SECT. III.

prefented on this globe; in the infinite number of different PART II. productions, with which its furface is covered or peopled, the CHAP. II. "animals," he obferves, " occupy the first or the highest rank, "whether by their resemblance to us, or by the fuperiority "which we perceive in them, to the vegetable or inanimate natures. The animals, by their make and by their sensitive and moving powers, have many more relations to the subjects a"round, than the vegetables have. Thefe, in their turn, by the " unfolding of their parts; by their figure, their organization, " and growth, have many more relations than the minerals, or any mere lifelefs mafs of matter. And it is by virtue of this greater number of relations, that the animal is fuperior to the

vegetable; and the vegetable is superior the mineral. Even we "ourselves, confidered in respect to the material part of our "frame, are not otherwife fuperior to the animals, than by a "few relations more, fuch as accrue to us from the use of the "hand and the tongue; and, though all the works of God are "in themselves equally perfect, yet, in our way of conceiving "them, the animal is most compleat; and man the master-piece " of all."

This is, perhaps, the first attempt that ever was made to give a reason why animals are reckoned of a higher order than plants, and thefe of a higher order than minerals or unorganized matter of any fort. And though no one difputes this order of things, yet this attempt to explain it will scarcely appear fatisfactory. Many

will

vegetal au deffus du mineral. Nous meme, a ne confiderer que la partie materielle de notre etre, nous ne fommes audeffus des animaux que par quelques rapports de plus, tels que ceux que nous donnent la langue et la main; et quoique les ouvrages du Createur font en eux-memes tous egalement parfaits, l' animal est, selon notre façon d' apercevoir, l'ouvrage le plus complet de la nature, e l'homme en eft le chef d'ouvre.

PART II.
CHAP. II.
SECT. III.

will be ready to afk, why eftimation fhould keep pace with the number of relations, which a fubject bears to other parts of the world around. One relation, compleatly and beneficently adjusted, may be preferable to many. And, if a beneficent purpose can be obtained by one relation, however fimple, the multiplication must appear rather a defect than a beauty. It appears, indeed, that where a number and variety of expedients or relations are wanting to obtain a purpose, the difpofition and ability to combine fuch a variety to one common beneficent end, is a great perfection in the power by whom fuch arrangement is made. When man has formed to himself any number of relations to the fubjects around him, fuch as he bears to the field he has cultivated, the city he has built, the work of any kind he has performed, the law or institution he has adopted; in fuch relations, indeed, the fuperiority of his own nature appears: But, in what his Maker has done for him, or for the other animals; in what is done for plants and minerals, it is the majesty of God that we revere ; and the relations of things merely inanimate ferve only as the fteps, by which we are led to contemplate the wisdom and goodness of the firft caufe.

In this fenfe, we already obferved, beauty and excellence are afcribed to material fubjects. And the inequality of rank which appears fo real in the fyftem of things, is a mere gradation of the luftre or effect, with which intelligence, or its principal features of goodnefs and wifdom, are made to appear in the different orders of being. The eloquent naturalift, cited above, feems to drop his arithmetic of relations, when he confiders the pre-eminence of intelligent forms: in the system of nature. For he applies it only to the material part of man; and, in reality, mere number of relations could ill account for the fuperiority of any nature whatever; as the relation between any

CHAP. II.

two species of being must be mutual, and in point of number at PART II. least the same; for fo many relations as man has to the fyftem SECT. III. of nature around him fo many precisely must the fyftem of nature have to him. But no one ever queftioned the pre-eminence of intelligent being; ever required an account to be given of it; or defired to know by what faculty it is perceived. Dimenfions are measured by some standard quantity of the fame dimenfion; length, by fome standard measure of length; and folid content, by fome standard measure of folid dimenfion; and why not intelligence, alfo, by fome standard conception of intelligent nature. The degrees to be estimated consist in variable measures of wisdom and goodness; and whoever has an idea of thefe, will judge accordingly of the fpecimens that approach to the standard, or of the defects that come short of it.

Some who have carried the analogy of animal fenfe and perception into this fubject, have started a question, whether moral excellence be not a fecondary quality; that is, like the perception of smell, sound, or taste, if it may not proceed from a cause in nature very different from that we conceive? But in the esteem of wifdom and goodness, there is not any danger that the quality we conceive is different from the quality that exifts, as our conception of found is different from a tremor in the particles. of air: for it is the very existing thing itself of which we have a conception, taken indeed from feeble, occafional, and paffing specimens, but easily abstracted by us from their defects and imperfections, to ferve as a standard of eftimation for what we propofe as the model of excellence, wherever our judgement applies or wherever a choice is to be made.

If

* Vide Lord Kames' Moral Effays.

PART II.
CHAP. II.

If we are asked, therefore, what is the principle of moral apSECT. III, probation in the human mind, we may anfwer, It is the Idea of perfection or excellence, which the intelligent and affociated being forms to himfelf; and to which he refers in every fentiment of esteem or contempt, and in every expreffion of commendation or cenfure.

Nay, but mankind are not agreed on this fubject; they differ no less in what they admire, than in what they enjoy. The idea of pefection no doubt may be affociated with fubjects divefted of merit: But notwithstanding the effect of fuch affociation in warping the judgement, virtue is approved as the specific perfection or excellence of man's nature; and as no one ever inquired why perfection should be esteemed; it is difficult to conceive why they fhould look for any other account of moral approbation than this.

From the predilections of birth and fortune, few, if any, are altogether blind to the distinctions of wisdom and folly, of benevolence and malice, of fobriety and debauchery, of courage and cowardice. And if thefe characters of mind could be perceived without the intervention of external figns; the difference of judgement on the fubjects of moral good and evil would, in a great measure difsappear; or there would not be fo much diversity of opinion as we obferve amongst men, concerning the forms or defcription of virtue. But the external actions which may refult from any given disposition of mind being different in different inftances, may occafion a difference of judgement, or a variety of custom and manners; and fuggeft the neceffity of a principle or standard of eftimation, on which their rate of merit or demerit may be fafely established. We accordingly proceed to the confideration of thefe particulars.

3

SECTION

SECTION IV.

Of the Difficulty of reconciling the different Judgements of Men relating to the Morality of External Actions.

WHEN the reality of any moral distinction is questioned, PART II.

we naturally refer to the general sense of mankind on the fubject. CHAP. I. To give this evidence, however, its full effect, in supporting the SECT.IV. reality in question, it is supposed, that mankind ought to be unanimous in their verdict, and agree, not only in admitting, that there is a distinction, but agree also in the description of fubjects, or in the choice of particulars, to be ranged under the oppofite predicaments of moral good and moral evil.

If men, it may be alleged, have a difpofition to felect objects of commmendation and cenfure, and yet are not agreed in their choice, we must suppose their difference of judgement to arife, not from a want of disposition in them to find out the truth, but from the want of a fufficient difference in the nature of things to lead or to establish their judgement.

Sceptics