PART II.

CHAP. II.

to fulfil that bond. So that, in making a free choice, the reality of a good forms the obligation, and the confequence to be SECT VIII• apprehended forms the fanction. Or, if a person should fay, that he is not obliged to chufe what is good, and may, if it so please him, prefer mifery to happiness, he may be told, that this is not the language of intelligence; nor can it be feriously held by any one who takes the words in their ordinary meaning.

To the question, therefore, that may arife in this place, Why any one should chufe to be virtuous rather than vicious? It may be answered; Because virtue is happiness, vice is misery; and in this contrast is implied at once all the good of which human nature is fufceptible, and all the evil to which it is exposed. In what, therefore, we may be asked, does integrity differ from what is fo loudly complained of under the notion of selfishness ? In nothing but in that which is of all others the most essential distinction, the wisdom of a choice which is made by the one, and the folly of the other. Those we call felfish endeavour to fupprefs the best and happiest fentiments of their nature, and become difaffected or indifferent to their fellow-creatures; while the virtuous have a common caufe with mankind; and, being fecure in the enjoyments of an affectionate temper, partake in the good which providence has difpenfed to the whole; and are ever happy in promoting the fame end to the utmost of their power.

Some writers on the fubject of morality, and lawyers for the most part, confider obligation as refulting from the command of a fuperior, and the fanction, or caufe of compliance, as refulting from the power of that fuperior to enforce his commands. They are used to confider laws that may be enforced; and in their notion

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PART II. notion of moral obligation, would recur to an authority that is fit to enforce the obfervance of moral duties.

CHAP. II.
SECT.VIII

But power employed to determine the will of a free agent must operate in presenting motives of choice; in presenting happiness as the reward of fidelity, and mifery as the punishment of neglect: And whether this be done by fo ordering the nature of things, that virtue fhall be its own reward, and vice its own punishment; or whether it be done by a fubfequent act of will and difcretion, in rewarding the good and punishing the wicked, in a way not previously connected with the part they have acted, the reality of the obligation, and the fanction is the fame: For if, in the nature of things, moral good be constituent of happiness, and moral evil of mifery, what can Almighty power do more to determine the choice of the one and the rejection of the other? If we conceive any fanction of moral law as different from this, it must however terminate in the fame effect. For what are the honours and rewards which men bestow upon virtue, or the chains and imprisonment which they award to the wicked? What is the heaven which religion decrees to the one, or the hell which is provided for the others? but happiness and mifery in other terms, or terms, if you will, in which every one is left to conceive what will operate moft on his own apprehenfions and feelings.

In the case of man, furely, it requires no great effort of understanding to perceive that wisdom, benevolence, temperance, and fortitude are happy qualities; that malice, folly, and cowardice are wretched.

And if it should be thought neceffary to confider moral law as the command of a fuperior, this may be done without departing

from

from that original doctrine of nature we have stated,-that moral PART II. good is the Specific excellence and felicity of human nature, and moral CHAP. II. depravity its Specific defect and wretchedness.

The Sovereign of the universe, by having made things as they are, has given his command, and promulgated his law in behalf of morality; and in every instance of conformity to his law, and in every infraction of it, continues to apply the fanction of happiness and mifery. Wisdom, benevolence, fortitude, and temperance, he has said shall be the conftituents of happiness ; folly, malice, cowardice, and debauchery fhall be the constituents of debasement and mifery. We may therefore chufe to treat of moral obligation as the tie of reafon, to prefer what is highly valuable in itself and eligible upon its own account; or we may treat of this obligation as the tie of reafon, binding the creature to obey his Creator, in making a choice, in fupport of which the Creator has exerted, and will continue to exert, his fovereign power.

In chufing what is morally good, it is happy to know that we obey our Creator; and in obeying our Creator, it is happy to know, that what he commands is the specific good, and felicity of our nature.

To separate these confiderations were doubtlefs of ill effect; and the fanctions of morality would be less powerful upon either principle apart, than they are upon the foundations of both united. Merely to obey, without a fenfe of goodness and rectitude in the command, would be greatly fhort of that duty which we owe to our beneficent Maker; and the love of virtue is no doubt greatly encouraged by the confideration, that Almighty power, in the established order of things, is exerted in its favour.

SECT VIII.

PART II.

CHAP. II.

In the genuine alliance of religion and morality, the wifdom SECT. VIII. and goodness, which we perceive to be the conftituents of happinefs, are likewife enjoined by the fovereign command of God. They are prefented to our thoughts, as attributes of the Supreme Being himself, and as forming in him the objects of reverence and of love; and our own capacity of attaining, in any degree, to a participation of these qualities is confidered as the highest perfection or prerogative of our nature.

To the ingenuous mind this conftitutes the obligation, and the fanction, whether of religion itself, or of moral duty. If we fhould be difpofed farther to enquire; by what fanction the profligate may be reclaimed from their profligacy, or by what means those who are difpofed to the commiffion of crimes may be actually restrained from disturbing the peace of fociety? the anfwer may be difficult.

Mankind from age to age have laboured upon this fubject; have urged the reafons of morality; have denounced the vengeance of God against iniquity; have held up the fword of justice, and threatened to exterminate the wicked; and all this, though no doubt with great effect, still without being able to reclaim the depraved from their vices, or to prevent the commiffion of crimes.

Happiness is misunderstood; religion is flighted, the movements of justice are flow, and defer the infliction of punishment, till after the wrong is committed.

Men have the concerns of animal life, as well as those of in

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telligent

CHAP. II. SECT. VIII.

telligent being, to care for; and, however evident the co-incidence PART II. of happiness and of duty, neither the degree of this evidence, nor that of any other fact, is at all times fufficient to guard the imagination against the admiffion of false apprehensions.

In the conceptions of ordinary men, there are advantages, whether of wealth or pleasure, which it is their interest or paffion to obtain: But there are means feemingly effectual to obtain these advantages, from which they conceive it their duty to refrain. They are tempted by the end; they are restrained by the law of morality, which forbids the means. While they continue to think in this manner, the obligation and the fanction of the moral law may, in their apprehenfion, be either the consciousness of what is right and wrong; the general esteem or contempt of mankind; the awe in which they stand of the fupreme Being; or the arm of the magistrate, which is lifted up to protect the innocent against the wrongs which they are difpofed to commit: So that, in this view of the matter, and as conceived by ordinary men, the fanctions of morality may be enumerated under the titles of conscience, public repute, compulsory law, and religion.

With respect to the first, it may be obferved, that perfons who diftinguish between their intereft, on the one hand, and their duty on the other, frequently conceive thefe objects to be in oppofition, and fit to distract their choice. They frequently feel the confideration of their interest more cogent than that of their duty, but still do not confound thefe confiderations together, nor lose the fenfe of moral obligation while they trespass on the maxims of moral law. In departing from their duty, they are ftill confcious of its reality, and affected with remorse and fhame: So that the fanction of confcience is entire, even when it is neglected.