of Proof is to be expected and infifted upon.

Have fomething to add for the better Reception of it; and that is concerning the Nature of the Proof I intend to infift upon, and it is reasonable to expect from

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ft, I hope no Man expects to meet with what is properly call'd fenfible Proof, in an Argument for the Existence of a Thing altogether remote from Senfe; nor therefore,

2dly, Muft he expect Mathematical Proof in the common acceptation for Geometrical, as it is converfant about Things and the Relations of Things, which fall under our Senfes not but that there are many Propofitions, and fome, I hope, in thefe Papers, which are built upon Axioms, as properly ftil'd, and deduc'd as demonftrably from them, as any Propofition in Euclid but, being of an abstracted Nature, are not so easily, nor fo fully affented to, by the generality of Mankind, as thofe Sciences which bring Reafon down to Serfe, and fo are better adapted to the weakness of Human Understanding; not again that these have any Advantage of the other, in point of Evidence, with a Capacity fufceptible of both.

And therefore, 3dly, most Readers cannot hope to find fuch Proof here, be it of what Nature foever, as will leave no Scruple or Hefitation in their Minds.

It is one ill effect of the Fall, that our Understanding is more deeply immers'd in Senfe, and fo [naturally] cramp'd when it aims at intellectual Objects, that Men of Strong Reasoning in other Cafes, often think

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we talk of we know not what, when we are got upon this Subject; to conquer this Difficulty, there is requifite a found and piercing Judgment, frequent Exercife, and a very particular Application: Thofe that have not thus employ'd a confiderable part of their time, I can only defire to reflect, after they have perus'd this, Effay, upon what the Proof 1 fhall bring amounts to all together; and to try if they can bring better, or as good Reafon to the contrary; and if they cannot, whatever Difficulties they find in the Apprehenfion, the Scale of Judgment will at laft turn on our fide; and, to carry on the Simile, will weigh as far down, tho not fo fwiftly, as if there were no oppofite Weight.

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4thly, As to the Method of proceeding in Our Proof, it will be the analitic or probatio. à pofteriori, from the Effect to the Caufe which, tho it is not fo perfect a Method, nor confequently the Reafoning by it fo ftrong as the fynthetic, or probatio à priori, from the Caufe to the Effect; yet it is, in its kind, a good and effectual Method of Proof; other wife we must be fceptical in the far greateft part of fcientific Knowledge, which leads us no other wife to the Caufe, than by the Effect which lies nearer to us; befides that all Relation is reciprocal, and we may fafely follow the Chain of Reasoning either way; not that, 5thly, We

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