PART II.
CHAP. II.

SECT. IV.

m

This ufe of external action, as a fign for the purpose of mere expreffion, is not confined to obfervances in their own nature altogether indifferent: Men freely incur phyfical inconvenience for the fake of fuppofed moral good; and actions, in their phyfical tendency actually pernicious or useful, are often more confidered in refpect to the meaning and intention of those who perform them, than in refpect to the actual benefit or harm, which they are fuppofed to produce. A kind intention, made known in any trivial matter, operates more powerfully on the affections, than gifts of the greatest moment, bestowed in a manner lefs gracious, or lefs expreffive of kindness.

Injuries are not always meafured by the actual harm which is done, nor malicious intention inferred in the highest degree, from the nature of the weapon with which a perfon is affaulted. A gentleman in modern Europe, as we have formerly obferved, is more offended with the stroke or threat of a stick, than with the wound of a fword.

These are no more than instances of the power of opinion, and habits of thinking, by which things, in their own nature agreeable or difagreeable, are affociated in the fame conception with feelings and qualities of the mind with which they have not any neceffary or original connection.

From the whole of thefe obfervations, then, we may conclude, that, without any variation in the ideas of excellence and defect, men may vary in their judgement of external actions. A different perfon, or the fame perfon in different circumstances, may act differently, and in this there is nothing to unfettle the judge

ment

CHAP. II. SECT. IV.

ment of moral right and wrong. Different opinions relating to PART II. external effects, whether fuppofed beneficial or hurtful, may lead men, with the fame candid or malicious intention, to act and to judge very differently. Any action, that is confidered merely or chiefly as an expreffion of will or meaning, may be differently understood in the form of different countries; and in none of thefe inftances is there implied any difference of apprehenfion relating to the intimate nature of moral good and evil. The first may be termed a difference of the cafe; the fecond a difference of opinion; and the third a difference of interpretation.

What is obferved of a difference in the laws of different countries, or in the terms of a different language, will be equally found not to affect the original or the effential distinction of moral right and wrong.

We are not to expect, that the laws of any country are to be framed as fo many leffons of morality, to instruct the citizen how he may act the part of a virtuous man. Laws, whether civil or political, are expedients of policy to adjust the pretenfions of parties, and to fecure the peace of fociety. The expedient is accommodated to special circumftances, and calculated to reprefs the specific diforders peculiarly incident to particular fituations.

The higher duties of morality, beneficence, and fortitude can feldom if ever be made the fubject of law. The vileft of moral depravities, envy, and malice, can only be reftrained from a few of their overt or moft flagrant effects. The law muft be contented to restrain such open and flagrant disorders; and, where the people are prone to any particular species of irregularity, the law may be VOL. II.

T

fpecially

gi

CHAP. II.
SECT. IV.

PART II. fpecially directed to reform it, or even with
nish, the first approach to fuch irregularities,
proaches as a greater crime than even the perp
evils, to which the people are less disposed, an
public therefore has lefs to apprehend.

In fome of the smaller states of Italy, where
quarrels so often prevailed, it was made capital
fhed a fingle drop of blood in the streets. Wh
mitted on the revenue are more frequent, an

prehended than private robberies, the law naturally directs its
feverity to the quarter from which the public interest is most
deeply annoyed. And its enactments are to be confidered, not
as instructions of morality, but as the convention of parties par-
ticularly fituated, and mutually engaged to fupport the cause of
a community, depending on circumstances peculiar to their own
fituation.

If the law, in this manner is to be confidered as a local expedient provided for the welfare and peace of communities; the language of the people, we may believe, is not always calculated to exprefs the mere abstract distinctions of right and wrong; but to difcriminate virtue and vice under fuch diverfities of external form, as they most frequently take in particular circumstances, and under specific systems of manners. Fortitude is made to express not mere strength of mind in the abstract; but has a reference, at the fame time, to the particular and more ordinary form in which there is occafion to exercife this virtue; whether in heroic patience or military valour. Goodness is not employed to exprefs benevolence in the abstract, but has a reference to the form in which there is the most frequent occafion to practife beneficence,

3

whether

DATE: 1792,

▷ VERIFIED: zap-nrlf-b1413.p7 v.1 1

:PATRON:

FORM 0805 PRINTED & THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U.S.A.

CHAP. II.
SECT. IV.

PART II. fpecially directed to reform it, or even with greater severity punish, the first approach to fuch irregularities, and treat fuch approaches as a greater crime than even the perpetration of greater evils, to which the people are less disposed, and from which the public therefore has less to apprehend.

In fome of the smaller states of Italy, where family feuds and quarrels fo often prevailed, it was made capital, we are told, to fhed a single drop of blood in the streets. Where frauds committed on the revenue are more frequent, and more to be apprehended than private robberies, the law naturally directs its feverity to the quarter from which the public interest is most deeply annoyed. And its enactments are to be confidered, not as inftructions of morality, but as the convention of parties particularly fituated, and mutually engaged to support the cause of a community, depending on circumstances peculiar to their own fituation.

If the law, in this manner is to be confidered as a local expedient provided for the welfare and peace of communities; the language of the people, we may believe, is not always calculated to exprefs the mere abstract distinctions of right and wrong; but to difcriminate virtue and vice under fuch diverfities of external form, as they most frequently take in particular circumstances, and under specific fyftems of manners. Fortitude is made to exprefs not mere ftrength of mind in the abstract; but has a reference, at the same time, to the particular and more ordinary form in which there is occafion to exercise this virtue; whether in heroic patience or military valour. Goodness is not employed to exprefs benevolence in the abstract, but has a reference to the form in which there is the most frequent occafion to practife beneficence,

3

whether