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SECT. VIL

enfeebled, as the Stoics alledged, with a notion that even these de- PART II. pended on fortune for part of their effects. While they affumed CHAP. I. virtue, or a laudable part to be acted in the community of mankind as the fupreme good; and reprobated the reclufe tranquility, or selfish enjoyments of the Epicurean, as poison to the foul of man, and death to his beft and happiest affections; whilft they allowed, that the highest measure of fortune never could be brought into competition with any confideration of justice or duty; they still required profperity, to compleat the felicity even of a virtuous life.

In this argument, the Stoics, though charged with paradox, and themselves the more ordinary butts of ridicule, yet turned this weapon against their antagonists: "You allow," they faid, "that "virtue is the conftituent of happiness, and even that fortitude " is a virtue; and yet to complete that happiness, you require a

fortune, which virtue defpifes, and an ease in which fortitude "is not required. You tell us of a good which the thief may "steal from his neighbour; which the mifer may lock up in his "coffers from all the world; which the glutton may devour at ་ a meal; which may be denied to the worthy, and lavished on "the vile. You preach up moderation, and even abstinence,

with refpect to this good. You own it is mean to be folicitous. "about it; and noble to defpife it. You call that a good, therefore, "of which the contempt is wisdom and honour; of which the "privation did not marr the happiness of Epaminondas and "Socrates; nor fecure the condition of Darius or Crofus. "wise man, they faid, will acquit himself properly with respect to the gifts of fortune; but, for his happiness, will rely upon "what he himself does; not upon what he poffeffes; upon the

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The

general

PART II.
CHAP. I.

SECT. VII,

general refolution, integrity and goodness which are his own; not upon the caprice of other men, nor upon the measure or "degree in which the materials on which he is to work falls to "his fhare."

This may well be confidered as a degree of perfection, far raifed above the ordinary state of human nature: It is, nevertheless, that, for which it was given, a noble idea, upon which the ingenuous mind cannot too nearly form itfelf.

Men very commonly fuffer themselves to depend, for present comfort, upon fome distant object, or the hopes which they entertain of the future. This is no more than a habit of thinking; yet it may produce frivolity and weakness, if not depravity of mind, or neglect of duty. The future feldom comes up to the expectations that were formed of it: But it is the nature or character of feeble minds, notwithstanding the fallacy of past expectations, to apprehend a future, on which, to the neglect of present objects or duties, they still continue to rely.

Material fubjects, or external circumstances of any kind, except fo far as they affect the organs of sense with pleasure or pain, are in their own nature indifferent; and, if beyond this they excite defire or averfion in the mind, it is by means of fome quality, whether of good or evil, honour or dishonour, which are not inherent to the subject itself; but affociated with it, in the conception which the mind entertains. The mifer has affociated happiness with money, in his conception of riches; and is infatiable of wealth. The ufurper has affociated honour with power or dominion; and sticks at no means, whether of infinuation or force to obtain his end.

I

Whatever

PART II.

Whatever be the habitual conception, and the habitual pursuit, CHAP. I. thefe form the ruling affection or paffion of the human mind: If SECT. VII. the object, in itself, were fitted by nature to excite fuch affection or paffion, as the juice of an orange produces the sensation of fweet, the affections or paffions of all men, like the sensation produced on their palate, would be the fame. But, while fenfations are uniform, conceptions are various; one perfon hopes for what, to another, is an object of fear: Infomuch, that many have thought themselves juftified in concluding, from these appearances, that there is not in reality any standard, by which to rectify or to fix the apprehenfions of men. But, as we have found the distinction of good and evil fufficiently established in the nature of things, we have only to apply this distinction, in order to correct any mistake or false apprehenfion, respecting the subjects of estimation or choice; and, in our endeavour so to profit by the exercise of reason, confifts the fruit of that information on the fubject of good and evil, which it is the object of moral science to obtain or convey.

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SECTION VIII.

The fame Subject continued.

Α τες μεν είδοτας καλες και αγαθες ήγειτο είναι: Τες δε αγνοώντας ανδραποδώδεις αν δικαίως κεκλησθαι.

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CHAP. I.

PART II. IF, to avoid the imputation of vifionary schemes, it be required SECT. VIII to keep in view the actual state of men's minds, as well as the abstract idea of what they ought to be, we may continue to offer a specimen of the opinions, or habits of thinking, in which the characters of men commonly originate; trusting that a few examples may be fufficient to lead every perfon in pursuing the fame tract of observation for himself.

There are perfons, we know, who do not fo much reprobate the vices to which mankind are fubject, as depreciate human na

ture

CHAP. I.

SECT. VIII.

ture itself. This is an unhappy turn of thought, tending to stifle PART II. the fentiments of humanity or good will towards others, and to check the efforts of any ingenuous endeavour in the person who would improve himself. Man is formed to take part in the common cause of his fellow creatures; and he fuffers in thinking meanly of their nature: He is formed for progreffion; and is frustrated in having his pretenfions stated fo low as to check his exertions. Men will not attempt what they think is altogether vifionary and beyond their reach: But, in the gradation of human character, there are every where faults to be corrected, and improvements to be made, of which the smallest poffible effect is ever preferable to none. Socrates believed that men might be disposed to mutual beneficence, and that numbers were fo difpofed. Aristippus conceived that all pretenfions to the love of others were false; and that every one proposed to be of use only to himself. The one was inclined, by his conception, to benevolence and magnanimity; the other to selfishness and distrust.

There is an error feemingly oppofite to this depreciation of human nature; but, in its defects, also productive of mifery. Such is an overweaning conception or imagination of what men actually are, producing an ill founded confidence in the fuppofed prevalence of generofity, magnanimity, truth, and fincerity, of which the undistinguishing affumption not only exposes the mind to folly, difappointment, and other effects of mistake; but leads, in the fequel, to the very oppofite extreme of diftruft of mankind, and despair of virtue.

To the well-informed and the well-difpofed, virtue is not the less real that vice is frequently opposed to it. The mixed fcenes of human life are its proper ftation. Here, it is equally fignaliz

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