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SECT. III.

tions arife. A condition, at first imposed by force may be PART II. fuch, it was observed, as that men shall be reconciled to it, conti- CHAP. IV. nue to obferve it willingly and freely, infomuch, that a perfon conforming to it, on his own part, has the most reasonable expectations of a fuitable return in the conduct of others.

This reasoning, however, will not apply, where any party in fociety affumes to itself an advantage, or fubjects any other to inconvenience of fuch a nature, as that, although compliance may continue to be forced; yet the fufferer is not reconciled to his condition, nor ever willingly confents to the obfervance of it. He does no more than he is forced to do; and the violence to which he submits, in every fubfequent period of a mere impofition, has the fame character of ufurpation which it had at the firft. Such, no doubt, is the character of defpotical tyrrany, by whatever party it be affumed, or exerted in difcretionary acts of injustice or cruelty, over the perfons and properties of other men.

Under this title of continued ufurpation, we have already ftated the claims of a master, refpecting his fuppofed property in the person of a flave; a claim which, we obferved, cannot be founded on any principle of justice acknowledged in the law of

nature.

A people, in the fame manner, from confiderations of danger, may fubmit to the claims of tyrrany, whether ufurped by the leader of a military band, or by the majority of a diforderly people, and they may acquiefce in one fpecies of evil from the apprehenfion of a worfe; but fuch government,whether of long or of short duration, we may observe, in answer to any of the questions now or formerly stated, is not founded in any maxim of right whatever. The principles

VOL. II.

Oo

CHAP. IV.
SECT. III.

PART II. principles of human nature, however long ftifled by violence, are ever repugnant to fuch ufurpations; and, like the force m of a fpring wound up, ftill exert a preffure against the power that reftrains them. Hence, in perfect confiftence with natural justice, though not always with prudence or expedience, vindicate the fudden or gradual reform of abuses, which for ages may have possessed in appearance the authority of law and political institution.

we may

When we look back to the origin of government, as there is no where an original right of one perfon to command another, except fo far as is neceffary to reftrain him from harm, we have recourfe to convention as the only principle upon which a right to command can accrue to one, or an obligation to obey can be incurred by another.

Prior to fuch convention, we fay, that fovereignty is lodged in the multitude; but, when we bring these words to the test of any rational application, they amount to no more than this, that, prior to convention, every one has a right to dispose of himfelf, so far as is confiftent with the fafety of others: And that the multitude have this right, because made up of individuals, each of whom is poffeffed of it; but, in what form the multitude is to exercise it, as a collective body, muft depend on agreement to which individuals affent. Prior to convention, the majority has not any right to command the minority, more than any one individual has to command another.

In the abftract decifions of natural law, refpecting the obligation of reciprocal contracts, the failure of one party diffolves the obligation of another. So far, the matter is adjusted, in words even between the fovereign and fubject. In practice,

SECT. III.

too, the fovereign has a ready provifion made to enforce the PART II. rights of government against the refractory subject, and the CHAP. IV. rights of one individual against the wrongs of another; but, when the prerogatives which are given for protection, are employed to opprefs, what new power can be found to redrefs the grievance? It is necessary, perhaps, that law fhould be filent on this head, or take its precautions in wife limitations of government rather than propose to resist its abuse.

This is accordingly the great problem of political wisdom, and a principal test of national felicity: But after all that can be contrived, or deliberately thought of, for this purpose, fomething must be left to the powerful instincts of nature. When the multitude, whose interests fo much it is to have a fettled government, tear down the power by which themselves are protected, we must suppose that they are either seized with madness, or that by wrongs they are driven to defpair. In either cafe, maxims of fcience and reason, or principles of juftice are inculcated in vain. The reafoner is every where furrounded with precipices. If he maintain, that the people, in every cafe, fhould obey, he delivers over the fubject to be oppreffed and injured at difcretion.

If he admit that the people, in any case, may resist; as there is none but the party himself to judge of the case, all government will seem to be held at the discretion of those who ought to obey it.

any speculative or ab-
And fo far are we left

So far are we from being able to state stract pofition that may not be abufed. to the powerful instincts of nature, for our direction in matters of the greatest moment. When the ftorm threatens, the benighted traveller will take shelter wherever he can find it; and, when the roof cracks over his head, he will fly from under it into the midft

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PART II.

SECT. III.

midst of the storm. He need not recur to any maxim of law for CHAP. IV. this purpose: The power of neceflity is fuperior to law; and the instinct of nature drives to its end, with a force which speculative maxims can neither withstand nor direct.

Attempts to find any regular counterpoife to the weight of defpotifm, when every ordinary form is warped to the purpose of injustice, have perplexed the most ingenious minds, or fometimes fuggested a doctrine which can scarcely be applied beyond the form of words in which it is stated. That, as power originates with the multitude, that is, with the individuals of whom the multitude is compofed, they have a right to reclaim it, wherever it is abufed; or, if they are bound by the terms of a political contract, to fubmit to government; these terms are reciprocal, and the contract may be broken of either fide: If on that of the fovereign, the power is again that of the multitude, and may be recalled.

Such maxims in fpeculation coft nothing but the words in which to exprefs them; but, in practice, we must remember, that, as the multitude never can be affembled, this maxim in effect puts the fword in the hands of every individual, to employ it for himself. And the fate of mankind, in such instances, must depend on what we term accident, or the character of those who gain the afcendant, or are able to prefcribe new forms of proceeding, after numbers are tired of the disorders which have attended the suspension of the old.

SECTION

SECTION IV.

Of the Cafe of Nations.

CHAP. IV.

SECT. IV.

THE human fpecies, though difpofed to affociate, is difpofed to PART II. feparation alfo. It is ever found in divifions and compartments, under the denomination of families, tribes, nations, or hordes. And of these the very leaft are rarely, without compulfion, or fome urgent confiderations of fafety or expedience, made to coalefce in greater numbers, or, beyond the ties of acquaintance or confanguinity, submit to act under any common direction.

There is, however, in the nature of things, fufficient provision made to affemble the fpecies, or to form the combination of indefinite numbers.

Men are, by their dispositions and their faculties, qualified to make the neceffary arrangements for the conduct of fociety however enlarged. And, however reluctant in every fucceffive ftep, they actually pafs over the bounds of perfonal acquaintance or

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perfonal

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