PART II. CHAP. II. Sceptics, accordingly, in order to repel the evidence of reality in matters of moral distinction, refer to the contradictory notions of mankind, on the subject of manners. "Mankind," they obferve," blame in one perfon, and in one "cafe, what they applaud in another. Thus, to deceive or to "kill is in one instance condemned, in another is applauded or permitted. What is held forth as a subject of praise in one age or country, is overlooked or neglected in another. What, in one age or nation, is permitted as allowable or innocent, in an"other is reprobated and abhorred, under fome denomination "of impiety, incest, or blafphemy 66 * "Certain forms of behaviour, forms of expreffion or gefture, are in one country, or amongst one set of men, required to good manners, or received with complacency; whilst they are "confidered as an unpardonable injury or infult in other na"tions, or in other companies. "In one nation, we are told, it is reckoned an act of filial piety "for a fon to kill his fuperannuated parent; in other countries, this, though we fhould fuppofe it to be done with confent of the perfon fuffering, would be detefted as a most horrid instance "of murder and parricide. "The definitions of crimes vary in the laws of different coun"tries: Infomuch, that what is deftined to fevere punishment in * Profana illic omnia, quæ apud nos facra; rurfum conceffa apud illos, quæ nobis incefta. Tacitus de Judæis, Hift. lib. v. c. 4. one country, is suffered, in another, to escape with impunity, even "without cenfure. Thus, theft, which was punished at Athens, was encouraged in Sparta. 、 "All men are loud in commendations of virtue; but obferve "their applications of this term, how different in the detail of particulars? Among the antient Romans it meant valour alone. Among the Jews it meant zeal for their own institutions, "and animofity to the reft of mankind. Among housewives it means œconomy and notable industry. In Italy it means a "tafte for antiquities, and curiofities of nature or art." From the whole of these instances it is proposed to infer, that there is not any certain rule of approbation or difapprobation refpecting the manners or behaviour of men. And notwithstanding the effential felicity and merit of wisdom and goodness as qualities of intelligent being, it must be allowed to follow from such varieties of apprehenfion, refpecting the morality of external action, that the distinction of right and wrong cannot be taken from the mere physical action itself, or that mere external movements of the body have not the fame power to command our moral feelings, as they have to command our perception of their form and phyfical effect. When the fhutters of a window are opened, and the light is admitted, every object in the room is illuminated; vifion is dif tinct to all who have organs of fight, and the perceptions of magnitude, figure, and colour are the fame to every one prefent. When certain tremors are produced in the air, every ear is ftruck with the fenfation of found; and however one perfon may differ from another in his conjectures refpecting its cause, or even refpecting VOL. II. S PART II. CHAP. II. PART II. fpecting the musical effect, the tone produced is the fame to every one by whom it is heard. CHAP. II. The fame thing may be faid with relation to the form and confequence of any action or movement of the body. All who are prefent perceive the fame phyfical operation, and the fame continuance or change of condition in the subject affected by fuch operation. A life may be taken away or preferved in their fight, and there is no difference of perception refpecting the phyfical cause or the physical confequence. May we not prefume, therefore, that if moral right and wrong were equally a part in the form of an action, as is the phyfical defcription of it, the perceptions of men in this refpect alfo would be equally uniform. The contrary, however, is observed to be true. The fame physical action in one inftance is applauded as a virtue, in another inftance is reprobated as a crime; or rather, to speak with more propriety, where the physical action is the fame, the moral action is altogether different; and is an object of approbation or difapprobation, correfponding to that difference of the moral quality. For an example, in which the physical action may, in repeated inftances, continue the fame, while the moral action is extremely different; we may suppose the death of a man, effected with a fword, in the manner in which executions in fome countries are performed; in which affaffinations are committed; and battles are fought. In all these instances the physical action may be precifely the fame, and every spectator have the same perception of it; but the moral action may be, and frequently is, extremely different. To CHAP. II. To devife the death of a man is criminal in the robber, who, PART II. to ftrip the traveller of his property, attacks him on the high SECT. IV. way. It is criminal in the affaffin, who, from jealoufy, revenge or malice prepenfe in any other form, lays a fnare for the life of his neighbour. But in a perfon who defends himself, in a judge who has condemned a criminal, or in the officer who conducts the execution of a juft fentence, the fame physical action may be innocent; may be the difcharge of a duty, or an act of public juftice. In a foldier, who, at the hazard of his own life, kills the enemy of his country, of his country, the material effect produced is precifely the fame, with that which is criminal in the affaffin or in the robber. But the moral action in these instances is extremely different: In the first it is efteemed as of the highest merit, in the others it is condemned as of the most atrocious guilt. Under this feeming difference of judgement refpecting the fame action, there is actually no more difference refpecting the moral apprehenfion than there is refpecting the physical effect. While every one perceives that a man is killed, every one perceives alfo that the affaffin or the robber did wrong in killing him; that the foldier acting in defence of his country, or the officer of juf tice in execution of a legal fentence, did right. In the affaffin or robber this physical act was an act of malice or rapacity; in the judge, magistrate, or foldier, it was an act of public justice or heroic valour: And mankind, we may repeat, are as little at variance with refpect to the moral quality of the action in either cafe, as they are with refpect to the mere form or description of the physical operation. We are familiar with this distinction between the phyfical and PART II. CHAP. II. the moral action, under a variation of circumftances which diverfify the cafe: And though the difference of judgement is more ftriking in fuch inftances than it is, in any other; yet no one thinks himself authorifed from thence to question the reality of moral distinctions. There are indeed no fpecimens of moral good and evil more striking than those which are presented by the fame phyfical action, performed by different persons and in different circumstances; from the motives of benevolence and duty, on the one hand, or of malice and depravity on the other. Every one is aware of the different judgements to be given where the cafes are different; and to give the variety of judgement an appearance of contradiction in the estimate of moral good and evil, we must have recourse to examples lefs familiar and in which we are less qualified to distinguish the moral from the physical qualities of an action. We are at a loss, for instance, when we are told, that what is punished as a crime in one country is rewarded or commended as a duty in another; because we are not qualified to perceive in what manner the moral action, under a different set of manners from our own, fhould be differently underflood, or in what manner the fame moral action fhould refult from phyfical performances extremely different. This defect, however, may be easily fupplied, if we confider, first of all, that men have different opinions refpecting external objects, and in one country value that as an honour or a benefit, which in another is rejected as pernicious, or as an infult': Farther, that many of the actions of men are confidered more as expreffions of what they mean or intend, than as operations materially beneficial or hurtful. In the first instance, men proceed up |