PART II. CHAP. IV. The case, then, which we are now to confider, is fuppofititious, and a mere abstraction. So that, in this point of view, the circumstances of a cafe, which in nature are joined with many other particulars, are to be stated apart, and feparately confidered. Such abstractions are useful in argument; but muft not, or ought not to be mistaken for matters of fact. This caution has not always been obferved, in treating of the abstraction which we have now made. The cafe of parties, ftrangers and unconnected, has been termed the state of nature, and even mistaken for historical fact: But, in applying the law of nature to this supposition, it is not by any means necessary to admit, that the whole of the human fpecies ever confifted of parties unconnected, or that men ever existed in a state of individuality, or in a state of eftrangement of one from all mankind. The purpose of science is effectually ferved, by fuppofing two or more parties fo unconnected, although neither be fuppofed unconnected with the whole fpecies. The term, ftate of nature, as equivalent to the abstraction which we now make, has been employed by writers, who do not by any means feem difpofed to favour the affumption of estrangement from his kind, as the natural state of man. Dr Blackst one, among others, has made use of that term in the following paffage: "If a man," he says, were to be in a state of nature, unconnect"ed with other individuals, there would be no occafion for any "other laws than the law of nature and the law of God; neither "could any other law poffibly exift." But he afterwards fubjoins: "Man was formed for fociety; and, as is demonstrated "by "by the writers on this fubject, is neither capable of living alone, PART II. The state of nature, then, according to this learned and judicious writer, is not the natural state of man, but a mere abstraction made for the fame purpose for which abstractions are commonly made in the pursuit of science; that we may have a distinct view of certain confiderations separately taken, before we proceed to view them as combined in the aggregate forms under which they are actually prefented in nature. Man, even in his physical state, exhibits a fum of many fimul-taneous circumstances, whether original and coeval with his being, or, what is nearly the fame thing, immediately confequent upon it. He has occupied fomething that is useful to him, and has a right of poffeffion; he has laboured to fome purpose, and has a right of property; he is a father or a child, the member of a family or fome larger fociety; and the fimpleft movement he can have made with his fellow creatures, may amount to conventi-on, or some adventitious modification of his original obligations and rights. So that we shall find no actual period of history in which we can apply the reasonings of this fection to the species> at large, or to any confiderable numbers of men. We may fuppofe two perfons, at the fame time, caft afhore on fome desert island, and fuch is perhaps the only poffible case in which our fuppofition can be realized; and our question at prefent with refpect to it is not, what would be mutual inclinaVOL. II. Comm. on the Laws of England. Introd. Sect. 2. tion: CHAP. IV.. CHAP. IV. PART II. tion of fuch perfons at their firft meeting, whether to co-operate as friends, or to encounter as enemies? This question is no doubt of confequence in forming our notion of man's destination, whether to peace or to war, to fociety or folitude: But that the decifion in fuch a cafe might apply to human nature in its fimpleft state; it might be neceffary to fet apart any previous effects of experience or habit, by which either of the parties feparately, or both, might be previously difpofed to act a part which nature would not have fuggefted to them prior to fuch experience or habit. It cannot be doubted, that in fo forlorn and difaftrous a state, each would rather meet with a friend than an enemy, and each would rather make a friend of the perfon he cafually met than an enemy. There is, however, reafon to believe, from the principle of caution with which human nature is endowed, even in childhood, and which experience may direct, but does not remove, that fuch perfons would approach one another with mutual circumfpection and caution, each rather with fear of what he himfelf might fuffer, than with any difpofition to annoy his fellow creature; and univerfally it may be affumed perhaps, that the earliest sensation of human nature, as Montefquieu has obferved, is rather a feeling of weakness and a need of support, than a feeling of strength or a difpofition to provoke animofity. But whatever may be the folution of this or any fuch physical queftion, our object at prefent is not to determine, what the parties in fuch a cafe might be inclined to do, but what each would have a right to do for his own prefervation and defence. We would state the decifions of the law of nature on a fuppofition of the fimpleft cafe, in which parties are vefted merely with their original rights and the means of defence with which they are ac 3 companied: CHAP. IV. SECT. II. companied: Our decifions, therefore, upon this fuppofition can PART II. be little more than a repetition of what has been already stated in the general enunciation of the law; whether refpecting the rights of which man is born in poffeffion, or which he is competent to acquire, and the general permiffion of means effectual, so far as they are necessary for the prefervtion of such rights. Together with the original appurtenances of human nature, life, limb, and faculty, we must likewife admit all those rights, which, even acting separately and unconnectedly, the individual may acquire for himself. We muft fuppofe him entitled to defend not only his organs and powers, but the fruits and effects of them alfo ; entitled to defend his poffeffion, as first occupier of any subject that accommodates him; or his property in a subject, as having employed labour to meliorate or to procure it: So that, together with his rights of original poffeffion, he is entitled alfo to defend his right, to make acquifitions by labour, convention, or otherwife. If, in the midst of rights fo defined, one party fhall commit an injury, or give just cause of alarm to another, this other is entitled to his defence and is not restrained in the choice of means, by any confideration befide the general provision of the law of nature already stated; a provifion which admits that effectual means may be used, but in which unneceffary acts of cruelty or severity, with respect to those against whom fuch means may be employed, are ftrictly prohibited. Upon the fuppofition of a difference fubfifting between parties otherwife ftrangers and unconnected, or what is called the ftate of nature, it is fometimes afked, who is to judge or to decide beween. L12 CHAP. IV. PART II. between parties in this state? This in effect is first to suppose, that parties having no convention are amenable to no jurisdiction inferior to the tribunal of God, and afterwards to enquire to what human jurisdiction such parties are subject. They may or may not submit to an arbiter at pleasure; and, though nature has limited the means of defence to those which are neceffary, the obfervance of this limitation, together with the exercise of every other right, would in fact depend on the discretion and candour of the parties themfelves; a cafe in which no provifion being made against the passions or mistakes of men, applications of the law of nature, however clear in theory, might be very lame and imperfect in practice; and fuch condition of parties, if ever realized, fhould be deplored as calamitous, or expofed to much inconvenience and evil. The inconvenience would fuggeft, for its remedy, recourfe to the judgement and arbitration of some third party, more impartial than either of the perfons more immediately concerned. The utility of fome permanent recourse of this fort, would naturally lead to political institution, and the establishment of ordinary jurisdiction and protecting power: So that, while we suppose men to be affociated from their birth, or otherwife caft into groups together, every difference or difpute would fuggest the neceffity or utility of political establishment. Society is the natural ftate of man, and political fociety is the natural result of his experience in that state of society to which he is born. This is not the experience of single perfons, or of fingle ages. It is an experience, which began with the commencement of every fociety, and can end only with its final extinction. Po litical |