CHAP. I. SECT. VI. PART II. fame; and yet there are perfons who have no such serious objects in view, who, without regard to the future, enjoy the exercifes and occupations of the prefent hour. Such are the huntsman in his chace; companions in their converfation or play: in all of which the end or the stake is a trifle. But exercises of the mind or the body are highly agreeable, and " labour itfelf," in the words of the Rambler, " is its own reward." To a mind conscious of this law of its nature, the object, it may be thought, fhould be to exert itself properly upon all occafions; to propose reasonable ends, but never to fink under any event, nor even to incur any grievous disappointment, fo long as the mind finds occafion to employ itself properly.. The exercifes of good fenfe and of wisdom are, in their own nature, agreeable. They proceed upon a juft difcernment of objects, and do not give way to illufive hopes or unmanly fears. As it is the excellence of a focial being to be the friend of those with whom he affociates; fo the love of mankind is to man, as fuch, the principal fource of enjoyment alfo.. Courage and fortitude, being the excellencies of an active nature destined to ply in the midft of difficulties, dangers, and hardships, are, to the perfon who is endowed with them, not lefs a fecurity for the poffeffion of all the faculties which nature has furnished for fuch occafions, than an exemption from fear ; and an alleviation of the fuffering which hardship or danger produces, in the timorous or defponding mind. It may be thought, perhaps, that exemption from difficulty or danger is preferable to refolution or force of mind; and it may may be thought wifer to feek for places of fafety from which the PART II. caufes of fear being removed, there is not any occafion to exercise the virtues of intrepidity or courage. The wife, no doubt, will avoid unneceffary occafions of fuffering or of danger; but thefe, notwithstanding, are, by the appointment of providence, fometimes a part of his lot: And if the fearful could remove every real cause of alarm from human life, where is the place of fecurity in which the coward will not figure to himself objects of fear and diftruft? Where is the bed of rofes on which the Sybarite will not find the doubled leaf? Or where are the circumftances of affluence and ease to which the difcontented and the peevish may not impute the sufferings of his own fretful temper? The virtuous are not deceived, when they avoid the excess of an animal gratification, or reject fenfuality as their guide to enjoyment. It is well known, that temperance is eligible, as the proper œconomy even of animal pleasure ; and, the more that fuch pleasure is valued, the more we fhould value those habits of life, which preserve the animal organs in a proper state of enjoyment. But temperance is the oeconomy of pleasure, still, in a higher sense than this: It is the economy of the wife; who, knowing the higher purpose of his nature, will not fubmit to beftow an improper part of his time or attention on objects of inferior confideration or value. To the fecond propofition, then, we may fubjoin, as its application and its comment, That happiness is conftituted in the mind, by the continued habits of wisdom, benevolence, fortitude, and temperance: And the reader may be addressed, nearly in the I 2 fame CHAP. I. SECT. VI. CHAP. I. PART II. fame terms which the emperor Antoninus addressed to himself; "If you discharge your prefent duty with diligence, refolution, "and benignity, without any bye views; if you adhere to this, "without any farther defires or averfions; completely fatisfied "in difcharging your prefent offices, according to nature, and " in the heroic fincerity of all your profeffions, you will live happily. Now, your doing this none can hinder." This account of happiness does not preclude any reasonable attention to the ordinary concerns of human life. Nay, requires fuch attention, as part of the offices of a man, and in the performance of which his happiness confifts. It precludes only fo much dependance of mind on the events of fortune, as difable it for the proper discharge or continuance of its office, with respect to these or any other object of reasonable care. It were unhappy to neglect any means that might tend to obtain the proper end yoù propose: but it is more unhappy to be so affected with any event whether adverse or prosperous, as to become unfit to continue or repeat the exertions of a diligent and beneficent mind. Such exertions are the foundation on which you are to rest for happiness. Events you may endeavour to obtain or provide ; but they may also happen contrary to your wishes; and your happiness cannot consist in events which you cannot bring about, although it may, and actually does, consist in the temper you command and the part you act, through all the variety of events to which you are exposed. On this fubject, good fenfe need not charge itself with the paradox, which, we are told, was mantained by oftentatious zealots, whether of the Epicurean or the Stoic fchool, that all external fituations 3 fituations are equal; and, that the perfect man would be equally PART II. happy in the bull of Phalaris, as on a bed of roses. Fortitude, of a very inferior measure to this, is furely a valuable quality; but, in whatever measure or degree a wife man poffefs it, he will not, without neceffity, or fome adequate inducement, run himself into sufferings of any fort. Such pain or inconvenience, as he has actually incurred, he will be happy to endure, without repining at providence, or intermitting the exercife of his mind and his faculties. If he be in profperity, he will think the happy part committed to his choice is moderation, equanimity, and beneficence; if, in adversity, the fame virtues ftill remain to be exercised in the manner which the occafion prescribes. CHAP. I. SECTION SECTION VII. Of the actual Measures and Sources of Good and Evil in human Life. СНАР. І. PART II. THE value of virtue, as we have endeavoured to define it, will not be questioned: For who can doubt the value of a wisdom, which cannot err; of a temper, which is ever joyful and ferene, in its exertions for the good of mankind; of a temperance, which no allurement of false pleasure can mislead; or, of a fortitude, which no difficulty or danger can embarrass or appal? This, we may be told, is first to imagine perfect happiness, and then to give it the name of virtue; whilft the whole is ideal, and never realized in the cafe of any human creature. Such, indeed, is the nature of abstract science, we systematize our own thoughts, leaving the application to be separately made. On the fubject of morals, more efpecially, we propofe to inquire, not what men actually are; but what they ought to be, or what are the ideas, upon which they may, and ought to determine their choice in particular inftances. But, although this be a sufficient answer to the objection which is fometimes made to moral science, |