on different notions of what is beneficial or hurtful. In the o- PART II. ther they exprefs or interpret their intentions differently. In fome countries honour is affociated with fuffering, and it is reckoned a favour to kill, rather with circumstances of torture than otherwife. This is confirmed in our account of the manners of fome American nations; and in the fortitude with which an Indian matron fubmits to extreme fuffering by fire on the funeral pile of her deceased husband. She courts the flames, with a zeal and enthusiasm more ardent than that with which the reforts to the bridal bed, or fhould mount, the throne of state in a terreftrial kingdom. Whatever conceptions mankind may have formed of external objects and circumftances, as matters of defire or averfion, it is natural for the benevolent to do what he himself and the world around him conceive as a benefit, and to avoid doing to others what they, or he himself, conceives as harm or an infult: And as it is a maxim in law " Volenti non fit injuria"; fo it is naturally apprehended, under a variety of opinions respecting external objects, that it is beneficent to treat every perfon in the manner which he himself conceives to be beneficial or kind. The fafety and the justice of this maxim, respecting matters of a certain confequence to the welfare of mankind, may no doubt be queftioned; and errors of choice, where they do not proceed from malice may be imputed to folly; but the rule that every one is to be ferved or obliged in his own way, ought not to be questioned respecting matters of indifference, or of small moment. These are variously employed by nations, as the figns or expreffions of good or ill disposition; in the fame manner as, in the use of language, words, CHAP. I. PART II. words, or articulate founds, are adopted as the signs or expreffions of meaning, intention, or will. CHAP. II. SECT. VI. Of this fort, no doubt, is much of the form and ceremonial of common life. It is the form of refpect in Europe to uncover the head: In Japan, we are told, the corresponding form is to drop the flipper, or to uncover the foot. The physical action in these inftances is different, but the moral action is the fame. It is an act of attention and refpect; difpofitions equally acceptable, whether expreffed in words, geftures, or figns of any other fort. Perfons, unacquainted with any language but their own, are apt to think the words they use. natural and fixt expreffions of things; while the words of a different language they confider as mere jargon, or the refult of caprice. In the fame manner, forms of behaviour, different from their own, appear offensive and irrational, or a perverse substitution of abfurd for reasonable man ners. To the ignorant or to the proud, who confider their own cuf toms as a standard for mankind, every deviation from that standard is confidered, not as the ufe of a different language and form of expreffion, but as a defect of reason, and a deviation from propriety and correctness of manners. Among the varieties of this fort we find actions, geftures, and forms of expreffion, in their own nature indifferent, entered into the code of civil or religious duties, and enforced under the ftrongest fanctions of public cenfure or esteem, or under the strongest denunciations of divine indignation or favour. I Numberless SECT. IV. Numberlefs ceremonies and obfervances are adopted in the ri- PART II. tual of different fects, for the fame reason that words are adopted in the vocabulary of different languages, though with a different effect on the minds of ordinary men. In religion, the rite is fuppofed to be prefcribed by the fame authority to which the forms of devotion are addreffed. The neglect of it is fuppofed to conftitute offence before that tribunal whose condemnation is fatal. The fubftitution of any other rite is fuppofed to be profane, or an unpardonable infult to the object of worship. Under thefe apprehenfions, arbitrary figns of devotion are fuppofed effential to religion; and deviations from the established practice, or any variation in the use of fuch figns, is purfued with that vengeance which the zealot thinks neceffary to recommend him to God. In many examples of this fort; as in the ufe of different languages, the people have not a different meaning, but merely a difference of the founds in which their meaning is expreffed; fo in the rites of devotion or worship, they admit a variety, not of the fentiment but of the external performance, which they employ as a fign or expreffion. And if in the different forms and ceremonies, which they practife, in their own nature indifferent or innocent, they equally mean to acknowledge and to adore the intelligent power and moral government of God; the zeal with which they condemn and perfecute one another, on account of fuch difference of forms and ceremonies, is no way more rational, than it would be to fofter national animofity on the fcore of a different language or accent of fpeech. PART II. This ufe of external action, as a fign for the purpose of mere expreffion, is not confined to obfervances in their own nature. altogether indifferent: Men freely incur phyfical inconvenience for the fake of fuppofed moral good; and actions, in their phyfical tendency actually pernicious or useful, are often more confidered in refpect to the meaning and intention of those who perform them, than in respect to the actual benefit or harm, which they are fuppofed to produce. A kind intention, made known in any trivial matter, operates more powerfully on the affections, than gifts of the greatest moment, bestowed in a manner less gracious, or lefs expreffive of kindness. Injuries are not always measured by the actual harm which is done, nor malicious intention inferred in the highest degree, from the nature of the weapon with which a perfon is affaulted. A gentleman in modern Europe, as we have formerly observed, is more offended with the stroke or threat of a stick, than with the wound of a fword. These are no more than instances of the power of opinion, and habits of thinking, by which things, in their own nature agreeable or disagreeable, are associated in the fame conception with feelings and qualities of the mind with which they have not any neceffary or original connection. From the whole of thefe obfervations, then, we may conclude, that, without any variation in the ideas of excellence and defect, men may vary in their judgement of external actions. A different perfon, or the fame perfon in different circumstances, may act differently, and in this there is nothing to unfettle the judge ment ment of moral right and wrong. Different opinions relating to PART II. external effects, whether fuppofed beneficial or hurtful, may lead CHAP. II. SECT. IV. men, with the fame candid or malicious intention, to act and to judge very differently. Any action, that is confidered merely or chiefly as an expreffion of will or meaning, may be differently understood in the form of different countries; and in none of these instances is there implied any difference of apprehenfion relating to the intimate nature of moral good and evil. The first may be termed a difference of the cafe; the fecond a difference of opinion; and the third a difference of interpretation. What is obferved of a difference in the laws of different countries, or in the terms of a different language, will be equally found not to affect the original or the effential diftinction of moral right and wrong. We are not to expect, that the laws of any country are to be framed as fo many leffons of morality, to inftruct the citizen how he may act the part of a virtuous man. Laws, whether civil or political, are expedients of policy to adjust the pretenfions of parties, and to fecure the peace of fociety. The expedient is accommodated to special circumstances, and calculated to reprefs the specific diforders peculiarly incident to particular fituations. The higher duties of morality, beneficence, and fortitude can feldom if ever be made the fubject of law. The vileft of moral depravities, envy, and malice, can only be reftrained from a few of their overt or most flagrant effects. The law muft be contented to restrain fuch open and flagrant diforders; and, where the people are prone to any particular fpecies of irregularity, the law may be VOL. II. fpecially T |