CHAP. I. SECT. VII. fcience, as a scheme of vifionary and unattainable perfection. It PART II may not be improper to confider what are termed virtues and vices in the minds of ordinary men; with their various degrees and occafions, in order to fhew that there is not any intention to obtrude definitions and divifions for hiftorical facts; and even, that the impracticability of perfect virtue is no reafon why we fhould abate our endeavours to do well. Perfection is ever to be aimed at, even by those who incur defects; and defects always to be shunned, even by those who come the fartheft fhort of perfection. If the moralist is not to enjoin perfection, he must do, what of all things is most contrary to reafon, recommend defects. The conditions of men are extremely unequal; yet, no one is fo high in the fcale of being, as that he may not move a step higher, and no one fo low, as that he may not get into the way of advancement. Although he may not attain to all the perfections of the wife as def cribed in any of the antient fects of philofophy; yet he may not incur all the mistakes of the foolish, and the fewer the better. Happiness, it should seem from the observations of the last and fome of the preceding fections, is a term of praise equivalent to merit, and confifting in the uniform tenor of a virtuous life: But, as honesty confifts in meaning well*, it fhould also seem that happiness is within the competence of every human creature: Whence is it, then, in any inftance fo imperfectly obtained? And whence is it, that fo many complain it is placed beyond their reach? They surely do not confider it as an attribute of their own will and affections.. Men of fpeculation have rifked a conjecture, that all the difference of genius or character, which have appeared in the world 3. * Laudandaque velle fit fatis.. may PART II. may be traced to fome cafual fuggeftion of fentiment or thought; or to fome specific occafion, that stirred the peculiar paffion, and roufed the original effort, which, continued into habit, gave the individual his bias to a distinguishing caft of genius or character through life t. But, without pretending, in this manner, to level the original distinctions of nature, we may venture to affume, that men are much affected by early impreffions; and continue to take much of their characters from the notions they entertain, and the habits of thinking they have acquired. As we may know what a person thinks from his actions, so we may guefs how a perfon will act, from our knowledge of his habitual ways of thinking, let it be conceived, that to live virtuously is to be happy, that to have an evil or malicious thought is mifery; and let these ideas be ever present to the mind, as the idea of his treasure is ever present to the mifer, or the importance of his own person is ever present to the coxcomb; and the apprehenfion of a happiness fo conftituted, will amount to a steady principle of integrity and beneficence; as their respective habits of thinking are, to the mifer, and the coxcomb, the effence of avarice, impertinence, and folly. Self-conceit muft appear in oftentation, or in a continual obtrufion on the notice of other men. The admiration of birth and fortune, in one clafs of men, may betray itself in pride and contemptuoufness, in another clafs, may appear equally in envy and malice, or in fervility or meannefs. The temper alfo re-acts upon the judgement. The chearful are inclined to think of gay fubjects; the melancholy, to entertain gloomy apprehenfions of things; as + Helvetius de L' Efprit. the the courageous are inclined to confide in their fellow creatures, PART. II. and the cowardly are inclined to distrust them. We are difpofed towards the objects around us, either as the other animals are difpofed towards the objects of fenfe, by an original instinct, or blind propensity of nature, or by a relation, peculiar to intelligent being, that of the conception we have formed, or the habit of thinking we have acquired. Such is the foil, in which the moralist is destined to fow, to plant, and to make his trial of what can be reaped; without being difcouraged, because the full bloom of terrestrial paradife is not every where, or perhaps not any where, to be seen on the earth; and the fairest fruits come, mixed with the noisome productions of the wilderness. Moral fcience operates for our good, only by mending our conceptions of things, and correcting or preventing the errors from which moral depravity or mifery proceeds. The very appellation of good, though no more than a name habitually bestowed upon its fubject, has great effect, on particular occafions, in warping the judgement, and in directing the choice. It was for this reafon, probably, that philofophers of old appeared fo anxious to fix the application of terms, as well as to store the mind, with just conceptions. They proposed, that the first principle of morality should eradicate every false apprehenfion on the fubject of good and evil; and fo become fufficient to give a just direction to the will and affections, wherever they proceed on the pre-conceived notion of things. Epictetus feems to reft the foundations of virtue and happiness on the proper discernment and choice of objects, which are in VOL. II. K Our CHAP. I. CHAP. I. 66 PART II. our own power, in contradiftinction to things which are not in our power. Among the things in our own power, he reckons our opinions, our purfuits, our defires, and averfions; and, in a word, whatever are our own actions." Among the things not in our own power, he reckons "body, property, reputation, "command, and, in a word, whatever are not our own actions *." Attachment to the firft, and indifference to the fecond, are, according to him, the effence of wifdom and happiness. It is furely happy for any one to be confcious that the best things are in his own power: But, in this, the vulgar are frequently deceived; and recur to fortune, as more in their power, than the attainments of a happy mind. They feek for happiness in external accommodations, rather than in any quality or condition of their own nature and feem to think external circumstances more in their power, than their own actions; or, what is worse, think their own actions of value, only fo far as they affect their fortune. :: To this ground of diftinction, which is laid by Epictetus, we may fubjoin another, relating to the same subjects; but taken from a different confideration of them, that is, from the confideration of their value, whether real or fuppofed, which is in fome inftances abfolute, in other inftances merely comparative. Among things of abfolute value, are to be reckoned chiefly the habits of a virtuous life, intelligence, benevolence, temperance, and fortitude; or, in fhort, the good qualities which form the best condition of human nature; and which they, who poffefs them, enjoy the more that others partake of the fame bleffings. Among advan tages Epictet. Enchiridion, cap. I. Mrs. Carter's tranflation. СНАР. І. tages merely comparative, on the contrary, we may reckon pre- PART II. cedence, and fuperiority, whether of riches or power; and, in a word, all the circumftances, in refpect to which the elevation of one is depreffion to another. In a former fection, there was an attempt to account for the origin of malice, from an error or defect of understanding, in admitting advantages or difadvantages which are merely comparative, as principal constituents of happiness or mifery. Under this apprehenfion, although a person were by nature disposed to benevolence, he is, by the interference of interests, checked in the effect of this difpofition. And, among parties fo ftated, the celebrity of one being obfcurity to another, or the precedence and preferment of one being degradation to the other, they are, in the midft of fuch purfuits, naturally rivals and competitors, and have more frequent occafions of hatred and diftruft than of confidence or good will *. "The king †," fays Baffompierre, “after " he had given the command of his army in Italy to his brother, bethought him how much the glory to be won in that fervice "would obfcure his own; and, fo powerful is jealoufy, even among relations, that he took this fo ftrongly into his head, or "rather into his heart as to deprive him of reft." In this rage for comparative advantages, the fuccefs of one is disappointment to another; and the industry of one to better himself a scheme of hoftility to those who must fink under his elevation. From this fource are derived, jealoufy, envy, and malice, those K 2 waters * See Sect. of the Origin of Evil. Lewis XIII. and XV. |