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5thly, We pretend to lead, by this Method, to a full Comprehenfion of the Cause; for the Caufe may have Properties which bear no Relation to that Effect; but that hereby we know something certainly of it, which is as full a Proof of its Existence, as if we knew every thing appertaining to it; for nibili nulla funt proprietates.

Laftly, It is allowed by all Philofophers a good Establishment of a Principle, how unknown foever in its felf, if there appear a Neceffity of recurring to it, for the Solution of fome real Phenomenon; provided ftill, that that Principle be not in it felf absurd, as well as unknown.

In this Senfe I understand a thing is well prov'd, when it is prov'd as far as the Nature of it will permit; in any other Senfe it feems a fallacious Conclufion to say, a thing is really prov'd, becaufe prov'd as well as the Nature of it will bear; for ftill the Question may lye, whether the Nature of it will admit of fufficient Proof. If therefore we can firft clear our Principle from Abfurdity, and not only fo, but bring good Arguments to prove it a Principle in rerum natura, and then evince the Neceffity of recurring to it in the Cafe before us; the Conclufion must be admitted; and this leads me to the firft Step of my intended Proof.

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SECT III.

Of Immaterial Substance in general.

TH

HE Principle therefore upon which I build is that of Immaterial Subftance; in which I fhall diftinctly confider the Subject and the Predicate.

Ift, As to Subftance; there needs no farther Proof of its Existence than the Definition of it already laid down, i. e. it is a felf-evident Propofition that an Attribute, Property, Mode, or Quality, abstractedly confider'd, cannot exist of it self; and yet here is an infuperable Objection against the Exi ftence of Subftance to any Man that is refolv'd to maintain that Senfation and Reflexion are the Source of all our Ideas; that is, of all our Knowledge; for it is certain Subftance became the Object of our Underftanding, by neither of thefe means.

Effay on H.
Und. lib. 2.

Cap. 13. §. 19.

And accordingly, the Author of that Scheme has, very confiftently, ridicul'd it; it is with him the Indian Philofophers nefcio quid, that Supports the Tortoise, that Supports the Elephant, that fupports the Earth; which is plainly to make our Notion of Subfrance not only unimaginable,but ungrounded

and

and chymerical. This I know is more than the Author apparently defigns ch. 27. §. 2. here, and where he repeats the

Simile, which is to fhew that the old Divifion of Subftance and Accident is useless in Philofophy; but granting the Simile was introduc'd for its Elegancy only, and also that this Division of Things into Subftance and Accident is ufelefs in fuch Inftances as he produces; which depend, as to their Solution, entirely upon our Knowledge of the Accidents; yet is not this general Divifion neceffarily to be made in the order of Nature, before we defcend to thefe Particulars? if not, we must allow a Self-fupport to Accidents.

Spinoz. Ethic

A profefs'd Enemy to immaterial Subftance is fo far from denying the real Existence of Subftance in general, that he lays down neceffary Existence, as an univerfal Property of it: I fhall pars 1. prop. 7. have occafion to undertake this Pofition afterward; only I obferve at prefent, that this Doctrine was own'd on both fides, till this Moderator interpos'd, who is fometimes on one, and fometimes on the other fide and now and then against both.

But do we know nothing of Subftance ? Yes, for we can diftinguish one Substance from another (which cannot be done without fome Knowledge of both) by their known different Accidents, which neceffarily

infer a proportionable difference in the Subflances to which they belong; but perhaps the meaning is, we know nothing of Subftance, taken in Distinction from, and Oppofition to its own Accidents; very true, and this Knowledge may not only tranfcend human, but all created Understanding; but ftill, of the Existence of that, as to its Effence unknown, Substance, we have felf-evident certainty, which, I think, cannot properly be call'd knowing nothing of it.

This therefore I venture to lay down as a felf-evident Propofition, That where ever there are Accidents, there is of neceffity a Subftance too; and this, as next to felfevident, that from the difference we find in the Nature of Accidents, we must con clude a like difference in the Nature of thofe Subftances to which they belong; for whereever a thing has its Dependence as to Being; there it must have its Dependence alfo, as to all the Modes of Existence.

2dly, Immaterial Subftance is not fo much without Controverfie. Spinoza in the forementioned Propofition giving the Divine Atribute of necessary Existence to Substance in general; and, one Divine Attribute inferring all the reft, makes but one kind of Subftance in the Universe, and all Diverfity to be accidental. A full

the Reader Duarum Ather mi Spinozani fubverfio. Moni Op. Vol. 1.

columnarum

A full Confutation of this Tenet is too tedious an Undertaking here; may find it to his Satisfaction in Dr. More. I only urge, that, according to what is faid in the precedent Section, that very accidental Diversity infers a difference in the Nature of the Subftances, and according to his own words, Due fubftantia Ethic. p. 1. diverfa attributa habentes, nihil

inter fe commune habent. So

prop. 2...

that if there be any fuch thing as two dif ferent Attributes, there must be two diftinct Subftances.

But that there must be, or, which is all one, must have been an immaterial Substance in the Univerfe; that is, a Subftance with Properties diftinct from, and inconfiftent with thofe that belong to corporeal Subftance; I fhall, waving other Arguments, prove from these two Principles, 1ft, That fomething was from Eternity. 2dly, That Motion was communicated to Matter.

The first is a Principle that needs no other to confirm it, unlefs by fhewing the Abfurdity of the contrary, as Dr. Cud

Intellect. Syst.

morth has done with invincible Evidence in this fhort Sentence, If ever there was nothing, there never cou'd have been any thing. But this eternal Being is not Matter confider'd either in its specific or generical;

Nature;

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