CHAP. I. PART II. jealoufy, envy and malice. The operation of parties in these purfuits are mutual impediment and mutual offence; and the efforts of one to better himself is confidered as an act of hoftility, or carries the aspect and the infection of malice to others. Malice is known to be a state of extreme fuffering or pain; it operates abroad in pernicious effects, and appears on the countenance in peculiar features of deformity and horror. It has It has per-haps no other fource in the human mind, than this unhappy choice of an object, in which the profperity and fuccefs of one is disappointment and detriment to another. Or if this unhappy choice be fufficient to account for malice, we are forbidden by reafon to look for any other caufe. It is a maxim in reason, that no more causes are to be affigned, than exist in nature, and are fufficient to account for the phenomena *. We may therefore venture to affume, that malice is no where instinctive, but must have proceeded originally upon fome preconceived notion of competition, of harm to one from the welfare of another, of provocation or fear; and is therefore, for the most part, entertained in the form either of Envy, Revenge, or Jealousy. These are the great sources of mifery to mankind. Envy is pain inflicted by another's good. Revenge is pain to be removed or alleviated, only by another's fuffering. And Jealousy is pain fuffered under the apprehenfion of what another may do or may have done: All of them fufceptible of unequal degrees; but in the slightest degree unhappy, and in the highest degree constitu 2 ent * Vide Newtoni Principia, lib. 3. ab initio. CHAP. I. ent of extreme virulence and of anguish, to which the prefence PART II. and welfare of a fellow creature alone, may give occafion; and, from which a being, who is doomed to fociety, has no means of escape, but by removing the evil of his own disposition. Befides the propenfity of man to join the herd of his species, a difpofition, which operates even with the malevolent, and is common to all the gregarious animals; the candid have, in their minds, a principle of affection, and love; a capacity of goodness by which they are difpofed or qualified, in different forms, to make a common caufe with their fellow-creatures. The distress of another is to them an occafion of commiferation or pity; his welfare an occafion of complacency and joy. To the fociable nature of man, the joint exertions or ftruggles of numbers in the fame caufe together, bring into actual exertion, the highest powers of enjoyment as well as of action. Commiferation or pity, being a participation of diftrefs, implies fuffering, and yet is known to be agreeable; infomuch, that the humane do not wish to be relieved of their pain otherwife than by the relief they can give to those they commiferate or pity. They regret the suffering of others; but enjoy their own sympathetic emotions; willingly fhed the tears of compaffion, and in this feel, with the poet, that, The broadeft mirth unfeeling folly wears, Pity is prevented, in particular circumftances, by the preva lence of other paffions, whether indignation, refentment, or fear. Indignation hardens the heart against those who fuffer for any VOL. II. · flagrant C 、 CHAP. I. SECT. II. PART II. flagrant crime; refentment against those who have given provocation; and fear, though not a difpofition to act offenfively, yet hardens the heart against the feelings of candour or pity, more perhaps than any other paffion: Hence, among the evils of cowardice we may justly reckon cruelty to the vanquished, no less than inability to contend with those that refift, or who alarm our fears. Commiferation or pity, in the candid mind, is bestowed indifcriminately and univerfally on the innocent who fuffers: But benevolence, in its other forms, is particular in its choice, and implies predilection for an object; whether the companion with whom we are familiar, the friend we love, or the country to the fervice of which we are devoted. An agreeable intercourfe may have place, even with perfons unknown; or is eafily formed, amidst the first or most general appearances of intelligence and fairness of difpofition. The manners of the candid, even among strangers, constitute a mutual exchange of good offices, and in human life are an ordinary and continual fource of agreeable fentiments. In friendship, benevolence is the engagement of choice, and renders every interest mutual to the parties concerned. The affection in which it confifts, and the confidence it inspires, conftitute a principal source of security and pleasure. Over and above these operations of a benevolent affection, man is qualified to entertain the fame difpofition, in a form yet more comprehenfive. The collective body of men in a country or nation is, to its own members, an object of the most ardent affection. While SECT. II. While the citizen reveres the inftitutions and the laws of his coun- PART II. CHAP. I. try, while he rejoices in its profperity, and laments the calamity or distress which befals it, he is often made to forget himself, and to facrifice his own interest or safety as an individual, to that of the community in which he is included. Interest is frequently fuppofed to be the ruling paffion of mankind; yet this facrifice of interest and of life, to the objects of public affection, is frequently made; and, under national establishments that are happily constituted, is not above the reach of ordinary men. The general tendency of benevolence, like that of the animal propensities, is to preserve the human race, and to render man ufeful to his fellow creatures; but, while the selfish principles operate to the preservation of the whole, by preferving or confulting the fafety of individuals apart, benevolence forms a general band of connection, and is at once a common fource of enjoyment and pleasure to many. It renders the participation of other men, in the favours of providence, an occasion of satisfaction and joy. While it seems to render the humane a fervant to the distressed ; the affectionate devoted to the interest of his friend and his country; it renders this fervice, and this devotion alfo, a principal fource of enjoyment to himself: differing from the gratifications to which any mere animal propenfity is competent, in being exempt from fatiety, and in being fitted, by occupying indefinite portions of time, to fill up the duration of human life, and to become not only the fpring of particular and occafional action, but the fource and constituent of felicity to those who act. So much that, in the courfe of a fociable and beneficent life, and in the offices of private friendship, or of public ftation, a perfon may occupy with fatisfaction every moment that can be fpared from the neceffities of his own condition. But, PART. II. But, over and above the pleasurable or painful ftate of our feelings, which arise from the proper or improper discharge of our animal functions; from the purpose to which we employ our faculties, and the manner in which we are affected towards our fellow-creatures; thefe very circumftances become, by reflection, the fource of additional enjoyment or fuffering. Consciousness of propriety, in the conduct of our natural propensities; attainments of knowledge, or intellectual ability; integrity, candour, and good-will to our fellow-creatures, are fources of the purest satisfaction and pleasure. The consciousness of brutality, folly, cowardice, malice, or guilt, on the contrary, is constituent of extreme fuffering, in the feelings of shame, and remorse. It is fupremely agreeable to perceive, in the works of nature, the marks or expreffions of wisdom and goodness, on which we may rely for the happy disposal of all things: And we may conclude, from the whole of these particulars, that the preferable pleasures of human life confist in fobriety, benignity of temper, or good will to mankind, and beneficent actions, with a perfect confidence in the wisdom and goodness of Providence. The contemplation of beauty and excellence, in whatever fubject, is matter of delight, and forms an agreeable state of the mind. The obtrufion of uglinefs or defect is of a contrary nature: And thefe are fources of enjoyment and fuffering peculiar to man. He alone, among the living natures known to us, appears fenfible to the diftinctions of beauty and deformity, of excellence or defect; and he alone, for ought we know, apprehends any gradation of worth in the fcale of being. He alone applies the canons of excellence and defect, of merit and demerit, to himself, and to his fellow-creatures; finding a moft agreeable state of his mind in the |