our souls, and in reference to a future world. For it is absurd to suppose, that the divine purpose can be made void, any more in the one case than in the other. According to this way of arguing, trade and commerce, the labours of husbandry and all the employments of life must be at a stand. For who, among all the busy mortals on earth, can foretel the event, or ascertain success? Who can tell, however promising the prospect, but Jehovah's purposes may render all his contrivances and all his painful industry entirely fruitless? Nay, further, upon this principle, we must not eat our common food, nor seek the needful refreshments of sleep; for it must be confessed, that we are absolutely ignorant what the purposes of God may be, as to the event, in either case. If it be his determination that we shall enjoy health and vigour, what occasion for the one or the other? and if not, what good will they do us? For his purpose shall stand, and he will do all his pleasure. But who, notwithstanding this, ever took it into his head to adopt the principle, and thus to apply it, in affairs of the present life? None, surely, but a fool, or a madman. While we have our sober senses in exercise, however firmly we may believe the existence of eternal decrees; or however clearly we may discern the interposition of providence, on ten thousand different occasions; we never suppose that those everlasting purposes, or these providential interpositions, were designed to supercede the use of means, or had, as to the concerns of time, any such tendency. Why then should we strive to separate the end from the means, in things of infinitely greater importance? The dictates of inspiration, the maxims of philosophy, the principles of common sense, and the general conduct of mankind, all unite

F

in utterly disavowing such a procedure, as irrational and absurd to the last degree.

This objection militates no less against the infallible fore-knowledge of God, than against his purpose. For Jehovah is perfect in knowledge. That knowledge which is absolutely perfect can admit of no increase. All the violations therefore of moral agents, and all the events consequent upon them, were from eternity present to the divine Mind, and open to his omniscient eye. And as every thing future was included in his all-comprehending view, before the world began; so it would be absurd to suppose that any event should ever take place, otherwise than as He foresaw it. With equal reason,' therefore, might the objector infer from the divine prescience that the use of means to attain any end is vain, as from the doctrine of predestination. For between the fore-knowledge, and the purpose of God, there is a close and an inseparable connection. To illustrate the point, and to apply the argument. Admitting the perfect fore-knowledge of God, the objector may thus argue against the use of means, respecting his eternal state. "The fore-knowledge of God is perfect. From eternity he viewed my final state. Either he foresaw me seated on a throne of bliss, and exulting in a sense of his favour; or loaded with chains of darkness, and groaning in the agonies of endless despair. As he from eternity viewed me, so it must inevitably be; for perfect fore-knowledge is infallible. My eternal state is therefore a fixed point with the Deity. What need then of the use of means to avoid punishment, or to obtain felicity? Prayer and watchfulness, all the exercises and all the duties of a painful profession are entirely in vain. If the Omniscient foresaw me happy in a future world, I cannot be mise

Fable. If he foresaw me miserable, I shall not, I cannot be happy; though all the angels in heaven, and all the men upon earth were to afford me their united aid."

This argument, I humbly conceive, wears the face of probability to as great a degree, and infers the objection I am now refuting with as much propriety and force, as that which is formed and the inference from it, against the decree of election.-But the truth is, neither that nor this has the least force or propriety. For as Jehovah, when he decreed the end, appointed the means and the application of them to their respective objects; so, in his eternal prescience, he not only viewed the end, but also. foresaw the means, with their application and use, as connected with the final event. As he foresaw none in the abodes of darkness, but those whom he viewed as guilty, and as walking in the ways of destruction; so he determined to bring none to glory, except in a way becoming himself as perfectly holy, and by the use of means which grace should render effectual. Hence it appears, that the objector must either give up his argument, or deny that his Maker is perfect, which would be to undeify the God that is above. This indeed with a bold impiety many have done; in order to support their fa vourite notions about free-agency and the liberty of the human will, in oposition to the doctrine of sovereign grace, and of divine predestination: being well aware, that whoever allows the eternal and perfect fore-knowledge of God, cannot consistently deny his decrees respecting the final state of men. This the Socinians have freely acknowledged. "Admitting, say they, the infallible prescience of all future contingencies, CALVIN'S doctrine of the predestination of some, by name, to life, and of

others to death, cannot be refuted." They therefore do their utmost endeavour to prove, (horrid to think!) that He who formed and governs the universe, is not possessed of such a foresight; in other words, that he is not God. This they do, by much the same arguments that others use, in opposition to the doctrine here maintained.

To the foregoing objections some, perhaps, may be ready to add, with an air of confidence; "Does not this doctrine, in its inseparable connections, represent the Most High, as partial in his conduct towards his creatures, and as a respecter of persons? as dealing hardly, if not unjustly, with far the greater part of mankind?"In answer to which I observe; That as to the charge of partiality and respect of persons, here exhibited against the divine conduct, it is entirely void of the least foundation. For wherever such a charge may be advanced with propriety against the conduct of any one, it must be in the affairs of remunerative, or of punishing justice, and where the rules of equity are more or less transgressed; but cannot possibly have place in matters of Sovereign favour and mere bounty, of which kind is election. For instance: If we consider a person in the capacity of à magistrate, as invested with the executive power of the criminal laws of his country, and behold him inflicting upon such offenders as are poor and mean, and of little account in the world, the penalties annexed to their respective crimes; while he suffers others of nobler birth, of more elevated rank, and of affluent circumstances, to escape with impuni ty; we have great reason to remonstrate against such a procedure, as a culpable partiality, a criminal respect of persons, and as no other than a perversion of justice. But if we consider the same person under

* Apud WITSIUM, O Econ. Foed. 1. iii. c. iv. 12.

the character of a benefactor, and behold him dis pensing his favours among his indigent neighbours, in order to relieve their wants and render them happy; we never imagine that he is under any obligation to show an equal regard to all that are distressed with poverty. Supposing he distribute his bounty in great variety to the favoured objects of his beneficence; nay, supposing he indulge some with favours, while others, who stand in the same need, are entirely overlooked; shall we arraign his conduct, and call him a respecter of persons? By no means. For were that the case, there would be nothing indecent, if after he had manifested his beneficent regards to some, others were to come with a commanding voice, and require his assistance in the same way, and to the same degree; than which nothing could be more impertinent. Besides, though men are under obligation to love and assist one another; though, being only stewards of what they possess, they are accountable to the supreme Judge for the manner in which they use their faculties, their time, and all their talents; yet God has the most perfect right to do, what he will with his own. For no creature, and especially no offending creature, has any claim upon his bounty..

If Jehovah must be denominated a respecter of persons, and his conduct pronounced partial, on supposition that he loved and chose some to everlasting happiness, while he rejected others and left them to perish under his righteous curse; if the equity of his proceedings, in the affairs of grace, must be called in question, because he bestows eternal blessings on some and entirely withholds them from others; how shall we vindicate the methods of Providence in ten thousand different instances? Does not God, as to the concerns of religion, afford those means of