must have the ingredient of benevolence, in order that a mind PART II. well informed may improve upon this principle of nature, and learn to direct it aright. "There are good qualities," fays the Duke de la Rochefoucault," which degenerate into faults when they are natural, and "others which are never perfect when they are acquired. It is neceffary, for instance, that we should become by reflection fparing of our money and of our confidence; on the contrary, we should by nature be furnished with benevolence and va"lour." The understanding at the outfet has its perfection to acquire; the heart is good by the inspiration of nature. But, in whatever terms we propofe to exprefs the standard of estimation relative to man whether wisdom, virtue, or goodness of heart, there are various conditions required to the performance of his part, and which must occur in every statement of qualities, that conftitute the specific excellence or perfection of his nature. He is formed for society, and is excellent in the degree in which he poffeffes the qualifications of an affociate and a friend. He is excellent, in the degree in which he loves his fellow creatures; he is defective, in the degree in which he hates them, or is indifferent to their welfare. Benevolence, therefore, is a principal excellence of human nature; and malice an article of extreme vileness or defect. These are the great fources of merit and demerit; of justice and beneficence, on the one hand; of wrong, iniquity, and cruelty, on the other; a distinction, to the reality of which mankind in all ages have borne the strongest teftimony: To which, on the one hand, they have paid the highest tribute of efteem and of love; and, on which, on the other, they have poured forth the highest measures of contempt and deteftation. VOL. II. F With CHAP. I. SECT. IV. PART II. With refpect to Temperance, it is a beautiful part, we may again obferve, in the œconomy of animal life, that things pernicious are painful, and things falutary are pleasant; that even things falutary and pleasant, in the proper use of them become painful, in the abuse, or when carried to excefs. Under this constitution of nature, the mere animals are fafely directed through life; but man's animal frame is either originally lefs perfect in this refpect, or is disturbed by the operations of a fancy, which lead him to look for enjoyments beyond the foundations which nature has laid. By nature, the gratifications of appetite are occafional, and do not occupy any improper portion of time; but the voluptuary conceives them as a fource of continued enjoyment: And fenfuality is a diftemper of the imagination, not a diforder in the ballance which nature has established between the animal and the rational part of man's constitution. The voluptuary does not enjoy more than the abstemious; but he employs more of his time in vain attempts to reftore a fatiated appetite, and to render that continual, which nature has ordained to be occafional and temporary. As great inequalities of character and eftimation refult from the different degrees in which men avoid the habits of debauchery on the one hand, or gain the habits of a just application to the better pursuits of a rational nature, on the other; there is, in this particular, much room for wisdom, and much danger from folly. In this, as in many other instances, man is defined by nature to govern himself, or to make the best of materials which become pernicious, if he abuse or neglect them; and which, to fecure the proper use of them, require his utmost attention and care. be re PART II. n This virtue, among the active qualifications of man, may ferred to the title of application; for the purfuit, which the tem- SECT. IV. perate withholds from the mere objects of animal gratification may be applied to the better and more worthy objects of human life. Senfuality, indeed, for the most part, is selfish and more folicitous about the gratifications of appetite, than about the concerns of other men; and temperance being an exemption, at least from this principle of selfishness, lays open the mind of man to those incitements of benevolence and candour, from which the difinterested are prepared to act. Temperance, therefore, in this point of view also, may be reckoned among the primary excellencies of human nature; intemperance or fenfuality may be reckoned among its most real defects. With respect to Fortitude, the fourth in the enumeration of cardinal virtues, we may observe that, in every active nature, befides the difpofition, the application, and the measure of skill, in refpect to which fuch natures may be unequally estimated, there is a measure of force also required to fupport their active exertions, and a measure of weakness fufficient to fruftrate the purpose of nature, or to betray the confidence that may be placed in the highest measures of skill and of good difpofition. Force of mind has a peculiar reference to the state of man, to the difficulties, hardships and dangers, in the midst of which he is destined to act. In the fupport of what is honourable and just, he has fometimes occafion to fuffer what is inconvenient or painful to his animal frame. In espousing the cause of the juft, he may incur the animofity and oppofition of the wicked. PART II. In performing the offices of beneficence to others, he may encounter with hardship or danger to himself. CHAP. I. SECT. IV. But this circumstance, which feems to restrain or limit his activity, ferves rather to whet his fpirit, and increase his ardour in the performance of worthy actions. The difficulty he furmounts becomes an evidence of the difpofition which he approves, and tually endears the object for whofe fake he exposes himself. Hence it is, that ingenuous minds are confirmed in the love of virtue, in proportion as it becomes a principle of elevation, of heroism, or magnanimity. These, it is scarcely neceffary to observe, are primary topics of praise, and principal excellencies of human nature, while pufilanimity and cowardice are amongst the lowest fubjects of contempt. From these particulars, then, we may collect that the excellence of a man includes the following particulars: Wisdom, or skill to chufe, and to accomplish what he ought to attempt; a benevolent affection, which wifdom is fitted to direct; an application of mind, which inferior confiderations cannot divert from its purpofe; and a force, which oppofition, difficulty, or danger, cannot difmay. And, as the excellent man is wife, beneficent, courageous, and temperate; the defective, on the contrary, is foolish, malicious, cowardly, and fenfual. The wife chufe, among their ends, what is beft; among the means they employ, what is most effectual. The benevolent are committed to their best affections; the courageous are exempted from the fuffering and the weaknefs of fear; the temperate referve their faculties, and their time, for the best and worthieft occupations of their nature; and, if from this statement of the excellence to which human nature is competent, we look back to what has been already obferved on the fubject of pleasure and СНАР. І. and pain, we shall have reafon to conclude, that the Author of PART II. nature has not only made that most agreeable which is most falutary; but that more especially constituent of happiness, which, in the estimate of human qualities, is alfo most excellent, or most highly esteemed. To be confcious of excellence, from the very nature of approbation and esteem, is a state of enjoyment; and, to be conscious of vileness or defect, a state of suffering: Or, if these fentiments could be fuppreffed, ftill, the conftituents of man's fpecific excellence, Wisdom, Juftice, Temperance, and Fortitude, apart from any reflections they may bring, are in themselves, either an exemption from pain, or an acceffion of pleasure. And providence feems to intend, that this diftinction, which is the fource of elevation, integrity, and goodness, in the mind of man, should be the guide, by which he is moft fecurely led to the highest enjoyments, to which his nature is competent. The excellence and beauty he admires may become an attribute of his own mind; and, whether in reflection or action, constitute the most agreeable state of his nature. If we thus figure to ourselves an active intelligent being in the best state of which he is fufceptible; this, in respect to him is to be virtuous. Or, if we fhould be difpofed to confider even the excellent mind, in refpect to its external relations and effects rather than in respect to its own constitution, we may observe, that the wife, the courageous, the temperate, and the benevolent, are of all others most likely to ftand well-affected to their fellow-creatures, to the univerfe, and to the Creator of the world; that none are fo likely to recognize the providence and moral government of God, or to fettle religion itself on its best foundations of inte |