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CHAP. I. SECT. II.

feigned to themfelves the most perfect form; or fuppofed her PART II. countenance to be caft in the most exquifite mold of natural beauty; but of an afpect, derived from the temper within, fo terrific and hideous, as to appal the most daring, and even to turn those on whom she looked into ftone.

Mind, we have reafon to believe, predominates in nature; fo that, in a comparative furvey of all that exists, whatever is not mind would be as nothing.

It is heat, we are told, that gives fpring and agitation to the mechanical world. Remove this ingredient, and all matter would freeze into one folid mafs, and become the formless repofitory of inertia, darkness, and death.

In the fame manner, and with ftill greater confidence, may we not fay, it is mind that strikes out from the forms of body, in the lovely afpects of excellence and beauty? And it is the diverfity of operating minds, in such forms of matter, that gives the distinction of beauty and deformity to fubjects otherwife, in their own nature, indifferent.

What were millions, and myriads of millions, of corpufcular particles affembled in the body of the fun, without the benignant power that renders him the fource of heat and of light to furrounding worlds? What were these worlds without the beneficent impulfe that gives them motion, and retains them in their orbits, at a proper distance from the fource of light and of heat? And what could avail their motions, without this combination of elements on their globes, that fit them for the refidence of living. natures?

The

PART II.

СНАР. І.

The same thing, multiplied through innumerable systems, owes SECT. III. its magnificence to the greatness of might and of thought, that acts in the formation and conduct of fuch boundless scenes of existence.

The distinction of excellence and defect, fo obvious to man in the contemplation of his own nature, and so easily transferred by affociation to any of his works or external circumftances, is the radical principle of elevation or progreffion in the human mind, to which there is ever prefented, as an object of defire, fomething higher and better than is poffeffed at prefent. This principle, in all its forms, proceeds upon fome pre-conceived notion of abfolute or comparative excellence, in respect to which the mind is never difpofed to acquiefce in its prefent attainment. Birth, fortune, power, and other constituents of rank, are the circumstances in which the vulgar of every condition strive to excel one another. The dwelling, the furniture, the equipage, and the table of the rich, flatter his vanity more than his fenfe of pleasure; and stir the emulation more than the appetite of those who admire his condition.

Whoever would govern mankind, if he can command their conception of what is excellent, or lead them to affociate honour with the task he would have them to perform, will find no farther difficulty, in procuring from them every facrifice of pleasure, interest, or fafety. This, as we have formerly obferved, is the honeft man's integrity, and the gentleman's honour, which neither will forego to preserve his fortune or his life. It is the foldier's glory, which renders danger and hardship agreeable; it is the martyr's crown, which renders extreme fuffering, and the profpect of death, an occafion of triumph and joy.

On

CHAP. I.

SECT. III.

On a subject of fo great importance, and of fuch powerful PART II. effects in human life, it behoves us to examine our opinions, and to be well founded in the conceptions, to which we thus furrender and deliver up all the other powers of our nature. If there be an excellence or beauty, fpecific to man, we may presume that, in the contemplation and poffeffion of it, his fupreme good, the most agreeable state of his nature, and the happiest course of his life is likely to confift.

VOL. II.

E

SECTION

SECT IV.

Of Virtue and Vice.

PART II.
CHAP. I.
SECT. IV.

WHen, in the manner of last section, we have resolved the excellence and beauty of this created frame into the wisdom and goodness of God; and return from this contemplation of nature to confider, what is the specific excellence of man; we must recognize in him at once a conftitution or form received from his Maker, and together with the gifts of intelligence and free will, a perfonage and character to be ascribed to himself. In refpect to either, he is distinguished in nothing fo much as in this power and difpofition to perceive, with delight, an intelligent and beneficent Author in the system of things around him. Were he thus to judge of any human production, his perception of beauty in the work would argue fome participation in the genius of its Author. May we not therefore, conceive, that his admiration of what appears in the universe of God, implies fome qualification to participate in the godlike principles of beneficence and wisdom. In this system, of which he is a part, the measures of providence are taken, and the defign is carried into execution; he too is deftined to act: But when we confider the magnitude of

CHAP. I.
SECT. IV.

this fyftem, and in how many ways, of which he cannot trace PART II. any tendency to the purpose of univerfal good, he himself may be affected, his concurrence in the design is likely to be merely paffive, or fofar only as to make him bear with complacency what the general order requires, rather than to call upon him for any active exertion directed to a purpose so far extended beyond his comprehension.

Even when we confider the world of men and animals, how ir extended beyond the reach of any active interpofition of the ndividual for its general good, we must suppose that the character of goodness, applicable to man, in respect to this object also, confists in pious refignation to the will of God; or, at most in perfect good will to mankind, in every instance in which the active power of an individual can apply. Fortunately for him, when he acts in particular inftances, for his friend, his neighbour, his country, or for any of the human race, there occurs, an occafion to practife and to promote that mutual affection, fidelity, justice, and humanity, which in fact are a common blessing to mankind; infomuch, that for him to adopt and to communicate the effect of these characters, is to act for the good of his fellow-creatures; and, fo far he becomes an able and a willingniftrument in the hand of God for the beneficent ends of his providence..

The merit of this character, however, is more a fubject of confciufnefs, orintuitive judgement, than of difcuffion or reasoning; and heywho are, in common life, most decided in their choice of good actions, proceed upon the ground of their affections and fentinents, more than upon any information derived by investigation r research. In attempts at fcience, however, we must descend › particulars, and endeavour to collect, by induction from the E 2 phenomena

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