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النشر الإلكتروني

CHA P. II.

OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF MORALITY, ITS IMMEDI-
ATE APPLICATIONS AND SANCTIONS.

SECTION I

Of the Law, or first Principle of Eftimation in the Character of
Man.

By feparately examining the nature of good and evil, under the PART II. titles of pleasure and pain, of beauty and deformity, of excellence and CHAP. II. defect, virtue and vice, of happiness and mifery; we have endea- SECT. I. voured to arrive at fome general conception of what is best for

mankind.

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Thefe

PART II.
CHAP. II.
SECT. I.

These articles we have found to differ chiefly in words, but in matter and substance to be nearly the fame. The fame qualities of wisdom, goodness, temperance, and fortitude, which conftitute the excellence of human nature, are conftituents alfo of its beauty and its happiness. The oppofite qualities of folly, malice, debauchery, and cowardice, which conftitute its defect, conftitute alfo its deformity, or turpitude, and its mifery.

The different appellations in question have a reference to different afpects, under which the fubject may be confidered. Beauty and deformity have a reference to the qualities of good and evil, in refpect to their first appearances or afpect. Excellence and defect, virtue and vice, have a reference to their reality in the character. Happiness and mifery have a reference to the ftate of enjoyment or fuffering, which they conftitute in the mind.

If we should endeavour to concentrate this defcription, or reduce this enumeration of qualities, to fome one general principle the most likely to unite the whole, we fhould be limited in our choice, probably, to one or other of the qualities first mentioned, in the estimate of characters; that is, either to wisdom, or goodness.

The other two qualities, whether of temperance or fortitude, confidered apart, are lefs likely to fecure the whole. Temperance, confidered as mere abftinence from improper gratifications, without any pofitive direction of the mind to a better purpofe; or confidered as restraint from evil, without the formation of a difpofition pofitively good, would constitute a very imperfect model of excellence or felicity.

3

Fortitude,

any

Fortitude, confidered as a mere force of mind, without fpecification of a choice or direction, in which that force fhould be employed, might be exerted equally for a wrong as for a right purpose; and courage, prompted by folly might be employed for the deftruction of its owner, like the brutal strength of that wrestler *; who could tear open the cleft of a tree, but who could fuffer himself at the fame time, to be caught in it.

The term equivalent to wisdom, among the antients, was employed by them to comprehend every article of praise, and enabled them alfo to comprise the laws of morality in the fingle recommendation of this quality. In our tranflation of that term, however, the fenfe is more limited; and, were we to state wifdom as the fundamental principle of morality, we fhould be thought to fubstitute a prudential choice of our interests for what ought to be matter of affection, and the effufion of a benevolent heart. Mere prudence is an excellence of the understanding only; but virtue includes, as a preferable confideration, the energy and direction of an amiable and happy difpofition.

It is well known that, to fecure a proper choice of conduct, on all occafions, good affection or difpofition is not lefs necefsary, than able judgement: Nay, we may be convinced, from experience, that perfons of common understanding, with fit dispofitions, are lefs apt to err on trying occafions, than the ablest understanding unfupported by any goodness of heart; or than mere understanding, warped as we may fuppofe it to be in the defect of good difpofitions, by motives of a different tendency.

If

PART II.

CHAP. II. SECT. 1.

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* Milo of Crotona.

PART II.
CHAP. II.
SECT. I.

If we are, therefore, to contract our defcription of happiness, or reduce it to a point, around which the most valuable qualities of human nature are likely to be collected, we may venture to felect that of goodnefs, or benevolence, as the most likely to ferve our purpofe; and, by way of principal or fundamental law of moral wifdom, may affume, that the greatest good incident to human nature is the love of mankind.

The different forms or afpects of this difpofition, as it may be exercifed in pity to the diftreffed, or in candour and humanity indifcriminately towards all men ; as it may be exercised in the mutual confidence of friends, or in the love of a citizen to his country, have been already stated; and although, in this place, its defignation in the mind of a man be taken from his relation to mankind, a title under which are comprehended objects the most intimate to him, and the leaft likely to be mistaken by him; yet, the difpofition fo characterised is in reality a susceptibility of just affection towards every object, whether of pity, respect, or veneration; whether the lowest or the highest that can enter the thoughts of a well difpofed and a happy mind.

The love of mankind, on every arduous occafion is an aid to the judgement, in directing the conduct which a wife man is destined. to hold: In difficult fituations, it is a noble fupport of courage. Even the timorous become bold under the inftigation of a warm or generous affection; the humane, by habits of benevolence, are fecured against the effect of difpofitions comparatively inferior or mean; and ordinary men, when roused to feelings of generosity or pity, remain insensible to the allurements of inferior pleafure, or the fufferings of pain.

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