PART. II.
CHAP. I.
SECT. IV.

phenomena of that nature we are confidering, what may be its destination, and what the ftandard by which its worth is to be estimated.

Among fubjects organized, we have already obferved that man is distinguished as living and active; among the living and active, he is distinguished as intelligent; or endowed with powers of difcernment, apprifed of the diftinction of good and evil, and invested with freedom of choice. Among the gregarious animals, he is diftinguished as affociating and political, and confcious of his ftation. as a member in the community of his fellow creatures. The order of nature itself is in a certain degree manifest to him; he is fitted to hold communication with its Author, to apprehend his will, and to become a willing instrument in promoting the ends of his government.

In ftriving to conceive the destination of fuch a being, we may with great confidence reject the idea of its being limited to the preservation of mere animal life, or even, as Epicurus affumed, to the poffeffion of mere pleafing thoughts or fenfations of any fort. There is an active character to be sustained, and a part to be filled up; first,in the community of men,who are partners in the joint cause of humanity and justice. There is a world of ftill and living nature, in the midst of which this active being must acquit himself, with fenfibility in refpect to fome, and with circumfpection and care refpecting the whole. There is a commanding order of things, to which he must accommodate himself, which he is required to study, and concerned to know; and to which, even where it exceeds his comprehenfion, he must with submission surrender his will.

To fill up fuch a part are required fkill, difcernment, or knowledge, fit difpofition, application, and force: Hence the four car

dinal virtues, celebrated in the schools of philofophy, Wisdom, PART II. Juftice, Temperance, and Fortitude.

Wisdom is the virtue of intelligence, or a just difcernment of the confiderations on which we are to rely for happiness, and the undisturbed poffeffion of the faculties which are given for the government of life. Man, in his character of intelligent being, is active in a form, and to an extent, greatly fuperior to any of the other animals. Every quality of his nature is an energy, not a quiefcent mode of existence; and, whatever be the limits within which he is destined to exert his faculties, within the fame limits, and in the fame form of active exertion, are to be found his excellencies and defects, his enjoyments and fufferings.

The lot of man is not, like that of the other animals, at once completely furnished by nature; he is invefted with powers, and left to employ them for his own advantage, or that of his fellowcreatures. He merits the praise of wisdom, or he incurs the imputation of folly, according to the use which he makes of his intelligent faculties; and in this, perhaps, gives the first and most ftriking fpecimen of the excellence or defect, of which he is fufceptible. His powers of conception, when well employed, lay the foundations of wisdom; when mifapplied or neglected, lay the foundations of folly; and fo far present him to his fellowcreatures, as an object either of esteem and refpect, or of contempt and derifion.

With the exception of a few determinate instincts, fuch as direct him on particular occafions to the means of felf prefervation or such as connect the individual with his kind, man, we have obferved, is left to follow the dictates of his own obfervation, difcernment and experience.

CHAP. I.
SECT. IV.

СНАР. І.
SECT. IV.

PART II experience. In nonage or infancy, indeed, he is committed to the difcretion of his parent; but, in the more advanced periods of life, he is committed to his own. His instincts and appetites are feldom to him, as they are to the other animals, determinate guides in the application of means to the attainment of his end, or feldom fecure him in the proper choice and measure of his gratifications. When urged by hunger, though in the midst of plenty, if the fruit or fpecies of food prefented to him be new or untried, he muft proceed with caution in the use of it, and examine well, before he ventures to tafte; much more before he ventures to feed on viands unknown, though of the fairest appearance.

Although his gratifications, like thofe of the other animalə, when the purpose of nature is ferved, frequently determine or pall on the sense; and fatiety, even in his case, might be fufficient to guard him against excefs; yet he is, by an error of his imagination, frequently led to exceed even these limits, and to feek for pleasure, where it is not any longer to be found, in the object of a fatiated appetite. In him, therefore, the defects of instinct must be supplied by reflection; and, he is to be taught, by experience and obfervation alone, to diftinguish the real fources of permanent happiness.

As to man, therefore, the errors of his own imagination, as well as the defects of his inftinct, are occafions of evil, they are to be fupplied or corrected by the proper use of his intelligent powers. And it may be asked, Are we to confider the intelligence of man as a mere subftitute for the correctness of choice to which the other animals are formed by nature, and to eftimate its value, by its apparent destination to do for him what inftinct, and the want of imagination, have done for the brutes? This were to fuppofe him destined to at

tain, by a tedious and uncertain process, that of which other ani- PART. II. mals are at once poffeffed by the suggestion of a specific propenfi- SECT. IV. СНАР. І.

ty
The bee, without any other direction than this, con-
ftructs his cell upon a model which the most perfect science
of mechanism cannot improve; and poffeffes that skill, from the
first, which in the human species, many ages and fucceffive trials
are required to obtain.

Animals, in general, whatever be their distination, are enabled to fulfil it at once. They acquiefce in their state, or enjoy its advantages, without any fenfe of its wants or defects. Man, at his outfet, being worse provided than any other animal, is accordingly not difpofed to acquiefce in his primary ftate. The wants or defects of his first condition feem, in the exercise of his faculties, to prefs him with all the force of neceffity; but, after his first wants or defects are fupplied, fancy fucceeds to necessity; and, whatever fupply he may have gained, or accommodation provided for himself, he is still urged with a defire of fomewhat beyond the prefent attainment, and is as little difpofed to acquiefce in the highest, as in the lowest state of his animal accommodation. The spur of impatience to better himself, which, in his rudest condition appears neceffary to his preservation, continued on to his state of highest attainment, feems to form in him a principle of progreffion, of indefinite or endless extent. He is made intelligent, not merely that he may be able to procure a fupply to his animal wants, but his animal wants appear to be multiplied, and his fancy rendered infatiable, that he may find an early scope for the exercise of his intellectual powers, and, by the indefinite pursuit of their ends, make that progrefs in knowledge, which conftitutes fo effential a part in the excellence or perfection, of which his mind is fufceptible.

We

PART II.

CHAP. I.

SECT. IV.

We may thus collect the specific excellence of any nature, from its capacity, and from the direction of its progress; and that of man, in particular, from his capacity of receiving information, of improving in difcernment and penetration, and from the progrefs he is qualified to make in these particulars. In him, the mere continuance of life is a course of observation, and repeated occafion, on which to exercise those faculties of the mind, which improve in being employed.

Man becomes powerful in the fyftem of nature, in proportion as he becomes knowing or wife: And the fpecies, in this particular, feems well apprised of the standard by which to ascertain its own merits or defects. Signal ability and understanding are admired, comparative incapacity, and dulness are despised. And there is, therefore, in respect to him no difficulty in collecting the grounds of esteem or contempt, whether we confider a priori what is fuited to his destination, or attend to the reception which his qualities meet with in the estimation of his kind.

Philofophers have thought, that every fubject of commendation, to which human nature is competent; every virtue and every constituent of happiness, might be comprised under the title of wisdom, or the excellence of intelligent being; that, on the contrary every subject of dispraise or contempt, every vice and every character of misery, might be comprised under the title of folly: But, it is not neceffary, nor perhaps even expedient, thus to force the attributes of human nature, under fingle appellations, however comprehenfive or general. Although it is both wife and profitable to love our fellow creatures, we can 'no more become affectionate to our friend, in the mere fearch of wisdom, than we can in fearch of our intereft. Our constitution