PART. II. CHAP. I. time, though thus agreeing in the clafs of fentiments to which they give occafion, seem to be disjoined in nature; or by us, at leaft, to be conceived apart. Beauty is fometimes faid to cover defects; and excellent qualities are faid to be concealed under apparent deformities. Beauty frequently ftrikes, from the first and more obvious afpect of things; excellence is to be collected by obfervation of their effential qualities. Every person, that enters a room, prefents at once the beauty of which he is poffeffed. His excellence, in the mean time, or effential good qualities, are to be known only upon farther acquaintance. These epithets, however, in proportion as the fubjects of them come to be underftood, gradually approach in their applications, and feem at last to unite in the fame thing. When apparent beauty is found to conceal defects, it ceafes to be admired, or even incurs contempt. When apparent deformities are found to conceal effential good qualities, we not only ceafe to contemn, but, from a principle of retributive juftice, are the more inclined in the fequel to admire that we at firft overlooked the value of our object, whether perfon or thing: So that the progrefs of intelligence in the difcernment of excellence and beauty feems to terminate in a point, which unites thefe epithets into one general ground of preference; and which, in that cafe, we fhall perhaps be more inclined to exprefs in the terms of perfection and excellence, than in that of elegance or beauty, which ftill carry a reference to first and external appearances. In the fyftem of nature, there is a beauty that belongs to the mechanical, to the vegetable, the animal, and intellectual kingdoms. In the mechanical kingdom, the principal, if not the fole conftituent CHAP. I. stituent of beauty, as the Pere Buffier has well obferved, is order; PART II. or, as the fame author farther explains this term, the apt combina- SECT. III. tion of parts, whether fimultaneous or fucceffive, for the attainment of a beneficent purpose. Mere matter, though perceivable by fenfe, is in itself indifferent to any The system of nature is fublime in refpect to the might of its Author. It is beautiful, with respect to the regular fitness of parts for the attainment of their ends, and in respect to the beneficent purpose which they are fitted to ferve. The latter circumstance, above all, is effential to their beauty. The fruits of continual exertion, without the regularity that proceeds from a well-concerted defign, as in the meaningless activity of children and restless animals, overturning and displacing whatever comes in their way, produces diforder, confufion, and extreme deformity: The regular tradefman fhudders at their being admitted into his work-fhop. A defign at the fame time may be perceptible; but, if directed by folly or malice, it is an object of difguft or of reprobation, not of admiration or esteem. The figures of birds, beafts, cones, or pyramids, cut out of an evergreen, in the antiquated garden, have PART II. marks of defign; but frivolous, and contemptible. The piece of SECT. III. ftatuary, of which we are told, in the bull of Phalaris, or in the Apiga or spouse of Nubis, may have been exquifite in the workmanfhip; but the defign was hideous or cruel: And, as the mere indication of mind is ambiguous, the indication of perfidy and malice is horrid; beneficence alone, directed by wifdom, is fupremely beautiful. In the material system of nature, the beneficent purpose of its Author is manifeft in the accommodations provided for beings diftinguished by their organization, or beings endowed with life. Thefe, in our terreftrial world, are plants, animals, and men. The elements are difpofed to promote the vegetation of plants; and thefe to furnifh their fubfiftence and place of abode to animals; and the whole to furnish the materials of fupply, and the fubjects of thought and contemplation to the living and intelligent nature of man. In the living kingdom of animals, the fame beneficent purpose, while it extends to the general fyftem, partly terminates alfo in the animal himself. He is made that he may be gratified, as well as that he may gratify others; and both are effential to the excellence and beauty of his frame: For this his organization is admired, and the profperous ftate of that organization is fo much valued, under the denomination of health. With refpect to man, alfo, the beneficent purpofe of nature, fo far as we are yet qualified to difcern it, terminates in himself; not in the individual confidered apart, but in the fubferviency of many to the common caufe of the whole. The individual is made that he may be gratified; but his chief gratification is made to PART II. to confist in beneficence, or a participation in the welfare of mankind. He is an active power in nature, which cannot fufpend SECT. III. its exertions, without incurring a state of wearinefs, fuffering, S and difguft. He is a beneficent power in nature, to whom benevolence is pleasure, malevolence is pain; and who cannot willingly forfake the paths of beneficence, without incurring the chaftifement of remorfe. His beauty and excellence is a partici_ pation, however faintly obtained, of that wisdom and goodness which constitute the splendor and majefty of the works of God. To perceive beauty, in any material subject, is to perceive indications of wisdom and goodnefs; and, if we are asked, why wifdom and good nefs fhould be admired? we may anfwer, For a reafon like to that for which pleasure is coveted; because in itfelf defireable and good. While other things are defired or esteemed on account of the pleasure they give, or the excellence they constitute, pleasure and excellence are themselves defired or efteemed, on their own account. In the fcale of natures fufceptible of excellence or perfection intelligence is fupreme, and wifdom and goodnefs are the fupreme perfections of intelligent being. Their prefence, when fuggefted by the order of nature, awakening the fentiments of admiration, are termed beautiful; but, in the mind itself to which they belong, are more properly termed its excellence, perfection, or merit. Folly and malice, on the other hand, may, in a figurative ftile, be termed the deformities of mind; but are more properly referred to the predicaments of defect, guilt, and demerit. From the whole, there is reafon to believe, that beauty when real PART II. real may be refolved into excellence and, that deformity may be refolved into defect; the one an effential diftinction of good, and the other of evil: That both, or either, can have existence in mind alone; fo that, in this question, man is doubly interested: He is concerned in the existence of excellence or beauty, as prefenting him with an agreeable object of contemplation and love; but more especially as conftituting an admirable state or condition of nature, attainable by himself. In the human figure, there is one beauty of form in the structure of its organs, or in the found ftate or configuration of the whole perfon, indicating exquifite defign, wisdom, and goodness, of the Maker. There is another beauty, confifting in the aspect and expreffion of the mind, that occupies and actuates this created frame, indicating good fenfe, equanimity, and benevolence of temper. In both, it is the beauty of mind that ftrikes through the form of a work, or the afpect of a perfon: The wifdom and goodness of the Creator, in the one; or the good meaning and temper of his creature, in the other. Where one of thefe beauties exifts, in any degree, the other may be fenfibly wanting. Thus, we are familiar with inftances, in which personal defects are compensated with a favourable expreffion and benevolence of afpect; or inftances in which natural advantages are deformed by an afpect of vanity, malice, or folly. The antient artists, in the features of Medufa, though a Fury, feigned 2 |