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CHAP. II.

SECT. V.

PART II. that wherever the manners of our country are dangerous to its fafety or have a tendency to enfeeble or to corrupt the minds of men, to deprive the citizen of his rights; or the innocent of his fecurity; it is our duty to do what is for the good of our fellow creatures, even in oppofition to the fashion and custom of the times in which we live.

Some rites in religion, as well as obfervances in the ceremonial of life, are of a nature phyfically indifferent, and fit to be retained as mere arbitrary figns or expreffions of the affection, which religion or good manners require. But, as there is a merit in refifting practices extremely inconvenient, though required under the notion of good manners; fo there is wisdom in abstaining from acts of cruelty, though required under the notion of devotion or fanctity.

The human facrifice performed, or the cruel perfecutions that have been practiced under this notion, did not proceed, like the voluntary fufferings of the enthusiast, upon an idea, that it was good for himself to fuffer; but upon an idea, that the Deity who requires fuch victims is jealous, vindictive, and cruel ; or is to be gratified with the infliction of human misery: And such practices, therefore, are to be counteracted, not merely as a mistake of what is beneficial or falutary, but as a corruption of religion itself; and as a fubftitution of malice or cruelty, where the mind fhould be taught only to form to itself models of perfection and goodness, as incitements to veneration and love.

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SECTION VL

Of the fame Subject, continued.

PART II.
CHAP. II.

IT is obfervable that, in many things, whether useful or neceffary there is a certain meafure to be kept preferably to any SECT. VI. other whether greater or lefs. The lefs is defective, and inadequate to the occafion, the greater is exceffive and erroneous. The juft mean is learnt by experience; and, when known, is the proper object of choice.

It is not uncommon to confider virtue itself as a mean between two extremes towards either of which any deviation from the middle path is vice. Thus liberality is confidered as a mean betwixt prodigality and avarice; bravery as a mean betwixt temerity and cowardice; temperance as a mean betwixt hurtful abstinence and pernicious excess.

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PART II.
CHAP. II.
SECT. VI.

Eft modus in rebus, funt certi denique fines,
Quos ultra citraque nequit confiftere rectum *.

This method is adopted in one of the most elegant and mafterly productions of antiquity, on the fubject of ethics or manners ; and there is no doubt, that propriety of conduct may be rendered perceptible and evident, not only when single actions are feparately defcribed, but alfo when placed in contraft with any deviation from what is right, whether on the side of defect or excess.

Such illustrations, however, if ufeful in treating of the external effects of virtue, may rather ferve to mislead, in confidering the excellency or depravity of mind, from which those effects proceed.

Wisdom and goodness are abfolute, not relative, fubjects of efteem. There may be a defect of either, but no excels. In the defects of intelligence, there is folly; but, in the highest measure of which it is fufceptible, there is no blameable extreme of wifdom. There is no extreme of justice; nor in the mind, be the quality of whatever denomination, is there any extreme of what is right.

In practice, indeed, beneficent intention may produce too much or too little effect. The proper medium or mean, betwixt the extremes, to be found by obfervation or experience, is itself.

* Horace.

† Ariftotle's Ethics.

CHAP. II. SECT. VI.

tfelf derived from a previous knowledge of what is right; and PART II. is not by any means to be confidered as an original standard of choice, even in matters of external convenience..

Mediocrity is certainly, not always upon its own account, an object of estimation. In matters, rather ornamental than neceffary to human life, it is the reverse of a commendation. In matters of genius, for inftance, whether poetry, eloquence, politics, or war, it is better not to have any pretenfions, than to have a mediocrity, which is likely to engage the perfon poffeffed of it in a course, of which he is not likely to attain the end. It is better to follow tamely in the track of others, than to affect the command, or the display of abilities, which mislead or disgust the more, that they substitute a mediocrity of effect, where an exertion of the highest degree is required.

Wherever the mean betwixt two extremes is the preferable object of choice, it feems to be fixed by its comparative utility, not by any original perception of merit, in mediocrity itself, confidered apart from its ufe. In the extreme of too little, there is a defect of utility; in the extreme of too much the excess is pernicious: And the falutary, or most useful measure, is that which determines the middle way to be chofen between the extremes: So that we are to look for the rule, by which this mean is to be diftinguished, and the very confideration which recommends it in the circumstance of its abfolute utility, or fitness to serve the purpose of nature.

If the ill effect of extremes fuggeft the expedience of recurring to the proper mean in every inftance of human conduct, fome apprehenfion of the proper measure or end of action is neceffary

to

PART II. CHAP. II. SECT. VI

to point out the evil of extremes, which confist in a deviation from the middle path towards either fide, of excess, or of defect. And, if the confideration of extremes ferves to illuftrate the mean betwixt them, it is evident that the knowledge of that mean is required to point out the boundaries beyond which all that exceeds, or falls fhort, is in extreme, and pernicious.

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